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Abstract
Our mental words are populated with concepts — rich representations of knowledge about things in the
world (e.g., diamonds, pumpkins). In language, words are used to refer to these concepts (e.g., “diamond”,
“pumpkin”) and to communicate with others. This is quite impressive given that a word does not activate
the same information each time it is used: conceptual information is flexibly activated based on the
context. For example, the phrases “raw diamond”, “baseball diamond”, and “diamond eyes” evoke
different kinds of diamond information. This flexible concept use is not only exemplified in creative
language, but in creative thought and natural language more generally. The goal of this thesis was to
leverage methods in cognitive neuroscience, network science, and computational modeling to explore the
kinds of conceptual structure that can support this flexible concept use. In the first study (Chapter 2) I
capture the global structure of concepts in novel feature-based networks, and show that aspects of this
network structure relate to text-based and empirical measures of flexible concept use. I subsequently
narrow in on the local representations of conceptual features that relate to flexible concept use by
observing what happens when concepts combine. In one fMRI study (Chapter 3) I show that feature
uncertainty predicts the extent to which features (e.g., green, salty) are flexibly modulated in the brain
during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations (e.g., “green pumpkin”, “salty cookie”). In follow-up
studies (Chapter 4) I further reveal the relationship between feature uncertainty and flexible feature
activations in combined concepts. In combinations that modify conceptual brightness (e.g., “dark
diamond”, “light night”), an explicit behavioral measure of conceptual feature modulation is predicted by
feature uncertainty as well as by a related predictive combinatorial Bayesian model. An associated fMRI
study reveals that flexible feature modulation and feature uncertainty relate to responses in left inferior
frontal gyrus (LIFG) and left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), suggesting roles for these regions in flexible
concept activation. Taken together, this work reveals relationships between conceptual structure and
flexible concept use in behavior and in the brain.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Psychology

First Advisor
Sharon Thompson-Schill

Keywords
conceptual combination, conceptual knowledge, fMRI, language, network science, semantic memory

Subject Categories
Cognitive Psychology | Neuroscience and Neurobiology | Psychology

This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3414

RELATING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE WITH FLEXIBLE CONCEPT USE
Sarah Solomon
A DISSERTATION
in
Psychology
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2019

Supervisor of Dissertation

Graduate Group Chairperson

Dr. Sharon Thompson-Schill

Dr. Sara Jaffee

Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Psychology

Professor of Psychology

Dissertation Committee:
Sharon Thompson-Schill, Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Psychology
Russell Epstein, Professor of Psychology
Lyle Ungar, Professor of Computer and Information Science

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people, animals, and places supported me while I completed the work in
this dissertation and I would like to extend my gratitude to all of them. I first want
to thank my advisor, Dr. Sharon Thompson-Schill, for the many years of
mentorship. I benefited immensely from your analytical and creative insights,
which gave me new ways to think about and solve problems. Thank you for
letting me pursue my risky or offbeat ideas — some of which are now contained
in this thesis. I am also appreciative of your culinary mentorship which introduced
me to foods that I may not have tried otherwise.
My research output and research experience would not be what it is without the
contribution of past and current members of the Thompson-Schill lab. The fresh
ideas, constructive criticism, and professional and personal companionship you
all provided was immensely valuable. Thank you to everyone who put up with me
popping up at your desks unexpectedly to discuss the scientific or non-scientific
crisis du jour.
I am also thankful for the larger communities at Penn that have supported me at
various points and in various ways. I learned a lot from seminars and workshops
hosted by the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Institute for Research in
Cognitive Science, Computational Neuroscience Initiative, MindCORE, the NSF
IGERT Traineeship in Complex Scene Perception, and the Psychology and
Neuroscience departments. Thank you to individual faculty — especially
committee members Dr. Russell Epstein and Dr. Lyle Ungar — for your valuable
insights and feedback. And a big thank you to the fellow graduate students in the
Psychology department who made this experience what it was (#gradschool).
I am also grateful for all of the Philadelphia cafés, restaurants, and bars in which
I completed much of this work. Thank you for the space, the coffee, the delicious
snacks, and the wine.
Thank you to Samantha (i.e., Sammies, Samsies, Sammers) the cat — you were
with me for all of the highs and all of the lows. You are the cutest thing in the
world.
And of course, thank you to my family for your ever-flowing support.

ii

ABSTRACT
RELATING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE WITH FLEXIBLE CONCEPT USE
Sarah Solomon
Sharon Thompson-Schill

Our mental words are populated with concepts — rich representations of
knowledge about things in the world (e.g., diamonds, pumpkins). In language,
words are used to refer to these concepts (e.g., “diamond”, “pumpkin”) and to
communicate with others. This is quite impressive given that a word does not
activate the same information each time it is used: conceptual information is
flexibly activated based on the context. For example, the phrases “raw diamond”,
“baseball diamond”, and “diamond eyes” evoke different kinds of diamond
information. This flexible concept use is not only exemplified in creative language,
but in creative thought and natural language more generally. The goal of this thesis
was to leverage methods in cognitive neuroscience, network science, and
computational modeling to explore the kinds of conceptual structure that can
support this flexible concept use. In the first study (Chapter 2) I capture the global
structure of concepts in novel feature-based networks, and show that aspects of
this network structure relate to text-based and empirical measures of flexible
concept use. I subsequently narrow in on the local representations of conceptual
features that relate to flexible concept use by observing what happens when
concepts combine. In one fMRI study (Chapter 3) I show that feature uncertainty
predicts the extent to which features (e.g., green, salty) are flexibly modulated in
the brain during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations (e.g., “green
pumpkin”, “salty cookie”). In follow-up studies (Chapter 4) I further reveal the
relationship between feature uncertainty and flexible feature activations in
combined concepts. In combinations that modify conceptual brightness (e.g., “dark
diamond”, “light night”), an explicit behavioral measure of conceptual feature
modulation is predicted by feature uncertainty as well as by a related predictive
combinatorial Bayesian model. An associated fMRI study reveals that flexible
feature modulation and feature uncertainty relate to responses in left inferior frontal
gyrus (LIFG) and left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), suggesting roles for these
regions in flexible concept activation. Taken together, this work reveals
relationships between conceptual structure and flexible concept use in behavior
and in the brain.
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1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Concepts are the currency of meaning. We rely on concepts — such as green,
sharp, diamond, and shadow — to understand the world around us and to
communicate this information to others using language. Our ability to
successfully use this conceptual currency to support both linguistic and
nonlinguistic aspects of cognition is remarkable when one considers the flexibility
of conceptual meaning across contexts. The information evoked by diamond
varies across the phrases raw diamond, baseball diamond, and diamond eyes.
Despite this flexibility, the conceptual system is not in a hopeless state of
anarchy: conceptual structure provides constraints on the cognitive system such
that we are able to settle on an appropriate meaning in each case.
The challenge is to characterize the kinds of conceptual structure that enable this
flexibility to emerge: this structure can be analyzed from cognitive, neural, and
computational perspectives. The cognitive structure of conceptual knowledge
refers to the way in which semantic knowledge is organized and represented,
and the kinds of cognitive processing that these structures enable. Around the
time Tulving (1972) coined the term “semantic memory”, different theories of
semantic structure emerged, including network-based (Collins & Quillian, 1969;
Collins & Loftus, 1975) and feature-based theories (Smith et al., 1974; Rosch,
1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Whereas classic network-based theories represent
semantic knowledge as a web of interconnected concepts, feature-based
theories represent individual concepts in terms of their corresponding features.
These feature-based theories are “compositional”, a characteristic of conceptual
structure that is important for theories of conceptual flexibility. The neural
structure of conceptual knowledge refers to how conceptual information is
embedded and organized within the brain; neural theories of conceptual structure
rely on empirical data from neurological patients and neuroimaging studies to
localize specific kinds of semantic information to different anatomical regions or
functional networks. Finally, computational approaches can help validate these
cognitive and neural theories and can even inform theories of conceptual
structure (Love, 2015).
The general goal of this thesis is to relate theories of conceptual structure with
flexible concept use. As illustrated in the diamond example, the information
evoked by a concept or word varies across contexts. These contexts can be
linguistic in nature (e.g., complex phrases, conceptual combination, figurative
language) or non-linguistic (e.g., generating novel uses for a common object). In
Chapter 2, I model individual concepts (e.g., cookie, knife) as distinct featurebased networks and explore whether aspects of this network structure relate to
1

linguistic and non-linguistic forms of flexible concept use (e.g., figurative
language, novel uses). In Chapters 3 and 4, I use conceptual combination (e.g.,
sharp diamond, dirty baseball) as a tool to study flexible behavioral and neural
responses to concepts in different verbal contexts.
In the empirical work reported here, I use a compositional, feature-based
conceptual structure to explain aspects of conceptual flexibility. I will thus begin
with a review of compositionality in cognitive, neural, and computational theories
of conceptual knowledge (1.1), followed by a review of conceptual flexibility (1.2)
and how previous models have attempted to capture this flexibility (1.3). I will
then specifically review cognitive, neural, and computational models of
conceptual combination (1.4) before summarizing the empirical work contained in
this thesis (1.5).

1.1 Conceptual compositionality
Compositionality is a principle that states that the meaning of one structure
depends on the meaning of its constituent elements and the ways in which those
elements are combined. In the domain of conceptual knowledge, compositionality
suggests that the meaning of a concept emerges as a function of its properties
(or “features”) and their associations. This is a central component of all featurebased theories, in which concepts are considered to be distributed
representations over featural information spanning multiple types of knowledge.
Conceptual compositionality has been implemented in cognitive, neural, and
computational architectures. Some theories incorporate an additional component
which integrates feature-specific information into a transmodal, or amodal,
representation. These components are commonly referred to as “convergence
zones”, “hubs”, and “hidden layers” in cognitive, neural, and computational
models, respectively. I will first review the compositional neural perspectives of
conceptual knowledge. I will then discuss compositional cognitive theories of
conceptual organization and the computational models used to implement them.
1.1.1 Neural models
From a cognitive neuroscience perspective, feature-based (i.e., compositional)
models are neurally plausible. This is suggested by many studies revealing how
the brain processes distinct features of the environment. In visual neuroscience,
distinct neural regions or processes have been associated with specific visual
features such as orientation (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Haynes & Rees, 2005),
shape (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001), and color (Martin et
al., 1995; Beauchamp et al., 1999). Outside of the visual modality, researchers
have explored the neural organization or locations of other properties such as
real-world size (Konkle & Oliva, 2012), texture (Lederman et al., 2001; CavinaPratesi et al., 2010), and manipulation (Boronat et al., 2005; Buxbaum et al.,
2

2006), among others. Having a grasp on how and where these features are
processed in the brain allows us to probe the activation of these features during
conceptual processing. For example, Coutanche & Thompson-Schill (2014)
found that the appropriate activation of color features (i.e. GREEN, ORANGE) and
shape features (i.e., ROUND, ELONGATED) predicted the success of object concept
classification (e.g., LIME, CARROT).
The compositional assumption has met success in predicting concept-evoked
brain activity. In vector-space models, each concept is defined as a vector in
multidimensional space based on its rate of co-occurrence with other words in
language. Distributed neural activation relating to concrete objects (e.g., CELERY,
AIRPLANE) can be predicted by the extent to which those concepts co-occur with
a set of feature concepts (e.g., TASTE, FLY) in a large text corpus (Mitchell et al.,
2008). This concept-evoked neural activity can also be predicted by objectproperty associations found in feature-norms data (Chang et al., 2011).
Neuroimaging evidence thus suggests that concepts can be decomposed into
features, the activation of which appears to contribute to the informational
content of the concept as a whole (Mitchell et al., 2008; Chang et al., 2011;
Coutanche & Thompson-Schill, 2014).
The convergence zone framework of Damasio (1989) provides another featurebased neural model of conceptual processing. In this view, conceptual content
depends on the activation of feature fragments in posterior sensorimotor cortices
(e.g., visual cortex, auditory cortex), coordinated by convergence-divergence
zones (CDZs) in more anterior regions (Meyer & Damasio, 2009). These CDZs
act as repositories for combinatorial codes that coordinate appropriate activity in
posterior modality-specific regions of the brain: the meaning of a concept resides
in the synchronized co-activation of feature fragments and CDZs, with the feature
fragments corresponding to modality-specific features of objects (e.g., color,
texture, sound). This model is compositional and distributed, and links conceptual
content to a neural architecture. Though in its original form it is computationally
under-specified, CDZs are sometimes incorporated into connectionist-style
models in the form of a hidden layer (see McNorgan et al., 2011).
Patterns of semantic deficits in neurological patients have provided extremely
informative data regarding the ways in which conceptual information is organized
in the brain. Some patients with brain damage exhibit category-specific deficits in
which knowledge in only one semantic domain is affected. The most common
pattern of deficits is that knowledge of living things is selectively degraded,
whereas knowledge of artifacts is spared, though the reverse is also possible (for
a review, see Tyler & Moss, 2001). An early explanation for these findings was
that the conceptual system is organized into distinct stores of sensory and
functional properties (Warrington & Shallice, 1984), and that damage to these
3

stores results in deficits that appear category specific. Caramazza & Shelton
(1998) claimed that this organization does not explain the more complex patterns
of semantic deficits, and hypothesized that domains of knowledge themselves
(e.g., animals, artifacts, food) are the first-order organizing principle. Further
claiming that this segregated organization does not adequately account for the
patterns of patient deficits and observed neuroimaging results, Tyler and
colleagues (Tyler et al., 2000; Tyler & Moss, 2001) proposed a framework in
which many features (perceptual, functional encyclopedic) are distributed
throughout a unitary conceptual system. Cree & McRae (2003) conducted a
detailed analysis of the relationship between feature distributions and semantic
deficits, revealing the factors (e.g., feature distinctiveness, concept familiarity)
that can explain how deficits that appear category-specific can emerge from a
distributed conceptual system based on modality-specific features. These
approaches harken back to earlier feature-based conceptual theories (e.g. Smith
et al., 1974).
1.1.2 Cognitive models
After Tulving (1972) coined the term “semantic memory,” the field was dominated
by “semantic network” models for quite some time. These models included
hierarchical network theory (Collins & Quillian, 1969) and the spreading
activation theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975); both represent individual basic-level
concepts (e.g., PENGUIN, PARROT) as distinct units in memory, connected to each
other within a larger semantic network. The hierarchical network model (Collins &
Quillian, 1969) includes higher-level category nodes (e.g., BIRD, ANIMAL) and uses
these to encode superordinate relationships (e.g., PENGUIN is a BIRD) in an
explicitly hierarchical system. The spreading activation model (Collins & Loftus,
1975) represents both concepts and features as distinct units, and connections
between them are based on strength of their relationship. In this framework,
concepts are represented as stand-alone units rather than sets of features.
The relationship between concepts and their features has been a point of
contention. Research on judgments of category membership and exemplar
typicality suggest that boundaries between concepts are fuzzy rather than clearcut (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978), and exhibit a graded structure (Mervis &
Rosch, 1981). However, the classical network models cannot account for these
findings. Representing category membership in terms of propositions (e.g., by
linking exemplars to superordinate categories via “isa” links) rather than sets of
features cannot provide a satisfying explanation for graded category structure.
Similarly, feature-based models in which concepts are represented as sets of
necessary and sufficient features would suggest well-defined, rather than fuzzy,
category boundaries (see Smith et al., 1974). Instead, the continuous variation in
degree of category membership is best explained by a conceptual organization in
which concepts are composed of characteristic, but not defining, features
4

(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). That is, some properties may be more central
to the concept, or more reliably associated with the concept, than others.
A fully compositional, feature-based approach emerged in the “conceptual
structure” framework (Tyler & Moss, 2001). In this account, many kinds of
features are distributed throughout a single conceptual system. The properties in
this model can be perceptual (e.g., BLUE, HAS-WINGS), functional (e.g., EATS,
CUTS), encyclopedic (e.g., LIVES IN ANTARCTICA), and category label (e.g., IS A
VEHICLE). Concepts (e.g., PENGUIN, CAR) are represented as vectors indicating
the presence or absence of these features, and semantic domains differ in terms
of how these features are statistically distributed across its members. This is a
compositional and distributed theory of concepts, in that conceptual meaning
emerges from the distributed pattern of properties spanning multiple kinds of
knowledge.
In particular, the conceptual structure account emphasizes property
distinctiveness and property correlations in characterizing the unique structures
of distinct domains. Property correlations refer to the extent to which certain
properties co-occur across exemplars within a domain: for example, the
properties HAS-WINGS and FLIES tend to co-occur with each other within the
domain of living things. Property distinctiveness refers to cue validity: highly
distinctive properties are only present in a small number of concepts, making
these properties useful cues for establishing concept identity. For example, HASTENTACLES is a distinctive property since it only applies to a handful of concepts
(e.g. OCTOPUS, SQUID), whereas HAS-WINGS is far less distinctive. This cognitive
architecture makes certain predictions about human performance on behavioral
tasks, which can be tested against human performance (Randall et al., 2004).
Importantly, the correlational structure used to characterize semantic domains
(e.g., ARTIFACTS) might also be used to characterize the structure of individual
concepts within those domains (e.g., KNIFE), as I explore in Chapter 2.
Additionally, one of the benefits of a compositional conceptual theory is the ability
to define property-level measures, such as distinctiveness, that relate to
conceptual processing. Chapters 3 and 4 examine a property-level measure of
uncertainty and explore whether it influences how combined concepts are
processed.
The “feature-correlation” account of conceptual knowledge, proposed by McRae
and colleagues, is similar to the conceptual structure account but differs in a few
important ways. First, they argue that conceptual features are processed in
modality-specific regions, as opposed to within a unitary conceptual system: this
has implications for how features are integrated to compose concepts (see
McNorgan et al, 2011). Second, instead of making assumptions regarding
features and their distributional statistics across domains, they empirically
5

derived these statistics using concept-feature norming data (McRae et al., 1997;
McRae et al., 2004). These data enabled the discovery of feature correlations
across a large set of basic-level concepts, and the exploration of how these
statistics influenced human behavior on semantic tasks (McRae et al., 1997;
1999; Cree et al., 1999, 2006). Third, they implemented their cognitive
architecture using a type of connectionist model called an “attractor network”: this
pairing of cognitive and computational architectures resulted in additional claims
regarding how word meaning is computed and provided a rich computational
framework within which to explore and test their theory. Behavioral results and
model simulations suggest that feature co-occurrence statistics across basiclevel concepts contribute to conceptual structure and can explain human
judgments of conceptual similarity (Cree et al., 1999; Tyler et al., 2000), typicality
(Cree et al., 1999), and property-verification (McRae et al., 1997; 1999). Cree et
al. (1999) also pit their theory against classical network models, and provide
evidence that their feature-based, non-hierarchical model better explains human
performance in semantic tasks. In Chapter 2, I also empirically derive feature
statistics across concepts and analyze these structures using a computational
approach — however, instead of characterizing the structure of domains of
conceptual knowledge using a connectionist architecture, I characterize the
structure of individual concepts using the mathematical tools of network science.
1.1.3 Computational models
Whereas cognitive theories of conceptual knowledge are concerned with the
types of representations and processes that characterize the conceptual system,
the goal of computational models is to define a particular problem and
characterize the relevant input-output relationships (see Love, 2015). For
example, models can be used to simulate semantic priming tasks: in this case
the input would be the concepts and/or properties, and the output would
correspond to reaction time or accuracy. For researchers studying semantic
memory, connectionist models are the most popular computational framework.
These models can naturally capture a compositional conceptual structure and
have been implemented in a variety of forms.
Connectionist models became popular in psychology and cognitive science with
the proposal of parallel distributed processing (PDP) models (Rumelhart et al.,
1986). The PDP model is an artificial neural network in which simultaneous
participation of multiple units, and the propagation of information through their
weighted connections, gives rise to semantic cognition (for a review see
McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Units and links can represent various kind of
information — in original PDP models, units represent item-labels (e.g.,
“canary”), relations (e.g., HAS, IS-A), and features (e.g., WINGS, YELLOW); links
represent the strength of association between units. By training these models on
item-labels, relations, and a vector of features, the model adjusts the weights
6

between units such that representations for each item are developed during a
gradual learning process. The fact that some input units represent features
suggests a certain degree of compositionality. However, this information is
transformed in a hidden layer, which McClelland & Rogers (2003) refers to as the
“representational layer” of the network; it is within this layer that semantic
representations emerge, along with a similarity space that corresponds to the
similarity of their real-world referents. Random damage to this hidden layer
results in model performance that mirrors semantic deficits that appear categoryspecific (Tyler et al., 2000). As noted above, computational architectures
sometimes have theoretical implications: hidden layers in connectionist networks
are often interpreted to reflect a level of representation that is more abstract than
that of the input layer. Whereas Damasio’s model (Damasio, 1989; Meyer &
Damasio, 2009) posits that semantic content comprises activation across
sensorimotor cortices (representing features) and convergence zones, certain
interpretations of the PDP model posit that semantic content emerges in the
separate “representational layer”, in which units can no longer be interpreted to
represent individual features. There are many versions of this model, however. A
recent connectionist model of semantic cognition (Hoffman et al., 2018) includes
sets of units that represent sensorimotor features in addition to sets of units that
represent verbal inputs and their co-occurrence statistics: separate “hub” and
“context” layers integrate this information in order to capture conceptual
representations that are influenced by both feature statistics and word cooccurrence statistics. Note that this model deviates theoretically from purely
compositional models in which semantic knowledge is captured by direct links
between feature representations. Semantic models which represent meaning in
terms of word co-occurrence or association statistics will be discussed in more
detail below (see section 1.4).
As mentioned above, McRae and colleagues (McRae et al., 1999; Cree et al.,
1999, 2006) implemented their feature-correlation theory using a class of
connectionist architectures called attractor networks. Attractor networks differ
from standard PDP models because they cannot be considered hierarchical:
feature-feature correlations are explicitly encoded in weights between feature
units, without the addition of a hidden layer (c.f. Cree et al., 1999). These models
capitalize on feature associations within semantic memory in order to learn the
feature-based representation of individual concepts. More specifically, attractor
networks carve a multidimensional feature space into regions corresponding to
individual concepts (i.e., attractor basins); the stable state within each of these
attractor basins is the learned representation for each concept. Thus, the
attractor networks of McRae and colleagues can be considered more purely
compositional than the standard PDP models of semantic memory.
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In this section I discussed how compositional theories of conceptual knowledge
have been implemented in cognitive, neural, and computational frameworks. I will
now summarize the evidence for conceptual flexibility, before discussing how this
flexibility has been modeled in compositional and non-compositional systems.

1.2 Conceptual flexibility
Intuitively, it makes sense that concepts are flexible. Any given concept, whether
domain-level (e.g., LIVING THINGS), superordinate-level (e.g., BIRD), or basic-level
(e.g., PENGUIN), can be activated and represented in a variety of ways. Living
things can be four-legged or winged, birds can be vibrantly colored or
monochrome, penguins can be fuzzy newborns or fully feathered adults.
Theories typically adopt a “static” view of concepts, in which conceptual
information is stable across instances. But this framework makes it hard to model
the conceptual shifts over long and short time-scales that occur during contextdependent concept activation and learning (Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016). Flexibility of meaning is also a challenge in the
language domain, and is called enriched lexical processing, type-shifting, or
coercion (e.g., Pustejovsky, 1998; McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al., 2005).
General knowledge of a concept can generate many specific conceptual
subtypes (e.g., birds can be penguins, pelicans, and ostriches), and can also
generate specific exemplars that are bound in space and time (e.g., this
particular penguin). Conceptual flexibility is more apparent when we consider the
flexible feature fluctuations of a single exemplar in different contexts. For
example, while looking for grapes in a supermarket, visual features may be
strongly active (e.g., GREEN, ROUND), whereas a cooking context might activate a
different set of features (e.g., SWEET, JUICY). The information activated for a
concept can also depend on event context: thinking about an egg before and
after you crack it to make an omelet results in very distinct representations.
Finally, a striking form of conceptual flexibility is the use of non-literal language,
when a concept is used to refer to a non-typical referent. The concept BUTTERFLY
typically refers to an insect but can also be used to refer to a non-insect (e.g.,
“The ballerina is a butterfly”) with a different set of features. These forms of
flexibility need not be categorically distinct, but making these distinctions helps us
map out the conceptual terrain. I will summarize the evidence for propertyflexibility, state-flexibility, and referent-flexibility and then will discuss ways in
which conceptual models have or have not accounted for this flexibility.
1.2.1 Property flexibility
The crux of conceptual flexibility is that the features activated for a given concept
will not be identical across instances: context determines the informational
content of a concept. Early cognitive accounts made the distinction between
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“context-dependent” and “context-independent” properties. Barsalou (1982)
claimed that context-independent properties form the core of a concept and are
always active when a concept is processed; context-dependent properties are
only activated some of the time. Barsalou (1982) found that participants were
always able to verify highly accessible properties (e.g., HAS A SMELL for SKUNK),
but were only able to verify less-accessible properties (e.g., CAN BE WALKED UPON
for ROOF) when a relevant context was provided (e.g., “The roof creaked under
the weight of the repairman”). This work suggested that word-evoked information
is not stable across instances but is context-dependent. Casasanto & Lupyan
(2015) have taken this further and argued that there is no such thing as a stable
conceptual core, and all semantic information is context-dependent. In Chapter 2,
this idea of a conceptual “core” will be translated into a network science
framework.
More recently, Yee et al. (2012) found that an object’s conceptual color (e.g.
GREEN for CUCUMBER) only influenced subjects’ living/non-living judgments if they
had previously performed a Stroop color-word interference task, which
established color as a relevant feature. This is evidence that task-context
influences the extent to which conceptual color information is spontaneously
activated. In a neuroimaging study, Hsu et al. (2011) observed increased neural
response in left fusiform gyrus (a region sensitive to conceptual color) when
participants had to use more detailed color knowledge (e.g., comparing the
colors of BUTTER vs. EGG YOLK) relative to when only basic color knowledge was
required (e.g., comparing PAPRIKA vs. PENCIL). Taken together, these behavioral
and neuroimaging results suggest that the cognitive and neural activation of
conceptual features varies across task-contexts.
Eye-tracking studies also provide evidence for flexible conceptual
representations. Using a visual world paradigm, Kalénine et al. (2012) revealed
that providing an event context modulated the activation of context-relevant
functional features. For example, the target WHISK competed with BLENDER in the
context of “mixing ingredients,” but competed with SPATULA in the context of
“cooking.” This suggests that the blending- and cooking-contexts resulted in
different sets of functional properties activated to represent WHISK. The different
contexts did not influence competition with thematically related objects (e.g.,
EGGS). This is further evidence that conceptual features are differentially
activated in different contexts.
1.2.2 State flexibility
Some concepts can occur in multiple states, each corresponding to its own
distinct set of conceptual properties. Whereas the cases of flexibility above relate
to the context-dependent activation of features that are not mutually exclusive
(e.g., the same whisk can be used to blend batter and to whip cream), state9

flexibility relates to mutually exclusive sets of features activated by real or
imagined event-contexts. For example, the concept EGG can be instantiated as
whole or cracked — these two states imply differences in shape, color, and
texture properties. A particular egg, bound in space and time, can either be
whole or cracked, but not both. Processing multiple states of a conceptual
exemplar as it changes in time thus involves differentiating the states’ associated
features and keeping the mutually exclusive states of the token distinct.
Neuroimaging research on object-state change suggests that regions of visual
cortex are recruited to represent distinct states of an object (Hindy et al., 2015),
and that left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is implicated in selecting between
competing state representations (Hindy et al., 2012, 2013; Solomon et al., 2015).
Tracking a conceptual exemplar as it changes through time recruits neural
regions that represent changing conceptual features, as well as regions involved
in semantic control that help shift between these representations. Additional
neuroimaging research suggests that learned associations between actions and
object-states become incorporated into a multistate object representation (Hindy
& Turk-Browne, 2015), highlighting the relationship between state-flexibility and
conceptual knowledge.
1.2.3 Referent flexibility
When concepts are used creatively — as in figurative language — a concept can
acquire novel or atypical referents. Unlike in the cases of property- and stateflexibility above, referent-flexibility results in representations that do not refer to
clear instantiations of the concept. This kind of non-literal language is very
common and includes standard figurative forms such as similes and metaphors
(e.g., Her eyes are diamonds), and also combined concepts like the ones
introduced above (e.g., diamond eyes). This flexible use of concepts has also
been explained within compositional frameworks.
Lakoff (1973) proposed that metaphorical meaning involves the highlighting of
characteristic — rather than defining — conceptual features. Behavioral research
reveals that processing a metaphor (e.g., “The ballerina is a butterfly”) involves
the activation of relevant properties (e.g., BEAUTIFUL, DELICATE) and/or the
suppression of irrelevant properties (e.g., FLIES, HAS ANTENNAE; Gernsbacher et
al., 2001; Glucksberg et al., 2001; Solomon & Thompson-Schill, 2017). A related
neuroimaging study reveals that prefrontal control mechanisms are recruited to
select between these conceptual properties (Solomon & Thompson-Schill, 2017).
Successful comprehension of figurative meaning can be understood as a flexible
adjustment of conceptual information; theories of conceptual structure must be
able to account for this flexible concept use. In Chapter 2, the relationship
between a feature-based network structure and figurative language use is
explored.
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The challenges discussed here are not unique to figurative language. For
example, polysemous concepts — for which there are multiple distinct yet related
meanings — might also be considered an example of referential-flexibility. For
example, BOOK can refer to a bound stack of papers or to the associated
informational content; CHICKEN can refer to a live animal or to a menu item.
Another example is provided by Anderson & Ortony (1975), in which it is argued
that the CONTAINER used to hold apples (e.g., basket) is much different than the
CONTAINER used to hold soda (e.g., bottle): the conceptual system might need to
navigate through the CONTAINER concept in order to understand what is meant by
“container” in each of these contexts. In this sense, polysemy exposes the extent
to which conceptual information must be flexibly activated during comprehension
(see Hoffman et al., 2018). This flexible activation of conceptual meaning is
arguably not restricted to polysemous and figurative language, but pervasive in
natural language use.
Conceptual combination is very similar to figurative language in that it involves
the flexible selection and integration of conceptual features across concepts
(Wisniewski, 1997; Estes & Gernsbacher, 2000; Coutanche et al., 2019).
Chapters 3 and 4 use conceptual combination as a tool to study how conceptual
features are flexibly modulated in language. After a discussion of previous
models of conceptual flexibility, Section 1.4 will be devoted to a review of
conceptual combination and how it relates to flexible concept use.

1.3 Previous models of conceptual flexibility
Do existing cognitive, neural, and computational models of conceptual
knowledge incorporate conceptual flexibility? The classical network-based
models (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins & Loftus, 1975) cannot model withinconcept flexibility, because concepts are represented as distinct, atomic units1. In
general, it is hard for atomic (i.e., non-compositional) theories to model flexibility,
because it is not clear what information can be manipulated to engender
conceptual change (c.f., Carston, 2010). Classical feature-based, compositional
theories do not address flexibility per se, but there are feature-based theories of
conceptual combination as I will explain in more detail below (Smith et al., 1988).
The conceptual structure account (e.g., Tyler & Moss, 2001) and feature
correlation account (e.g., McRae et al., 1997) represent concepts as static,
distributed patterns of activity across semantic features, though the need to
capture conceptual variation is addressed (O’Connor et al., 2009).

1
The spreading activation model of Collins & Loftus (1975) might be able to capture
flexible activation patterns across the semantic system as a whole, but this is not the kind
of flexibility under discussion.
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Attractor networks like the ones used by McRae and colleagues have been used
to capture aspects of conceptual flexibility. For example, O’Connor et al. (2009)
trained an attractor network to learn both basic-level concepts (e.g., HAMMER) and
superordinate concepts (e.g., TOOL) in a non-hierarchical feature space. The
basic-level concepts were trained in a one-to-one mapping of wordform to
exemplar (e.g., “hammer” paired with a vector of HAMMER features). The
superordinate concepts were trained in a one-to-many mapping, in which a
wordform was paired with different feature vectors on different trials (e.g., “tool”
separately paired with HAMMER, WRENCH, and SCREWDRIVER features). As a
result, the model could capture variability in the representation of superordinate
concepts. In another study, Rodd et al. (2004) trained an attractor network on
homonyms (e.g. “bank”) and polysemes (e.g. “twist”). After training, it was
observed that the attractor basins for homonyms are non-overlapping, whereas
attractor basins for polysemes overlap to form wider attractor basins in feature
space. This prior work suggests ways in which flexible conceptual meaning can
be embedded within computational models.
A cognitive theory that can capture conceptual flexibility is Barsalou’s (1999)
perceptual symbols system (PSS) theory. In this framework, the set of modalityspecific features activated during perception of a particular item is reactivated
during conceptual processing. Perceptual symbols (e.g., YELLOW, SWEET) that are
activated during perception are integrated to form a “simulator” for each concept
(e.g., BANANA). These simulators can activate subsets of perceptual symbols in
order to generate a potentially innumerable number of context-specific
“simulations” (Barsalou et al., 2003). The organization of conceptual information
within the PSS model can provide an explanation of how some kinds of
conceptual flexibility emerge, such as token variability, polysemy, and
metaphorical language. However, this theory is not computationally wellspecified.
A neural theory that can capture conceptual flexibility is the “hub-and-spoke”
model in cognitive neuroscience. Proponents of this model claim that
representing conceptual knowledge involves “hubs” in bilateral anterior temporal
cortex that integrate information from modality-specific neural regions (the
“spokes”). The controlled semantic cognition framework updates the hub-andspoke view, such that semantic representation and control are mediated through
different networks; the ATL hub is involved in representing generalizable
conceptual knowledge, and separate regions represent task contexts (Ralph et
al., 2017). These ideas were further developed into a connectionist model of
semantic cognition that directly accounts for conceptual flexibility (Hoffman et al.,
2018). In this model, a hub-and-spoke architecture (Rogers et al., 2004) is
enriched with a “buffer” that incorporates prior context. The architecture includes
two hidden layers: a “hub” layer integrates information from sensorimotor and
12

verbal input units, and a “context” layer captures the hub activation patterns
elicited by the previous input. The fully recurrent architecture enables the model
to generate context-sensitive representations and is thus able to capture the
multiple meanings of homonyms as well as the context-dependent graded shifts
of word meanings that occur in natural language use. The neural and
computational models inspired by a hub-and-spoke architecture are intriguing
and are valuable additions to research on conceptual flexibility. However, the
inclusion of word co-occurrence statistics and amodal semantic hubs result in
representations that are transformed away from conceptual features.
Related approaches in “distributional semantics” are popular in cognitive and
computational models of language use — these models capturing the meaning of
words in terms of their co-occurrence or association statistics. In this class of
models, a semantic space is defined based on word statistics extracted from
large text corpora (see Mitchell & Lapata, 2010). Researchers using models of
distributional semantics have attempted to predict the meaning of combined
concepts. These experiments will be summarized below in the discussion of
conceptual combination.

1.4 Conceptual combination
Theories of conceptual knowledge and flexibility can be illuminated by studies of
conceptual combination. When concepts combine with each other, we can
observe flexibility of properties, event-states, and referents — as in green
pumpkin, cracked egg, and diamond eyes, respectively. Conceptual combination
involves processes of feature selection and feature integration, in which
conceptual information is flexibly modulated to result in an appropriate
representation of the combined concept.
Early cognitive theories of conceptual combination include the attribute
inheritance model (Hampton, 1987; 1988), the selective-modification model
(Smith et al., 1988), and the concept specialization account (Murphy, 1988;
Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991). In Hampton’s attribute inheritance model, each
concept is represented as a prototype comprising a list of independent features
weighted by importance. Comprehending combined concepts involves
constructing a composite prototype of the constituents by merging their feature
lists, and then adjusting this composite list to satisfy various constraints (e.g.
necessity, impossibility, coherence). The predictions of this model were
consistent with the features explicitly generated in a conceptual combination task
(Hampton, 1987). However, a limitation of this model is that it only applies to
conjunctive noun-noun combinations of the form “An X that is also a Y” (e.g., “A
pet that is also a bird.”) A satisfying theory of conceptual combination will be able
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to explain non-conjunctive noun-noun (e.g., apartment dog) and adjective-noun
(e.g., small dog) combinations.
The selective-modification model (Smith et al., 1988) directly targets the feature
modulations observed in adjective-noun combinations. Concepts are represented
as sets of slots (e.g., COLOR) and their fillers (e.g., RED, GREEN). Each filler refers
to a potential feature and has a salience value that indicates its strength for that
concept (e.g., RED has higher salience than BROWN for APPLE). In adjective-noun
combinations (e.g., “brown apple”), the adjective selects the appropriate slot
(e.g., COLOR) and filler (e.g., BROWN) to be modified in the noun concept. The
salience of that feature and the diagnosticity of the slot is increased in the
resulting combined concept. This model is appealing because it makes wellformalized predictions about how concepts combine, and it successfully captures
similarity and typicality judgments (Smith & Osherson, 1984; Smith et al., 1988).
A limitation of this model is its inability to capture the interdependence of
features. Conceptual features interact with each in ways that influence the
comprehension of combined concepts. For example, people interpret “wooden
spoons” to be large and “metal spoons” to be small, suggesting that MATERIAL
and SIZE features are associated within the SPOON concept (Medin & Shoben,
1988). Feature associations are an important component of conceptual structure
and will influence the outputs of conceptual combination (Wisniewski & Gentner,
1991; Sloman et al., 1998). The goal of Chapter 2 is to capture feature
associations within concept network models and determine whether these
structures can predict aspects of flexible concept use.
A related criticism of the selective-modification model is that it cannot capture the
flexibility and context-dependence of adjective meaning. The same adjective can
have different effects when paired with different nouns (e.g., fresh vegetable,
fresh shirt, fresh idea; Murphy & Andrew, 1993), or modulate features to various
degrees (e.g., red face, red truck, red fire; Halff et al., 1976). Proponents of the
concept specialization model claim that comprehension of combined concepts
cannot be a function of the constituent concepts alone, but that additional
knowledge is required (Cohen & Murphy, 1984; Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski &
Gentner, 1991). The appeal to “world knowledge” addresses the inherent
flexibility in the combination process, but this world knowledge is vaguely defined
and therefore hard to incorporate into a well-defined model. The goal of Chapters
3 and 4 is to capture some of the flexibility in the conceptual combination process
using well-defined models of feature representations.
Though characterized by a very different theory of semantic knowledge, the field
of distributional semantics (referenced above in Section 1.1.1) has proposed
well-defined models of how concepts combine in complex phrases. Based on the
assumption that words with similar meanings appear in similar verbal contexts,
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words are represented as vectors based on their co-occurrences with other
words in a large text corpus (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Mitchell & Lapata,
2008; 2010; Steyvers & Griffiths, 2007). Vectors representing individual words
can then be combined into phrases using different classes of functions (e.g.,
additive, multiplicative). Mitchell & Lapata (2010) tested many different
combinatorial functions within a vector-based semantic space. They compared
additive models (e.g., simple, weighted) and multiplicative models (e.g., simple,
tensor product) in cases of adjective-noun, noun-noun, and verb-noun
combinations, and found the best success for weighted-additive, simple
multiplicative, and dilation models (see Mitchell & Lapata, 2010). These authors
also tested combinatorial semantic functions using a probabilistic topic model of
semantic space (Steyvers & Griffiths, 2007) and similarly report success of a
simple multiplicative model2. Another model is proposed by Baroni & Zamparelli
(2010) in which adjectives are treated as linear functions over nouns. The
meaning of a noun is captured in a vector-based representation, and each
adjective is represented as a matrix which is used to transform these noun
vectors. Baron & Zamparelli (2010) report increased success of their model
relative to additive and multiplicative models and claim that their model is able to
capture aspects of flexible adjective meaning (e.g., green chair vs. green
initiative). In sum, approaches in distributional semantics provide techniques that
can be used to predict the representations of combined concepts.
In cognitive neuroscience studies of conceptual combination, there have been
few attempts to predict the neural representations of combined concepts. An
fMRI study by Chang et al. (2009) analyzed distributed neural responses to
adjective-noun phrases (e.g., “soft bear”, “sharp knife”) using the compositional
models of distributed semantics described above, and report that the neural
patterns evoked by adjective-noun combinations were best predicted by a
multiplicative combination of the individual adjective and noun patterns. Two
additional fMRI studies examined multivoxel responses to combined concepts in
the left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), a region implicated in conceptual
knowledge and combination (Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011). Both
of these studies report that multivoxel responses to combined concepts in LATL
can be predicted by combining the patterns of the constituent concepts. For
example, Baron & Osherson (2010) report that the GIRL-pattern is predicted by

2

In these probabilistic topic models, words are not represented as points in a highdimensional space but as probability distributions over a set of topics. In a related
approach, Chapter 4 will explore the possibility of representing concepts as probability
distributions over features.
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additive and multiplicative combinations of the YOUNG- and WOMAN-patterns in
LATL.
Rather than trying to predict the neural representations of combined concepts,
much work in cognitive neuroscience has revealed the particular brain regions
that are recruited in conceptual combination tasks. The LATL has been
implicated in conceptual combination tasks using both MEG (Bemis & Pylkkänen,
2011; 2012; 2013) and fMRI methods (Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson,
2011; Boylan et al., 2017), and its role has been characterized as relating to
feature attribution or object-concept specification (Westerlund & Pylkkänen,
2014; Boylan et al., 2015; 2017). Another important region is the angular gyrus,
which appears sensitive to the plausibility of adjective-noun combinations (Price
et al., 2015) and combinations describing events or relations (Boylan et al., 2015;
2017). The goal of Chapter 4 is to explore which neural regions are specifically
involved in the flexible modulation of features during comprehension of combined
concepts.

1.5 Current approach
The current approach is to explore global and local aspects of conceptual
structure that relate to flexible concept use. In Chapter 2, I construct novel
feature-based concept networks and determine which aspects of global network
structure might relate to various measures of flexible concept use (e.g., semantic
diversity, figurative language). I zoom in to examine local structure of individual
features in Chapters 3 and 4, and explore the kinds of feature representations
that predict the flexible modulation of conceptual information during
comprehension of combined concepts. The fMRI study in Chapter 3 assumes a
distributed neural representation of conceptual features, and tests whether the
flexible neural activation of features during comprehension of adjective-noun
phrases can be predicted by either feature surprisal or feature uncertainty.
Following up on this study, Chapter 4 embeds feature uncertainty in probabilistic
models of feature modulation to explore adjective-noun comprehension in
behavior and in the brain. Neural regions previously implicated in conceptual
combination are explored in order to determine which regions are specifically
sensitive to the flexible modulation of conceptual information.
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2: IMPLEMENTING A CONCEPT NETWORK MODEL
This chapter was previously published as an article in Behavior Research Methods:
Solomon, S.H., Medaglia, J.D., Thompson-Schill, S.L. (2019). Implementing a concept
network model. Behav Res.

2.1 Introduction
The APPLE information evoked by “apple pie” is considerably different from that
evoked by “apple picking”: the former is soft, warm, and wedge-shaped, whereas
the latter is firm, cool, and spherical. If you scour your conceptual space for
APPLE information, you will uncover the knowledge that apples can be red, green,
yellow, or brown when old; that they can be sweet or tart; that they are crunchy
when fresh and soft when baked; that they are naturally round but can be cut into
slices; that they are firm, but mushy if blended; that they can be found in bowls,
in jars, and on trees. Despite the complexity of this conceptual knowledge, we
can generate an appropriate APPLE instance, with the appropriate features, based
on the context we are in at the time. In other words, the APPLE concept can be
flexibly adjusted in order to enable a near-infinite number of specific and
appropriate APPLE exemplars. This flexibility enables concepts to be represented
in varied and fluid ways, a central characteristic of the semantic system.
The concept APPLE can be instantiated as a Granny Smith or as a Macintosh,
and either one can easily be brought to mind. The fact that a single conceptual
category has many distinct subordinate types that differ from each other is a
basic form of conceptual variation that has been embedded within hierarchical
semantic models (e.g., Collins & Quillian, 1969). But even a representation of a
single instance of APPLE can be flexibly adjusted: activated properties might be
RED and ROUND while shopping, whereas they might be SWEET and CRISPY while
eating. A concept can also be represented in varied states, each with their own
distinct features: the representation of an APPLE is FIRM versus SOFT before and
after baking, and SOLID versus LIQUID before and after juicing. Conceptual
flexibility is further evidenced in the frequent non-literal use of concepts: one
should stay away from “bad apples” and should not “compare apples with
oranges;” and, one can use concepts fluidly in novel analogies and metaphors.
Typically, theories assume a “static” view of concepts, in which conceptual
information is stable across instances. But this framework makes it hard to model
the conceptual shifts over long and short time-scales that occur during contextdependent concept activation and learning (Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016). By “context” we refer to events or situations, whether in
the physical environment or in language, that could influence the ways in which
conceptual information is activated and represented. The flexibility of meaning is
also a challenge in the language domain, and is referred to as enriched lexical
processing, type-shifting, or coercion (e.g., Pustejovsky, 1998; McElree et al.,
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2001; Traxler et al., 2005). Though conceptual flexibility is a pervasive
phenomenon, it poses a formidable challenge: how is conceptual information
organized to enable this flexibility?
We are particularly interested in the structure of individual concepts (e.g., APPLE,
SNOW), rather than the structure of semantic space more broadly. This latter
pursuit — the modeling of semantic space — has already been approached from
various theoretical orientations and methodologies. Some theoretical approaches
claim that the meaning of a concept can be decomposed into features and their
relationships with each other (e.g., Smith et al., 1974; Tversky, 1977; McRae et
al., 1997; Sloman et al., 1998; Tyler & Moss, 2001). For example, the
“conceptual structure” account (Tyler & Moss, 2001) represents concepts as
binary vectors indicating the presence or absence of features, and argues that
broad semantic domains (e.g., ANIMALS, TOOLS) differ in their characteristic
properties and in their patterns of property-correlations (e.g., HAS-WINGS and
FLIES tend to co-occur within the ANIMAL domain). Models that represent basiclevel concepts in terms of their constituent features are valuable because they
can be implemented in computational architectures such as parallel distributed
processing models and other connectionist models. For example, the “featurecorrelation” account (e.g., McRae et al., 1997; 1999; McRae, 2004) pairs
empirically-derived conceptual feature statistics with a type of connectionist
model called an attractor network: property statistics characterize the structure of
semantic space, and the model can leverage these statistics to settle on an
appropriate conceptual representation given the current inputs (Cree et al., 1999;
Cree et al., 2006).
However, most instantiations of feature-based models represent individual
concepts with sets of features that are static and unchanging — a clear limitation
if one aims to incorporate flexibility into conceptual structure. There are some
recent connectionist models that aim to incorporate context-dependent meaning
(Hoffman et al., 2018), and the flexibility and context-dependence of individual
features has been addressed in prior work (Barsalou, 1982; Sloman et al., 1998).
For example, Sloman et al. (1998) modeled the pairwise dependencies between
features in order to ascertain the mutability or immutability of features. The
authors claim that a feature is immutable if it central to a concept’s structure: it is
harder to imagine a concept missing an immutable feature (e.g., a robin without
bones), than a mutable feature (e.g., a jacket without buttons). The authors argue
that modeling a concept in terms of formal pairwise relationships makes it
possible for concepts to be structured as well as flexible. While the goal of these
and other researchers has been to characterize the role of individual conceptual
features (Sloman et al., 1998; Devlin et al., 1998; Cree et al., 2006; Tyler &
Moss, 2001; Sedivy, 2003), our present goal is to examine whether a featurebased conceptual structure can shed light on the flexibility of a concept as a
whole.
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Another way to model conceptual knowledge is to use a network to capture the
relationship between concepts in language. The use of networks to model
semantic knowledge has a well-established history. The early “semantic network”
models (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Collins & Loftus, 1975) represent concepts as
nodes in a network; links between these nodes signify associations between
concepts in semantic memory. These networks capture the extent to which
concepts are related to other concepts and features, and can model the
putatively hierarchical nature of conceptual knowledge. Though these models are
“network-based”, they are so in a rather informal way. On the other hand,
network science, a mathematical descendent of graph theory, has developed a
rich set of tools to study networks in a formal, quantitative framework (Barabási,
2016). For example, current network approaches characterize relationships
between concepts in terms of their word-association strengths or corpus-based
co-occurrence statistics. Word co-occurrence statistics can be extracted from text
corpora and have been used to create probabilistic models of word meanings
(Griffiths et al., 2007), to represent semantic similarity (Landauer & Dumais,
1997), and to characterize the structure of the entire lexicon (e.g., WordNet;
Miller & Fellbaum, 2007). In a similar approach, word association data has been
used to capture and analyze the structure of semantic space (Steyvers &
Tenenbaum, 2005; Van Rensbergen et al., 2015; De Deyne et al., 2016).
In network science, units and links are referred to as “nodes” and “edges”,
respectively, and the pattern of connections between nodes can be precisely
described, revealing patterns of network organization. Nodes can represent any
number of things (e.g., cities, people, neurons), depending on the system being
modeled; edges can likewise represent a range of connection types (e.g., roads,
friendship, synapses). Many diverse systems have been described in network
science terms, including the world wide web (e.g., Cunha et al., 1995), social
communities (Wellman, 1926), the nervous system of Caenorhabditis elegans
(Watts & Strogatz, 1998), and many others (see Boccaletti et al., 2006). Here we
will summarize how network science has been applied, and can be further
extended, to the study of conceptual knowledge.
Network structure can be characterized at different levels of organization. For
example, the large-scale organization of a network (i.e., topology) can be
characterized as a “regular”, “random”, or “small-world” structure (Fig. 1 A-C;
Watts & Strogatz, 1998). In regular networks, each node is connected to its k
nearest neighbors; in random networks, nodes are randomly connected to each
other. Regular networks result in long path lengths and high local clustering
(modular processing), whereas random networks result in short path lengths and
minimal clustering (integrated processing). Between these two extremes is the
small-world network, which contains high-clustering as well as a few random,
long-range connections: this results in the “small world” phenomenon in which
each node is connected to all other nodes with relatively few degrees of
separation. A small-world topology thus maximizes efficient spread of
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information, enables both modular and integrated processing, and supports
network complexity (Watts & Strogatz, 1998; Bassett & Bullmore, 2006). Much
work has revealed that naturally evolving networks have small-world topology
(Bassett & Bullmore, 2006), including functional brain networks (Salvador et al.,
2005; Bassett et al., 2011) and language networks (e.g., Steyvers & Tenenbaum,
2005). These systems exhibit small-world topologies presumably because this
structure facilitates local “modular” processing as well as easy communication via
a few long range connections.
The semantic network approaches described above use nodes to represent
individual words, and edges to represent their co-occurrence or associations.
Once modeled in this way, network structure can be quantitatively analyzed and
related to other phenomena. As mentioned above, it has been suggested that
human language networks exhibit small-world properties (Steyvers &
Tenenbaum, 2005; i Cancho & Sole, 2001). Additionally, semantic networks
appear to exhibit an “assortative” structure, meaning that semantic nodes tend to
have connections to other semantic nodes with similar characteristics (e.g.,
valence, arousal, concreteness; Van Rensbergen et al., 2015). A spreading
activation model applied to these word-association networks makes accurate
predictions of weak similarity judgments; for example, between the unrelated
concepts of “teacher” and “cup” (De Deyne et al., 2016). Further, Steyvers &
Tenenbaum (2005) report that the degree of a word in a language network (i.e.,
how many links it has to other word nodes) predicts aspects of language
development and processing — a high degree word is likely learned at a younger
age and engenders faster reaction times on a lexical decision task. These
network models are valuable because semantic structure can be analyzed using
a rich set of network science tools. However, current network-based
implementations do not provide the internal conceptual structure that is
necessary — we argue — to model conceptual flexibility. In other words, it is
hard to provide a model of conceptual flexibility (in the sense described above)
when the features that are being flexibly adjusted are not explicitly represented.
We believe that a feature-based conceptual framework paired with network
science techniques provides a platform on which conceptual flexibility can be
quantified and explored. Here we introduce a new approach in which concepts
are represented as their own feature-based networks, and we work through an
example as a proof-of-concept. We create concept-specific networks for 15
concepts (e.g., CHOCOLATE, GRASS, KNIFE), in which nodes represent conceptual
features (e.g., BROWN, GREEN, METAL, SHARP, SWEET) and edges represent how
those features co-occur with each other within each concept. The creation of
such networks thus requires the calculation of within-concept feature statistics,
which describe how a concept’s information may be appropriately adjusted to
form valid, yet varied, concept representations. Though here we are interested in
analyzing the structure of basic-level concepts, these concept network methods
could theoretically be applied at any level of the conceptual hierarchy. Our
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specific goals here are to (1) show that creation of such networks is possible, (2)
confirm that these networks contain concept-specific information, and (3)
demonstrate that these networks permit the extraction of measures that relate to
conceptual flexibility.
We have hand-picked a selection of measures to extract and analyze from our
concept networks. As mentioned above, small-world networks (Fig. 1B) are
characterized by high network clustering such that a node’s neighbors also tend
to be neighbors with each other. Previous work has found a relationship between
the clustering within semantic networks and individual differences in creativity
(Kenett et al., 2014) — because creativity relates to flexible conceptual
processing, the clustering coefficient is one of our measures of interest. In smallworld networks, this clustering paired with random connections results in network
modules, which are communities of nodes with dense connections between
them. Modularity is a formal measure that captures the extent to which a given
network can be partitioned in this way (Fig. 1D). A network with a modular
structure is able to activate distinct, specialized sets of nodes; because this might
translate into a concept’s ability to activate distinct sets of features, modularity
was another measure of interest. In modular networks, each node can also be
characterized in terms of its diversity of connections across network modules
(Fig. 1E). Some nodes may have links within only one module, whereas others
may have links that are highly distributed across different network modules.
Because related measures are often used to define network hubs that support
flexible network processing (van den Heuvel & Sporns, 2013; Sporns, 2104), we
were interested in exploring the relation between network diversity and flexible
concept use. Another kind of network topology is core-periphery structure (Fig.
1F), in which a network is characterized by one highly-connected core and a
sparsely connected periphery. Core-periphery organization, originally observed in
social networks (Borgatti & Everett, 2000), has recently been applied to
functional networks in neuroimaging data (Bassett et al., 2013). A core-periphery
structure in a concept network would reflect one set of highly associated features
(i.e., core) but also a substantial collection of features that are weakly associated
with one another (i.e., periphery). We included core-periphery structure as a
measure of interest because we hypothesized that the “stiff” core and/or “flexible”
periphery of a concept network (Bassett et al., 2013) might relate to flexible
concept use.
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Figure 1: A visualization of network topologies and measures. Networks are defined
in terms of nodes (circles) and edges (lines). Network topologies fall into three main
categories: (A) regular, (B) small-world, and (C) random (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Most
naturally evolving networks exhibit small-world topology, including neural networks and
language networks. Regular and small-world networks have high clustering. (D)
Modularity reflects the extent to which a network can be partitioned into a set of denselyconnected “modules”, represented here in distinct colors. (E) Some nodes participate in
multiple modules, reflecting a diversity of connections: this is captured in a “diversity
coefficient.” A diverse node (yellow) participates in multiple modules (green, purple),
whereas other nodes (grey) do not exhibit these diverse connections. (F) A network has
strong core-periphery structure if it can be characterized in terms of a single denselyconnected “core” (yellow) and a sparsely-connected “periphery” (grey).

In this proof-of-concept, we will extract measures of network organization from
concept-specific networks (i.e., clustering, modularity, core-periphery, diversity)
and explore what these structural characteristics might predict about how a
concept is used. Conceptual flexibility manifests when a concept is recruited to
represent varied subordinate exemplars, when a concept word is used in a
variety of language contexts, and when a concept is differentially activated
depending on task context. We therefore aimed to relate our network measures
of interest to a measure of semantic diversity (SemD; Hoffman et al., 2013)
calculated from text-based statistics. We also collected data on two tasks related
to conceptual flexibility — a figurative language task (comprehension of novel
similes) and a widely used measure of creative cognition, the Alternative Uses
Task (AUT) — to explore whether network structure relates to how a concept is
flexibly used in different task contexts. Here we present one variation of the
concept network approach, implementing a particular set of methodological
decisions on a particular set of concepts, in order to show the potential of this
framework to provide new ways to characterize the structure and flexibility of
conceptual knowledge.
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2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Network Methods
Our goal is to construct feature-based networks that capture each concept’s
specific constellation of features and the ways those features relate to each
other. There are, however, many ways one could create such networks. Here we
walk through one possible instantiation of this method to reveal the feasibility of
this approach, and to suggest the kinds of analyses that could be used to
examine the relationship between concept network topology and conceptual
flexibility. We hope that future researchers interested in conceptual knowledge
will be able to use, improve, and expand upon these methods. Our data and
code are available online.
We collected data in two rounds, and we refer to these data as Set 1 and Set 2.
We collected data for five concepts in Set 1 as a first attempt to construct
concept networks. Once we established the success of these methods, we
collected data for another 10 concepts in Set 2. The concepts in Set 1 included:
CHOCOLATE, BANANA, BOTTLE, TABLE, and PAPER. The concepts in Set 2 included:
KEY, PUMPKIN, GRASS, COOKIE, PICKLE, KNIFE, PILLOW, WOOD, PHONE, and CAR.
When statistics are reported separately for the two sets, we report Set 1 followed
by Set 2. Once the networks are constructed and we analyze network measures
and their relation to other conceptual measures, the sets are no longer treated
separately, and each concept is treated as an item (N=15). We use Spearman’s
rank correlation in all correlational analyses due to this small sample size.
2.2.1.1 Network Construction
The first step was to define our nodes. Since our nodes represent individual
conceptual properties, we compiled a list of properties that could be applied to all
of our concepts within each set. Participants (N=66, N=60) were recruited from
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and were asked to list all of the properties that
must be true or can be true for each concept. It was emphasized that the
properties do not have to be true of all types of the concept. Participants were
required to report at least 10 properties per concept, but there was no limit on the
number of responses they could provide. Once these data were collected, we
organized the data as follows. For each concept, we collapsed across different
forms of the same property (e.g., “sugar”, “sugary”, “tastes sugary”), and
removed responses that were too general (e.g., “taste”, “color”). This was a
highly data-driven approach; however, see Bootstrap Analysis for an analysis of
robustness across properties. For each concept, we only included properties that
were given by more than one participant. We then combined properties across all
concepts to create our final list of N properties (N=129, N=276) that were
represented as nodes in our concept networks.
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Figure 2: Visualizing the chocolate network. (A) The CHOCOLATE concept can be broken
down into a range of subordinates, which can each be defined as a property vector
(columns). Each property can also be defined as a vector (rows), which can be used to
calculate within-concept property relationships. Only a small set of subordinates and
properties are shown here for simplicity. (B) A simple schematic of the chocolate network
that reveals a selection of potential property relationships. Certain properties might cluster
together in the CHOCOLATE network, for example EDIBLE, SWEET, BROWN, CREAMY, and MESSY,
LIQUID, HOT. (C) The actual chocolate network we constructed based on the empirical
property statistics. Our constructed chocolate network was binarized (threshold=90%) in
order to reduce the number of properties to ease visualization. Properties are arranged in
order of degree (number of links), from low degree (white) to high degree (blue). Image
generated using cytoscape (Shannon et al., 2003).

The same AMT participants that provided conceptual properties also provided
subordinate concepts (from now on referred to as “subordinates”) for each of the
concepts. For each concept, participants were asked to think about that object
and all the different kinds, forms, types, or states in which that object can be
found. Participants were required to make at least five responses, and could
make up to 15 responses. For each concept, we removed subordinates that
corresponded to a property for that concept (e.g., “sweet chocolate”),
subordinates that were highly similar to other subordinates (e.g., “white chocolate
chip cookie”, “chocolate chip cookie”) and responses that were too specific,
including some brand names (e.g., “Chiquita banana”). Though this was a datadriven approach, there was some degree of subjectivity in the final subordinate
lists; see Bootstrap Analysis for an analysis of robustness across subordinates.
In Set 1, we only included responses that were given by more than one
participant; due to the increased number of participants and responses in Set 2,
we included responses that were given by more than two participants. In both
sets, we ended up with a set of K subordinates for each concept (K: M=17,
SD=3.14). The included and excluded subordinates for all concepts are
presented in Supplementary Table 1.
A separate set of AMT participants (N=198, N=108) was presented with one
subordinate of each of the concepts in random order (e.g., “dark chocolate”,
“frozen banana”) and was asked to select the properties that are true of the
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Figure 3: Example images used to generate test data in classification analysis.
Test data used in the classification analysis were generated from participants who made
property judgments on images of conceptual exemplars. Yellow cross indicates object to
be considered. Example images for grass (top) and cookie (bottom).

specific subordinates (see Fig. 2A). The full list of N properties was displayed in a
multiple-choice format. For each subordinate, responses were combined across
participants; we thus know, for each subordinate, how many participants reported
each of the N properties. In the networks we report here, we have used weighted
subordinate vectors in which values indicate the percentage of subjects that
reported each property. However, in order to reduce noise, we only included a
weight for a subordinateproperty if it was reported by more than one participant; if only one participant
reported a particular property for a particular subordinate, the weight . For each
concept we excluded properties that were not present in any of its subordinates,
resulting in a smaller set of Nc properties that were present in subordinates
(Nc: M=126, SD=32.2). Each concept’s data thus included a set of K
subordinates, each of which corresponds to a Nc -length vector that indicates
each property’s weight in that subordinate.
Importantly, these data for each concept can also be considered a set of Nc
properties, each corresponding to a vector indicating that property’s weight in
each of the subordinates. For example, if a concept was described by 10
subordinates (K) and 100 meaningful properties (Nc ), we have 100 10-element
vectors, each of which represents the contribution of a single property across
subordinates of the concept. The premise behind this concept-network
construction is that the ways in which these patterns of property contributions
relate to each other, within a single concept, may be an important aspect of
conceptual structure. Our networks will thus capture the pairwise similarities
between properties, that is, between the Nc K-element vectors. In order to do
this, many different distance metrics can be used (e.g., Euclidean, Mahalanobis,
cosine); we used the pdist() function in MATLAB which includes many distancemeasure alternatives. In the analysis and results we report here, we constructed
our networks based on Mahalanobis distance, a measure suited for high25

dimensional data and which takes the variance between subordinates and
correlations between subordinates into account. However, there are many other
options, the choice of which might depend on other analysis decisions. For
example, if the subordinate concepts are binary instead of weighted, a
“matching” measure such as Jaccard distance might be more appropriate.
First, the distance between each of the Nc K-element vectors was calculated.
This results in a square, symmetrical Nc x Nc matrix which contains the distance
between each pair of properties. These values were scaled between 0 and 1,
and converted to a similarity measure by subtracting these values from 1. We
thus created a network for a single concept that captures pairwise propertyproperty similarities; this represents the patterns of property relationships across
subordinates within a given concept (see Fig. 2). Here we used weighted
networks, where edges represent similarity measures between 0 and 1, though it
is also possible to use unweighted networks by binarizing these similarity values
according to a given threshold. We repeated this (weighted) network construction
process for each of the 15 concepts. These final networks were then analyzed
using standard network science methods (see Network Analysis).
A simple measure of concept stability. The subordinate property data for each
concept enabled us to calculate a simple measure of conceptual stability that did
not involve treating concepts as networks. For each concept, we counted the
number of properties that were represented across all of that concept’s
subordinates (weighted value greater than zero). We then divided this number by
Nc in order to calculate the proportion of possible properties that were universally
consistent for that concept. We interpreted this measure as a measure of
conceptual stability, because higher values indicate that a large number of
properties are not variable across conceptual instances. We refer to this measure
as simple stability, and consider it to be an inverse measure of conceptual
flexibility.
2.2.1.2 Classification Analysis
Our goal is to extract concept-specific measures from our networks, and this goal
is only justified if the network structures themselves are concept-specific. Even
though different sets of data contributed to the different concept networks, it is
not necessarily the case that the resulting networks would differ from each other.
It could theoretically be the case that property-relationships are consistent across
the entire semantic domain; indeed, this is the premise of the neural network
models of semantic knowledge created thus far (e.g., McClelland & Rogers,
2003; Cree et al., 1999; 2006). However, our goal is to capture concept-specific
property-relationships, and so our first task was to test whether we succeeded in
this goal.
If our concept network models capture concept-specific information, the networks
should be able to successfully discriminate between new concept exemplars.
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Exemplar data were generated from sets of photographs for each concept (see
Fig. 3); all subordinates were represented. AMT participants (N=60, N=30) were
shown one image per concept, were asked to imagine interacting with this object
in the real world, and to consider what properties it has. The full list of N
properties was displayed in multiple-choice format, and participants were asked
to select the properties that they believed applied to the object in the image.
Individual participants’ responses to each exemplar image were represented as
N-length property vectors and were used as test data in the classification
analysis. Test data comprised 300 property-vectors (Set 1: 60/concept, Set2:
30/concept); classification analyses were run separately for Set 1 and Set 2.
By performing eigendecomposition on each adjacency matrix (i.e., concept
network) we can assess the extent to which a vector is expected given an
underlying network structure (e.g., Medaglia et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2018). For
each adjacency matrix A, V is the set of Nc eigenvectors, ordered by eigenvalue.
M is the number of ordered eigenvectors to include in analysis, and designates a
subset of V. For each eigenvector v, we find the dot product with signal vector x,
which gives us the projection of x on that dimension in the eigenspace of A. That
is, it gives us an “alignment” value for that particular signal and that particular
eigenvector. We can include all eigenvectors in M by taking the sum of squares
of the dot products for each eigenvector. The alignment value for each signal is
defined as:
+
𝑥" = ∑,
(-.(𝑣( ∙ 𝑥)

(1)

where is a property vector, M is the number of eigenvectors to include in
alignment (sorted by eigenvalue), is one of M eigenvectors of the adjacency
matrix, and is the scalar alignment value for signal x with adjacency matrix A,
given the eigenvectors 1-M. In our case, signal x is a property vector
corresponding to a particular exemplar image (e.g., Fig. 3), which we align with
each of the concept networks. Each exemplar was restricted to the properties
included in each concept model before transformation; that is, exemplar data (x)
were reduced to NC–length vectors. The concept network that resulted in the
highest alignment value ( was taken as the “guess” of the classifier; each
exemplar was either classified correctly (1), or incorrectly (0). We averaged these
data across all exemplars to calculate the average classifier accuracy.
To calculate a baseline measure of classification accuracy, we created traditional
vector models for each concept. These models were similar to those used
elsewhere in the literature (Tyler & Moss, 2001; McRae et al. 1997; 1999; 2004).
For each concept, we averaged the K subordinate vectors resulting in an Nc length vector containing mean property strength values. Each concept’s
traditional vector model and network model contained the same conceptual
properties. We ran a separate classification analysis using these traditional
models and a correlational classifier. Each exemplar property-vector was
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correlated with each of the traditional concept vector models; the concept model
that resulted in the highest correlation value was taken as the guess of the
classifier. We calculated average measures of classifier performance using the
same methods described above.
2.2.1.3 Network Analysis
We extracted network metrics from our concept networks using the Brain
Connectivity Toolbox (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010). The set of nodes in each
network is designated as N, and n is the number of nodes. The set of links is L,
and l is the number of links. The existence of a link between nodes (i,j) is
captured in :
if a link is present and
if a link is absent. The weight of a
link is represented as , and is normalized such that
. is the sum of all
weights in the network. The network metrics we extracted included clustering
coefficients, modularity ( ), core-periphery structure, and diversity coefficients
(Fig. 1), for the reasons described above.
The clustering coefficient captures the “cliquishness” of a network, that is, the
extent to which a node’s neighbors are also neighbors of each other. The
clustering coefficient is calculated for each node individually (Ci), by calculating
the percentage of potential pairwise connections among the neighbors of node i.
A “triangle” is formed when node i is linked to j and h, and j and h are also linked
to each other; the number of existing triangles can be calculated for each node (
can which is used to calculate the proportion of possible triangles that exist for
each node. This proportion is averaged across nodes to result in the clustering
coefficient (C) for a network (Rubinov & Sporns, 2010; this can also be calculated
for weighted networks):
𝑡( = ∑ℎ,𝑗∈𝑁 𝑎(1 𝑎(2 𝑎12
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Modularity ( ) is a metric that describes a network’s community structure. We can
attempt to partition a weighted network into sets of non-overlapping nodes (i.e.,
modules) such that within-module connections are maximized and betweenmodule connections are minimized. Some networks exhibit more of a modular
structure than others; is a quantitative measure of modularity for each weighted
network (Eq. 4; Rubinov & Sporns, 2010), which is defined as
𝑄A =
where

.
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BC
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is the module containing node i, and

(4)
= 1 if

and 0 otherwise. The

modularity calculation is stochastic; in our analysis we performed a modularity
partition 10,000 times and averaged across these iterations to calculate a mean
Q coefficient for each concept . Nodes may have connections to many different
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modules, or have very few such connections. The diversity coefficient ( is a
measure ascribed to individual nodes that reflects the diversity of connections
that each node has to modules in the network. This is a version of the
participation coefficient, and is calculated using normalized Shannon entropy; we
have previously used entropy to model property flexibility, and so predicted that
diversity would be a good candidate for a network-based measure of conceptual
flexibility. The diversity coefficient (Eq. 5; Rubinov & Sporns, 2011) for each node
is defined as
.

ℎ(± = − LMN J ∑PÎ𝑀 𝑝(± (𝑢) log 𝑝(± (𝑢),
where 𝑝(± (𝑢) =

V<±(P)
V<±

(5)

, 𝑠(± (𝑢) is the strength of node i within module 𝑢, and 𝑚 is

the number of modules in modularity partition . We averaged diversity
coefficients across nodes in a network to obtain a mean measure of diversity for
each concept network. The diversity coefficient is based on Q, which is
stochastic; we thus calculated a diversity coefficient for each of the 10,000
modularity partitions, and averaged across these iterations for each concept.
Core-periphery structure is another way to describe the structure of a network.
Here, we attempt to partition a network into two non-overlapping sets of nodes
such that connections within one set are maximized (i.e., the “core”) and
connections in the other are minimized (i.e., the “periphery”). Core-periphery fit
(𝑄Z ) is a quantitative measure of how well each network can be partitioned in this
way (Eq. 6), and for weighted networks is defined as
𝑄Z =

.
[\

]∑(,1Î𝐶𝑐^𝑤(1 − 𝛾Z 𝑤
` a − ∑(,1Î𝐶𝑝 ^𝑤(1 − 𝛾Z 𝑤
`a c
(6)

where 𝐶d is the set of all nodes in the core, 𝐶e is the set of nodes in the periphery,
𝑤
` is the average edge weight, 𝛾Z is a parameter controlling the size of the core,
and 𝑣Z is a normalization constant (Rubinov et al., 2015).
2.2.1.4 Bootstrap Analysis
The properties and subordinates used to create these networks were chosen by
participants, not experimenters. However, there was a certain degree of
subjectivity in how the final lists were constructed, and the properties and
subordinates reported by the participants are unlikely to fully represent the total
possible sets. We thus ran bootstrap analyses in order to explore whether
relationships between network and non-network measures were dependent on
the particular sets of properties and subordinates used in our network
construction.
Bootstrapping over Subordinates: The goal of this analysis was to generate a
distribution of correlation values for a specific pair of measures. In each iteration
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of the analysis, new networks were constructed: for each concept, a random
subordinate was removed before network construction. Network measures were
extracted from these 15 concept networks, and correlated with another measure
of choice: this correlation value was recorded. We performed 1000 iterations of
this analysis, resulting in a distribution of 1000 correlation values along with a
95% confidence interval.
Bootstrapping over Properties: The goal of this analysis was to generate a
distribution of correlation values for a specific pair of measures. In each iteration
of the analysis, new networks were constructed: for each concept, a random 10%
of its meaningful properties were removed (NC) before network construction.
Network measures were extracted from these 15 concept networks, and
correlated with another measure of choice: this correlation value was recorded.
We performed 1000 iterations of this analysis, resulting in a distribution of 1000
correlation values along with a 95% confidence interval.
2.2.2 Figurative Language Task
The structure and flexibility of a concept likely has implications for how the
concept can be used in creative contexts, such as in figurative language
comprehension (e.g., Sloman et al., 1998). We therefore set out to collect data
reflecting the extent to which a given concept is easily interpreted in a figurative
context, and to explore the characteristics of conceptual structure that may
facilitate this creative process.
2.2.2.1 Participants
300 subjects recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk contributed data to this
study and were compensated according to current standard rates. Consent was
obtained for all participants in accordance with the University of Pennsylvania
IRB.
2.2.2.2 Stimuli
Experimental similes of the form “X is like a Y” were constructed using the 15
target concepts in the “vehicle” (Y) position. Fifteen additional concepts were
used in the “tenor” (X) position of the similes: TRUTH, TIME, CONVERSATION,
SADNESS, CITY, LIFE, DREAM, CAREER, FAMILY, FRIENDSHIP, GOVERNMENT, SCHOOL,
HAPPINESS, CELEBRATION, BOREDOM. These tenor concepts were chosen to
minimize sensorimotor content, but otherwise were chosen randomly. The 15
target concepts and 15 tenor concepts were fully crossed, resulting in 225 novel
similes (e.g., “Truth is like a key”, “Happiness is like chocolate”, “Boredom is like
a bottle”). The experimental similes were split into 15 lists consisting of 15 similes
each; each target concept and each tenor concept occurred once within each list.
An additional 10 similes were taken from Blasko & Connine (1993) and were
used as control similes; five were high-apt similes (e.g., “A book is like a treasure
chest”) and five were moderate-apt similes (e.g., “Stars are like signposts”). Each
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list (and therefore each of the experimental similes) was seen by 20 participants.
The control similes were seen by all 300 participants.
2.2.2.3 Task
Each participant read 25 total similes (10 control similes, 15 experimental
similes) presented in a randomized order. On each trial, the simile was presented
at the top of the screen, with two sliding-scale questions beneath. To assess
simile meaningfulness, participants were asked: “How meaningful is this
figurative sentence?” ranging from “It does not have any meaning at all” to “It has
a very strong meaning.” To assess simile familiarity, participants were asked:
“How familiar is this figurative sentence?” ranging from “It is not familiar at all” to
“It is very familiar.” These questions were motivated by prior work on simile
comprehension (Blasko & Connine, 1993). For both questions, participants were
asked to slide a bar in order to make their desired response. Values on both
questions ranged from 0-100, but these values were not displayed to
participants.
2.2.2.4 Analysis
Meaningfulness and familiarity ratings for each simile were separately averaged
across participants (experimental: N=20, control: N=300). Inspection of the
control similes borrowed from Blasko & Connine (1993) revealed that our
measures were sensitive to simile characteristics reported elsewhere: the five
high-apt similes were judged more meaningful than the five moderate-apt similes
(t(8)=7.20, p<0.0001); they were also judged as more familiar (t(8)=5.60,
p<0.001).
The meaningfulness and familiarity ratings across all experimental and control
similes are shown in Fig. 4. Here it is clear that the meaningfulness and
familiarity ratings of our experimental similes are not categorically different from
the similes reported in outside literature, suggesting that our constructed similes
— though novel and pseudo-randomly generated — were meaningful enough for
further analysis. The control similes were not included in any subsequent
analysis.
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Figure 4: Simile ratings. The relationship between simile meaningfulness and familiarity
ratings for target similes (blue) and control similes. As expected, the high-apt control
similes (red) were rated as more meaningful than the moderate-apt control similes (pink).
The range of meaningfulness and familiarity ratings for our target similes subsumes the
range of the control similes. Since meaningfulness and familiarity were highly correlated,
we averaged these measures to create a single measure of simile goodness.

Across the 225 experimental similes, meaningfulness and familiarity ratings were
highly correlated (r(223)=0.83, p<0.0001); since this tight correspondence made
it difficult to tease apart the separate measures, we averaged meaningfulness
and familiarity measures within each simile to construct a composite measure we
refer to as simile “goodness”. These simile goodness measures were then
averaged with respect to each target concept; that is, the goodness ratings for
the 15 similes that contained the same target concept (e.g., “chocolate”) were
averaged together (e.g., “Truth is like chocolate”, “Happiness is like chocolate”).
This resulted in a single simile goodness measure for each of our 15 target
concepts.
2.2.2 Alternative Uses Task
The Alternative Uses Task (AUT) is a widely used measure of creative cognition
in which participants generate novel uses for common objects. In order to further
explore the relationships between conceptual structure and flexible concept use,
we set out to collect data reflecting the extent to which a given concept can be
re-imagined in creative ways.
2.2.3.1 Participants
28 participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk generated novel uses in
the AUT, and an additional 25 participants provided ratings on these responses.
All participants were compensated according to current standard rates. Consent
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was obtained for all participants in accordance with the University of
Pennsylvania IRB.
2.2.3.2 Alternative Uses Task
Participants (N=28) generated alternative uses for the 15 concepts. They were
instructed to think of as many novel uses of each object as they could, that
responses should be plausible but significantly different from the common use of
the object, and that there were no right or wrong answers. On each trial, the
concept label appeared above blank response boxes. Participants had 60
seconds to answer with as many alternative uses as they could. After 60 seconds
passed, the next trial immediately began. The presentation order of the 15
concepts was randomized.
After these data were collected, we removed responses that were not taskrelevant (e.g., “I can’t think of anything”), and terminal responses that were
incomplete (due to the strict 60-second time limit). The number of responses
given by each participant for each concept was recorded, and these values were
averaged across participants: this resulted in a measure that reflected the mean
number of alternative uses generated for each of the 15 concepts (M=3.24,
SD=0.39).
From the full set of responses, we selected the first response from each
participant for each of the 15 concepts: this resulted in a set of 420 alternative
uses (28 per concept). These responses were edited such that they began with a
verb (e.g., “Use as a hat”, “Use as a bowling ball”, “Make pie”). This set of
responses was rated by an additional set of participants in the next stage of this
study.

Figure 5: Classification results. We ran a range of classification analyses using
different numbers of eigen-dimensions from our concept networks. Classification was
successful using 1 dimensions in both Set 1 and Set 2. Classification performance
increased as more dimensions were added, such that performance of the networkmodels reached performance of the vector-based models (single data points).
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2.2.3.3 Alternative Uses Ratings
An additional set of participants (N=25) provided ratings on the alternative uses
data described above. Participants were told that they would be judging other
participants’ responses on an alternative uses task, which was used to study
creative thinking. On each trial, they were presented with a concept label (e.g.,
“PUMPKIN”) and one alternative-use response beneath (e.g., “Use as a hat”).
Participants were asked to make three multiple-choice responses on each trial.
The first two questions were: “Would this work?” (yes/maybe/no) and “Have you
seen someone use this object to do this before?” (yes/no). These questions were
not central to our aims of this study, and the corresponding data will not be
reported here. The third question, which provided our main measure of creativity,
asked participants to rate each response as one of the following: (1) Very
obvious/ordinary use, (2) Somewhat obvious use, (3) Non-obvious use, (4)
Somewhat imaginative use, and (5) Very imaginative/re-contextualized use. The
design of this question was motivated by Hass et al. (2018), in which good
reliability was obtained for ratings on a similar alternative uses task. Each
participant rated 80 total responses, which were approximately evenly distributed
across the 15 concepts; trials were presented in a randomized order. Each
alternative-use response was rated by 5 different participants.
For the main creativity measure, ratings (1-5) for each alternative-use response
were averaged across the 5 participants. The mean ratings of creativity for each
alternative-use were then averaged within each concept, resulting in a measure
that reflects the mean creativity score of alternative-use responses for each of
the 15 concepts (M=2.91, SD=0.45).

2.3 Results
2.3.1 Classification Results
In order to determine whether our concept networks contained concept-specific
information, we ran a classification analysis using eigendecomposition for both
Set 1 and Set 2. We ran multiple analyses using different ranges of
eigenvectors, which were sorted by eigenvalue (positive to negative). We started
by only using the first eigenvector in each of the concept networks and
determined whether this dimension alone could be used to classify the property
vector as one of the 5 concepts in Set 1 or 10 concepts in Set 2. One dimension
was enough to classify exemplars in both Set 1 (Mean Accuracy=0.31; SE=0.03;
Chance=0.20) and Set 2 (Mean Accuracy=0.53; SE=0.03; Chance=0.10).
Classification accuracy in both Set 1 and Set 2 continued to increase as more
eigenvectors were included in the analysis (Fig. 5), with performance leveling off
around 22-25 eigenvectors. The network-based classification accuracy reached
the performance of a more traditional vector-based classifier (rightmost point on
graph), which was successful at classifying exemplars in Set 1 (Mean
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Accuracy=0.85; SD=0.06; Chance=.20) and Set 2 (Mean Accuracy=0.84;
SD=0.10; Chance=0.10). The successful classification of conceptual exemplars
using our concept network models suggests that the structures of these networks
are concept-specific. We can now extract and analyze traditional network science
measures from these concept-specific networks in order to examine the
relationships between network topology and flexible concept use.
2.3.2 Network Measures of Conceptual Structure
We extracted network measures from 15 concept networks and explored how
they relate to text-based and empirical measures of conceptual flexibility.
Hoffman et al. (2013) use word co-occurrence statistics to quantify the contextdependent variations in word meanings found in language. In order to capture
“semantic ambiguity” and “flexibility of word usage” in a computational
framework, the authors provide a measure of semantic diversity (SemD) based
on latent semantic analysis (LSA; Hoffman et al., 2013). A high SemD item is a
word that occurs in diverse language-based contexts — that is, the verbal
context surrounding instances of the word are relatively dissimilar in meaning.
Based on the assumption that flexibility of word usage reflects flexibility of
meaning, we extracted SemD values for our 15 concepts to determine whether
SemD predicts any of our network measures of interest. The correlations
between all network measures, along with means and standard deviations, are
shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Statistics and correlations between network measures. The mean and
standard deviation across 15 concepts is shown for each network measure of interest
in the top row. Beneath are the spearman correlation values between the four network
measures. The only significant relationship is between core-periphery structure and
network clustering.
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Figure 6: Network predictors of Semantic Diversity. Semantic diversity measures
calculated using word co-occurrence statistics (Hoffman et al., 2013) were (A) positively
predicted by core-periphery structure (r=0.71, p=0.003), and (B) negatively predicted by
network clustering (r=-0.70, p=0.004).

We hypothesized that network modularity, network diversity, core-periphery
structure, and network clustering might relate to conceptual flexibility, and we
tested whether our network measures correlated with SemD (Hoffman et al.,
2013) across our 15 concepts. First we examined modularity and diversity —
these measures capture the extent to which a network can be partitioned into
distinct clusters of nodes (“modules”), and the extent to which individual nodes
participate in these modules, respectively; SemD was not predicted by network
modularity (p>0.2) nor network diversity (p>0.5).
Next, we examined core-periphery structure — this measure reflects the extent to
which a network can be partitioned into one densely connected core and a
sparsely connected periphery; SemD was positively predicted by core-periphery
fit (r=0.71, p=0.003; Fig 6A). Core-periphery fit was not significantly related to K
(p=0.16), Nc (p>0.3), or simple stability (p>0.3). Further, core-periphery fit
predicted SemD when separately controlling for each of these measures in a
general linear model (all p’s <0.035). Our interpretation of the positive
relationship between SemD and core-periphery fit is that the presence of a
“periphery” — that is, a set of weakly associated features — relates to increased
variation of potential word meaning.
The last network measure we explored was the clustering coefficient, which
reflects the overall connectivity of a network; SemD was negatively predicted by
clustering (r=-0.70, p=0.004; Fig 6B). Clustering was not significantly related to K
(p=0.18), Nc (p>0.4), or simple stability (p>0.7). Further, clustering predicted
SemD when separately controlling for each of these measures in a general linear
model (all p’s <0.04), except for K (p=0.12). We interpret this negative
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Figure 7: Results of bootstrap analyses. (A) Distributions of correlations between SemD
and network measures when multiple networks are constructed using subsets of (A)
subordinates or (B) properties. The positive relationship between core-periphery structure
and SemD is robust to variations in subordinates and properties; the negative relationship
between network clustering and SemD is robust to variations in subordinates and
properties.

relationship between SemD and network clustering to reflect that fact that
networks with high clustering are too intra-connected to facilitate the flexible
activation of varied sets of features.
Core-periphery fit and network clustering were significantly negatively related to
each other (r=-0.56, p=0.03). No other measures of interest were significantly
correlated, though there was a trend towards a negative relationship between
modularity and clustering (r=-0.46, p=0.08), and diversity and core-periphery fit
were marginally positively correlated (r=0.45, p=0.095).
Finally, we explored whether SemD related to our simple stability measure which
reflects the extent to which properties in a concept are represented across all of
that concept’s subordinates. We observed a significant negative relationship
between SemD and simple stability (r= -0.52, p= 0.046). Simple stability did not
significantly relate to any of the network measures of interest (p’s > 0.3).
2.3.3 Bootstrap Analysis
We ran bootstrap analyses to test the robustness of network-SemD relationships
when only a subset of subordinates or a subset of properties was used to create
the concept networks. These tests were to confirm that the network measures we
report in this paper are not dependent on the exact subordinates and the exact
properties that went into network construction.
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Figure 8: Network predictors of creative concept use. (A) Network diversity positively
predicted the goodness of similes including the target concept in the vehicle position. (B)
Network diversity negatively predicted the creativity of initial responses in an alternative use
task.

Results of the leave-one-out subordinate analysis are shown in Fig 7A. For each
of the four network measures of interest, the bootstrap analysis resulted in a
distribution of correlations with SemD (blue histograms), along with a mean and
95% confidence intervals (pink bars). The distribution of core-periphery SemDcorrelations was significantly greater than zero (p=0), and the distribution of
connectivity SemD-correlations was significantly less than zero (p=0); these
results confirm that the correlations reported above are robust to variations in the
set of subordinates for each concept. Though modularity was not significantly
related to SemD, the distribution of SemD-correlations was significantly above
zero (p=0.01). On the other hand, the distribution of diversity SemD-correlations
was not significantly different from zero (p=0.23).
Results of the leave-10%-out property analysis are shown in Fig 7B. For each of
the four network measures of interest, the bootstrap analysis resulted in a
distribution of correlations with SemD (blue histograms), along with a mean and
95% confidence intervals (pink bars). The distribution of core-periphery SemDcorrelations was significantly greater than zero(p=0), and the distribution of
connectivity SemD-correlations was significantly less than zero (p=0); these
results confirm that the correlations reported above are robust to variations in the
set of properties for each concept. The distributions of SemD-correlations were
not different from zero for either modularity (p=0.12) or diversity (p=0.32).
In both of these bootstrap analyses, the variability in correlations between
network diversity and SemD is striking. This instability of network diversity across
38

bootstraps might indicate that network diversity is driven by a small number of
nodes with highly-varied connections whose presence varies over each iteration.
However, the particular local and global structures of a concept network that
contribute to network diversity — and the stability of this measure across different
concepts and methods of network construction — is an open question for future
work.
2.3.4 Similes
Interpreting a simile (e.g., “X is like a Y”) involves context-dependent activation of
conceptual meaning: the explicit comparisons contained in a simile implies that X
is similar to Y with respect to a certain dimension(s) or subset of properties of Y,
thus requiring the interpreter to select a likely subset of Y’s properties that is
being asserted for X. For example, to interpret the simile “Truth is like a knife”,
one must decide which properties of KNIFE can also apply to TRUTH. Since this
process involves within-concept property structures and flexible conceptual
meaning, we asked which of our measures, if any, predict the simile-goodness
measure we constructed for each of our 15 target concepts.
SemD did not predict simile goodness (r=-0.14, p>0.6). The two network
measures that were significantly related to SemD — core-periphery and
clustering — did not predict simile goodness either (Core-periphery: r=0.04,
p>0.8; Clustering: r=0.25, p>0.3); neither did network modularity (r=-0.11, p>0.7).
Interestingly, network diversity positively predicted simile goodness across the 15
target concepts (r=0.54, p=0.04; Fig 8A). Network diversity still predicted simile
goodness when controlling for K (p=0.04) and Nc (p=0.03) separately as well as
simultaneously (p=0.04). However, the bootstrapped distributions of networkdiversity and simile goodness correlations were not significantly greater than zero
(Supplemental Figs. 1 and 2), suggesting that this relationship might not be
robust to variations in subordinates and properties used during network
construction. The relationships between concept network structure and figurative
language comprehension should be further explored in future work.
2.3.5 Alternative Uses
Generating alternative uses for common objects involves thinking about those
objects in new, creative ways (Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2011). Theories
posit that the generation of novel uses requires one to suppress the typical
function of the object and to pay attention to its sensorimotor properties. For
example, the common use of CHOCOLATE is “to eat” — in order to realize that it
can also be used “as paint” one must activate the CHOCOLATE properties of MELTABLE and BROWN. Since this process involves consideration of a concept’s
properties and property relationships, we asked which of our measures, if any,
predict performance on an alternative uses task.
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First, we analyzed the average number of responses given for each of the 15
concepts in the alternative uses task. SemD positively predicted the number of
responses (r=0.67, p=0.006), such that if a concept-label (“key”) occurs in a
diverse range of textual contexts, participants will generate more potential
alternative uses for that concept (e.g., will give more responses for what novel
things to do with a KEY). None of the network measures predicted number of
alternative use responses (all p’s > 0.1).
Second, we analyzed the average creativity ratings for the first response given
for each of the 15 concepts. Mean creativity was strongly negatively predicted by
mean number of responses (r=-0.77, p<0.001), suggesting that concepts that
inspire more responses also tend to inspire less creative (initial) responses.
SemD did not predict mean creativity (r=-0.41, p=0.13). The two network
measures that were significantly related to SemD — core-periphery and
clustering — did not predict creativity either (Core-periphery: r=-0.32, p>0.2;
Clustering: r=0.40, p=0.14). A negative relationship between network modularity
and creativity was observed, but did not reach statistical significance (r=-0.50,
p=0.056). Interestingly, network diversity was a negative predictor of creativity
(r=-0.56, p=0.03; Fig. 8B). Network diversity still predicted creativity when
controlling for K (p=0.041) and Nc (p=0.036) separately, and was marginally
reliable when both were controlled for simultaneously (p=0.053). As in the
previous analysis, the bootstrapped distributions of network-diversity and
creativity correlations were not significantly less than zero (Supplemental Figs. 3
and 4), suggesting that this relationship might not be robust to variations in
subordinates and properties used during network construction. However, the
other network measures were reliably related to creativity in the bootstrap
analyses, suggesting that concept network structure may relate to people’s ability
to use the concept in creative ways.
2.4 Discussion
Here our goal was to model basic-level concepts using graph-theoretical
networks. A model structured using within-concept feature statistics provides a
framework in which varied yet appropriate instantiations of a concept may be
flexibly activated. An APPLE network may contain a strong connection between
CRUNCHY + FRESH and between SOFT + BAKED, enabling the conceptual system to
know what sets of properties should be activated in a particular APPLE instance
— for example, in the representations evoked by “apple picking” versus “apple
pie.” The property-covariation statistics for a given concept will determine which
sets of properties tend to co-occur, and how individual properties relate to those
sets and to each other. Here we have demonstrated (1) how to create these
concept network models, (2) that these models are concept-specific, and (3)
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structural characteristics of these networks can predict other measures of
conceptual processing.
The concept network approach we describe here is a general one, and there are
many different ways in which feature-based concept networks can be
constructed. We have walked through one potential way to do so, in a proof-ofconcept that reveals the feasibility and potential utility of this approach. The
specific methodological decisions used in this worked through example are
described above, and we hope that other researchers interested in modeling and
capturing conceptual flexibility will use variations of these methods — for
example, different concepts, distance metrics, or network measures — in order to
further explore how conceptual structure relates to flexible concept use.
There would be no point in attempting to extract concept-specific measures of
conceptual flexibility if the networks themselves did not contain concept-specific
feature relationships. Our approach assumes that this is the case, though this
was not a theoretical certainty. In fact, many feature-based models of conceptual
knowledge rely on feature correlations across the entirety of semantic space or
within a large semantic domain, and represent many concepts within this single
correlational feature space. For example, it could have been the case that the
property BLACK relates to SOFT and ROTTEN across all concepts. However, our
analyses suggest that properties relate to each other in different ways across
basic-level concepts. For example, BLACK might relate to SOFT and ROTTEN in
BANANA, but with FIRM and BITTER in CHOCOLATE. We found that our 15 concept
networks could successfully discriminate between new conceptual exemplars,
suggesting that within-concept feature statistics differ reliably between basic-level
concepts. These results emerged out of a classification analysis based on
eigendecomposition of our concept networks. Eigendecomposition of graphs has
previously been used to assess the correspondences between anatomical brain
network structure and patterns of functional activation (Medaglia et al., 2017);
here we adapted this method to assess the correspondences between
conceptual structure and feature-vectors for individual conceptual exemplars.
Empirically demonstrating that networks contain concept-specific feature
statistics enabled us to analyze each concept’s network structure and relate
structural characteristics to aspects of conceptual processing.
The kinds of structure we analyzed here included network clustering, modularity,
core-periphery, and diversity. In order to explore whether these network
structures could predict interesting aspects of conceptual processing, we
examined three external measures: a text-based measure of semantic diversity
(SemD; Hoffman et al., 2013), empirical measures of simile goodness, and
empirical measures of creativity on an alternative uses task. We found reliable
relationships between network measures and each of these three external data
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sets, highlighting the potential of this approach to capture aspects of flexible
concept use.
Network clustering, quantified in a clustering coefficient, captures the extent to
which nodes are linked to its nearest neighbors. A network characterized by high
clustering is one in which network nodes form “cliques” in which nearby nodes
are linked to each other (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). This is intuitive in social
networks, in which friends of one person tend to be friends with each other. High
network clustering has been observed in text-based semantic networks (Steyvers
& Tenenbaum, 2005), and semantic networks exhibit greater clustering in highversus low-creative individuals (Kenett et al., 2014). Here, we observed that
feature-based concept networks with greater clustering exhibit less text-based
semantic diversity (SemD). That is, words that do not occur in many text-based
contexts correspond with concepts whose features exhibit strong clustering. This
result was robust to variations in properties and subordinates used in network
construction. This finding suggests that dense local feature associations within a
concept network reduce the extent to which word meaning can vary across
instances.
Network modularity, quantified in coefficient Q, captures the extent to which a
network can be partitioned into densely connected modules (i.e., sets of nodes)
with sparse connections between them. Modularity is a defining characteristic of
“small-world” networks (Bassett & Bullmore, 2006) and has been observed in
semantic networks (Kenett et al., 2015) as well as functional brain networks
(Bassett et al., 2011). Here, we did not observe direct relationships between
network modularity and our other measures, though our additional bootstrap
analyses suggest that stronger relationships between modularity and conceptual
processing may be found when a larger set of concept networks are analyzed.
Core-periphery structure, quantified in a core-fit measure, reflects the extent to
which a network can be portioned into one set of densely connected nodes
(core), with sparse connections between all other nodes (periphery). This kind of
network structure, originally observed in social networks (Borgatti & Everett,
2000t), has also been observed in functional brain networks (Bassett et al.,
2013). Here, we found that concept networks with stronger core-periphery
structures exhibit greater text-based semantic diversity (SemD); this result was
robust to variations in properties and subordinates used in network construction.
This finding suggests that the presence of one set of highly-associated features
(“core”) in addition to a substantial set of weakly-associated features (“periphery”)
is predictive of conceptual flexibility. In particular, this structure might enable
substantial variation in the activation of individual periphery features across
instances of concept representation.
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Network diversity, quantified in a diversity coefficient, reflects the extent to which
nodes in a network participate in few or many network modules. This a version of
a “participation” coefficient calculated using Shannon entropy (Rubinov & Sporns,
2011). In functional brain networks, these measures are typically used to define
network “hubs” (Sporns, 2014), which are particularly important for transitioning
between network states (i.e. patterns of activity in a network). Here, we observed
that network diversity positively predicted simile goodness judgments and
negatively predicted creativity of responses in an alternative uses task. However,
these results were not robust to variations in properties and subordinates used in
network construction, so these specific relationships should be interpreted with
caution until replicated in a larger set of concept networks.
We observed relationships among non-network measures that are interesting in
their own right. First, we found that the distributional, corpus-based measure of
SemD (Hoffman et al., 2013) was negatively correlated with our simple stability
measure, which is the proportion of properties that are present in all of a
concept’s subordinates. As discussed in Landauer & Dumais (1997), two
important aspects of word meaning are usage and reference; measures of
distributional semantics (e.g., LSA, SemD) are constructed based on usage only,
and do not contain nor point to information in the world to which a word refers.
Feature-based measures (e.g., McRae et al., 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001), on the
other hand, do incorporate reference into word meaning by pointing to the sets of
features contained in each concept. Though distributional semantic approaches
have their benefits, it is often difficult to know what their respective measures
relate to from a cognitive or psychological standpoint. Our finding that the
distributional, corpus-based statistic of semantic diversity was negatively related
to a feature-based statistic of conceptual stability provides some insight into how
usage- and reference-based measures of conceptual diversity and stability might
converge.
The alternative uses task (AUT) also resulted in findings that warrant further
investigation. First, we found that the SemD of a word is a positive predictor for
the number of alternative use responses participants can generate for that item.
One interpretation of this finding is that if a word is found in more diverse textbased contexts it is easier to think of alternative uses of the object to which the
word refers. We additionally found that the mean number of alternative use
responses for a concept is negatively correlated with the creativity of the initial
alternative use response. Though further analysis of these findings is beyond the
scope of the current report, this might be a relevant finding for those interested in
the AUT task and creativity more generally.
Taken together, these results reveal the ability of feature-based concept
networks to capture meaningful aspects of conceptual structure and use. The
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analyses reported here were exploratory; we did not have any strong a priori
predictions of which network measures would relate to each additional
conceptual measure, and in what direction. However, we did predict that network
measures — which capture different kinds of conceptual structure — would
predict the ways in which concepts are flexibly used in language and thought. We
have thus demonstrated how to create concept-specific networks, and that the
structures of these networks can be related to other concept-specific measures.
The external measures we report here (SemD, simile goodness, alternative uses
task) are intended to serve as examples of measures that could be related to
concept network structure. We look forward to future work further exploring the
utility of this concept network framework in the study of conceptual knowledge.
Linking back to cognitive theories of conceptual knowledge, this concept network
approach has similarities to theories that aim to characterize the flexibility of
individual features. Sloman et al. (1998) captured pairwise relations between
features in order to model the feature-based structure of individual concepts.
These authors were interested in the role of individual features with respect to
conceptual coherence, which relates to notions of centrality in the “intuitive
theory” view of concepts (e.g., Keil, 1989; Murphy & Medlin, 1995). Sloman et al.
(1998) simplified this previous notion of centrality by basing conceptual structure
on asymmetrical dependency relationships between features; this structure
captures the concept-specific “mutability” of a feature, and offers a framework in
which concepts can be structured yet flexible. In the current paper, our concept
networks are defined by symmetrical feature co-occurrence statistics rather than
asymmetrical dependency relationships. However, it would be possible to
capture feature dependencies in directed concept networks (i.e., with
asymmetrical links). The use of network science tools enables us to analyze not
only a concept’s global structure, but also the characteristics of individual feature
nodes (e.g., mutability, centrality). These kinds of structures have implications for
flexible concept use such as analogies, metaphors, conceptual combination
(Sloman et al., 1998).
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Fig 9: Predicting conceptual combination. (A) The within-concept feature statistics of
BANANA are encoded in its concept network. These data can also be used to define a
transition probability matrix that encodes the probabilities that activation will spread from
one node to another. We can use these data in a (e.g., random walk) spreading activation
model in order to predict network states in different contexts. For example, we can predict
the state of the BANANA network during adjective-noun combinations: here the adjectives
“green” and “soft” are represented as single-node activations. (B) Activating a single node
will cause the spread of activation throughout the network according to the transition
probabilities. For example, activating the GREEN node (in “green banana”) will likely cause
activation of FIRM and SWEET (top), whereas activating the SOFT node (in “soft banana”) will
likely cause activation of BROWN and SWEET (bottom). Thus, the structure of the BANANA
network enables the activation of a range of states, subsequently generating varied, yet
appropriate, representations of bananas.

Though we believe that a feature-based concept network approach will provide a
new set of useful tools with which to study conceptual flexibility, it is not the only
way to do so. Other frameworks have the potential to capture the flexibility of the
conceptual system, including attractor networks (e.g., Cree et al., 1999; 2006;
Rodd et al., 2004) and recent updates of the hub-and-spoke model (Ralph et al.,
2017; Hoffman et al., 2018). The concept network framework proposed here is
not in opposition with these other approaches; the development and
implementation of all of these methods will greatly benefit our understanding of
the semantic system. However, we do believe that a network science approach
to conceptual knowledge has its unique advantages. The ability of graph
theoretical network science to model a vast range of systems enables us to
examine conceptual structure across cognitive, linguistic, and neural levels of
analysis. The structure of behavioral, feature-based networks (as discussed
here) can be analyzed and compared with the structure of functional brain
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networks within specific cortical sites (e.g., ATL) or across the brain as a whole.
There is an additional possibility of analyzing “informational” brain networks, in
which networks are constructed on the basis of simultaneous patterndiscriminability across cortical sites (Informational Connectivity; Coutanche &
Thompson-Schill, 2013). Network neuroscientists have previously forged links to
cognitive processes such as motor-sequence learning (Bassett et al., 2011) and
cognitive control (Medaglia et al., 2018), setting a precedent for the application of
networks to cognitive neuroscience.
Recent work exploring the intersection of network science with control theory
suggests another possible future direction. Network controllability refers to the
ability to move a network into different network states, and has been applied to
structural brain networks in order to shed insights into how the brain may guide
itself into easy- and difficult-to-reach functional states (Gu et al., 2015). There
have been additional attempts to link brain network controllability to cognitive
control (Medaglia, 2018). The application of control theory to concept networks
may provide an additional way to quantify conceptual flexibility by identifying
nodes that are well-positioned to drive the brain into diverse, specific, or
integrated states. Perhaps concept networks that are more controllable overall —
that is, networks in which it is easier to reach varied network states —
correspond to concepts that are more cognitively flexible.
So far, we have discussed mainly event context — a BANANA representation will
be slightly different while one is painting as opposed to eating, and it will be
different before and after a peeling-event has occurred. However, language itself
can provide a context: language is inherently interactive, and the meaning of a
word (i.e., the corresponding conceptual content) will depend on the words
surrounding it (e.g., Pustejovsky, 1998; McElree et al., 2001; Traxler et al., 2005).
Researchers interested in conceptual combination aim to understand how the
meaning of a combined concept (e.g., “butterfly ballerina”) can be predicted
based on the meaning of its individual constituents (Coutanche et al., in press).
This is not a unique challenge for noun-noun compounds, but also for adjectivenoun compounds: even the (putatively) simple concept RED has different effects
when combined with the concepts TRUCK, HAIR, and CHEEKS (see Halff, 1976).
Combining a noun-concept with an adjective-concept might not simply involve
the reweighting of a single property node, but a more complex interaction
governed by within-concept statistics.
These predictions could be generated using models of signal propagation, such
as spreading activation (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; De Deyne et al., 2016) or
information diffusion (e.g., Bakshy et al., 2012). On graph-theoretical networks,
spreading activation can be formalized by simulating “random walks” over the
network (Abbott et al., 2015; De Deyne et al., 2016). The edges in the network
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can be used to define a transition-probability matrix (e.g. Fig. 9A), which contains
the probabilities of transitioning from one node to another node. A random walk
begins at an initial node, and then continues to a new node by following one of
that node’s edges at random. Eventually the random walk will end (e.g.,
determined by a maximum path length), and the resulting path and activated
nodes can be observed. This approach, which has been used to analyze word
association data over large-scale semantic networks (Abbott et al., 2015; De
Deyne et al., 2016), can also be used to analyze the concept networks proposed
here. Random walks over concept networks could be used to predict the
properties activated for a concept in a given context — starting with an initial
property node, we could trace the activation of associated properties to predict
the cluster of properties that are likely to be activated in that instance. For
example, a random walk over the BANANA network starting at node FIRM would
likely include GREEN, SWEET, and YELLOW, whereas a random walk starting at
SOFT would be more likely to include BROWN, SWEET, and YELLOW (Fig. 9). These
methods could thus be used to predict interpretations of conceptual
combinations.
Finally, interesting differences might exist in the flexibility of concept networks
across individuals, or in the neural networks that support their processing. It has
previously been suggested that individual differences in functional neural
networks relate to differences in psychopathology (Lynall et al., 2010; van den
Heuvel, 2013), and that the structure of semantic networks differ between lowand high-creative persons (Kenett et al., 2014). Though these networks are
different in kind than the ones proposed here, the same kinds of comparisons
could be explored. The ability to shift a concept network from one state to
another, that is, the ability to flexibly modify the activation of certain properties,
could relate to an individual’s ability to generate or comprehend novel metaphors,
or to generate novel uses for common objects. The flexibility of person-specific
concept networks and neural networks could be explored in relation to
performance on these kinds of tasks. More generally, the structure and flexibility
of individuals’ concept networks may differ in meaningful ways, and this could be
a fruitful avenue for future research.
We acknowledge that our proposed concept network model framework has some
limitations. A large amount of data had to be collected such that we could
calculate within-concept statistics and run a classification analysis. Here we were
only able to construct and analyze 15 concept networks, a small sample with
which to work. However, the primary bottlenecks were related to the classification
analysis, which required that the concepts within a set were initially defined by
the same set of properties, and required other tasks related to stimulus design
and data analysis. Here we have provided evidence that concept networks are
concept-specific, and thus classification analyses are not an essential part of the
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pipeline moving forward. This will greatly reduce the effort and time needed to
construct concept networks in future work.
Additionally, there is a certain degree of experimenter subjectivity in the final
selection of properties and subordinate concepts. Both our properties and
subordinates were reported by subjects, and were not determined by the
experimenters. However, some decisions had to be made, such as deciding
whether a response should be considered a subordinate or a property (e.g.,
“nuts” with respect to CHOCOLATE), and deciding an appropriate level of specificity
of subordinates (e.g., excluding some brand names). In order to mitigate these
concerns, we have reported bootstrap analyses in which subsets of subordinates
or properties are excluded in order to assess the robustness of network
measures and their relationships. These kinds of analyses can be used in the
future in order to flag any potentially idiosyncratic effects in a given data set.
Despite these limitations, we believe that the construction and analysis of
concept networks will provide useful insights on the relationship between concept
structure and flexible concept use.
In this proof-of-concept, we have constructed concept network models, confirmed
their ability to capture concept-specific information, and extracted network
measures that relate to external test-based and behavioral measures. We
believe the application of network science to conceptual knowledge will provide a
set of tools that will enable the intrinsic flexibility of the conceptual system to be
explored and quantified. We hope that other researchers will be able to use these
tools to further our understanding of conceptual flexibility and the conceptual
system more broadly.
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2.5 Supplemental Material

Figure S1: Subordinate bootstrap analysis of network measures and simile
goodness. Distributions of correlations between network measures and simile
goodness when multiple networks are constructed using subsets of subordinates.
Though we observed a significant positive correlation between network diversity
and simile goodness, this result is not robust to variations in subordinates. Further
work is needed to determine which aspects of network structure relate to
comprehension of figurative concept use.
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Fig S2: Property bootstrap analysis of network measures and simile goodness.
Distributions of correlations between network measures and simile goodness when
multiple networks are constructed using subsets of properties. Though we observed
a significant positive correlation between network diversity and simile goodness, this
result is not robust to variations in properties. Further work is needed to determine
which aspects of network structure relate to comprehension of figurative concept use.
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Figure S3: Subordinate bootstrap analysis of network measures and AUT
creativity. Distributions of correlations between network measures and creativity on
the AUT when multiple networks are constructed using subsets of subordinates.
Though we observed a significant negative correlation between network diversity and
creativity, this result is not robust to variations in subordinates. Further work is needed
to determine which aspects of network structure relate to creative concept use.
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Figure S4: Property bootstrap analysis of network measures and AUT
creativity. Distributions of correlations between network measures and creativity on
the AUT when multiple networks are constructed using subsets of properties. Though
we observed a significant negative correlation between network diversity and
creativity, this result is not robust to variations in properties. Further work is needed
to determine which aspects of network structure relate to creative concept use.
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Concept

KEY

PUMPKIN

Subordinates
car key, key to a city, door key, encryption key, garage key, gate
key, key to my heart, house key, key card, keyboard key, map key,
motorcycle key, office key, padlock key, password, piano key, safe
key, skeleton key
pumpkin bars, pumpkin bread, pumpkin candle, canned pumpkin,
pumpkin cookie, pumpkin field, Halloween pumpkin, Jack O’Lantern,
pumpkin latte, pumpkin muffin, pumpkin pie, pumpkin puree, rotten
pumpkin, pumpkin seeds, smashed pumpkin, pumpkin soup,
pumpkin spice, whole pumpkin, Thanksgiving pumpkin

Excluded
Subordinates

electronic key, Florida Keys

carved pumpkin, fresh
pumpkin, gourd

GRASS

Astroturf, bamboo, barley, bent grass, grass clippings, crab grass,
dead grass, hay, lawn grass, lemongrass, marijuana, oatgrass,
overgrown grass, grass seeds, sod, wheatgrass

artificial grass, Bermuda
grass, cut grass, blue grass,
fescue, fresh grass, mowed
grass, rye grass, St.
Augustine grass

COOKIE

almond cookie, butter cookie, chocolate cookie, chocolate chip
cookie, Christmas cookie, cookie cake, cookie dough, gingersnap,
Girl Scout cookie, lemon cookie, M&M cookie, macadamia nut
cookie, macaroon, mint cookie, no-bake cookie, oatmeal raisin
cookie, peanut butter cookie, shortbread cookie, snickerdoodle,
sugar cookie, wafer

Chips Ahoy, fresh-baked
cookie, frosted cookie,
oatmeal cookie, white
chocolate chip cookie

PICKLE

bread & butter pickles, canned pickles, pickle chips, chopped
pickles, cucumber pickles, dill pickles, garlic pickles, gherkins,
hamburger pickles, homemade pickles, jarred pickles, kosher
pickles, relish, sliced pickles, sandwich pickles, pickle spears, whole
pickles

spicy pickles, sweet pickles

PILLOW

airplane pillow, bed pillow, body pillow, cotton pillow, couch pillow,
decorative pillow, down pillow, feather pillow, foam pillow, hypoallergenic pillow, memory foam pillow, neck pillow, silk pillow, throw
pillow, travel pillow

contour pillow, king pillow,
standard pillow,
Tempurpedic pillow

KNIFE

bread knife, butcher knife, butter knife, cheese knife, chef knife,
dagger, hunting knife, jackknife, machete, paring knife, pocket knife,
steak knife, switchblade, sword, throwing knife, utility knife

boning knife, bowie knife,
carving knife, cleaver, filet
knife, kitchen knife, pen
knife, Santoku knife, survival
knife, Swiss Army knife

WOOD

wood blocks, wood chips, chopped wood, wood fence, firewood,
wood floor, wood furniture, log, lumber, wood paneling, paper, wood
planks, plywood, wood pulp, sticks, tree, cedar wood, cherry wood,
maple wood, oak wood, pine wood, walnut wood

wood boards, balsa wood,
birch wood, ebony wood, fir
wood, hickory wood,
mahogany wood, redwood,
rosewood, teak

PHONE

Android phone, antique phone, broken phone, car phone, cell
phone, emergency phone, flip phone, home phone, iPhone, landline
phone, payphone, rotary phone, satellite phone, smart phone, wall
phone, wireless phone

corded phone, cordless
phone, house phone, mobile
phone, Motorola phone,
push-button phone,
Samsung phone, telephone

CAR

broken down car, compact car, convertible, coupe car, electric car,
family car, hatchback car, hybrid car, Jeep, luxury car, pickup truck,
race car, rental car, sedan, sports car, station wagon, SUV, toy car,
truck, used car, van

crossover car, Audi, BMW,
Chevrolet, Dodge, Ferrari,
Ford, GMC, Honda, Mazda,
Mercedes, Nissan, Toyota
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cont.
CHOCOLATE

bittersweet chocolate, caramel chocolate, chocolate bar, chocolate
chips, chocolate syrup, cocoa powder, dark chocolate, chocolate
fudge, melted chocolate, milk chocolate, nut chocolate, salted
chocolate, white chocolate, hot chocolate (drink)

baking chocolate, semisweet chocolate,
unsweetened chocolate,
smooth chocolate

BANANA

banana chips, banana pudding, Cavendish banana, fried banana,
frozen banana, mashed banana, over-ripe banana, peeled banana,
plantain, raw banana, red banana, ripe banana, rotten banana,
sliced banana, unripe banana

apple banana, baby banana,
Chiquita banana, green
banana, old banana, organic
banana, big banana, large
banana, short banana, small
banana, yellow banana

BOTTLE

baby bottle, beer bottle, broken bottle, juice bottle, liquor bottle,
medicine bottle, milk bottle, soda bottle, spray bottle, water bottle,
wine bottle

glass bottle, metal bottle,
plastic bottle, clear bottle

TABLE

bedside table, changing table, coffee table, conference table, dining
table, drafting table, end table, folding table, kitchen table, play
table, poker table, pool table, side table, workbench

rectangular table, oval table,
square table, round table

PAPER

butcher paper, cardboard, cardstock, construction paper, envelope,
graph paper, legal paper, newspaper, notebook paper, paper towel,
papyrus, poster board, printer paper, sandpaper, scrap paper,
sketch paper, stationary, tissue paper, toilet paper, wrapping paper

writing paper, black paper,
colored paper, white paper

Table S1: Included and excluded subordinates for all concepts. Subordinates were
excluded for a given concept if (a) the subordinate was similar or identical to a property
included for that concept (e.g., “black paper”), (b) the subordinate was highly similar or
identical to another subordinate included for that concept (e.g., “white chocolate chip cookie”
compared to “chocolate chip cookie”), (c) the subordinate was a specific brand name that
was similar or identical to other subordinates for that concept (e.g., “Chiquita banana”,
“Audi”).
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3: FEATURE UNCERTAINTY PREDICTS THE FLEXIBLE
NEURAL ACTIVATION OF CONCEPTUAL FEATURES IN
COMBINED CONCEPTS
3.1 Introduction
Individual concepts (e.g., COOKIE, OCEAN) are rich structures comprising many
features, and the activation of these features fluctuates across contexts. A
COOKIE can be crispy, chewy, fresh, sweet, and sometimes even salty. An OCEAN
can be calm, rough, warm, cold, and is always salty. A challenge for researchers
interested in conceptual knowledge is to predict what features will be activated in
a given instance. One way to navigate the flexibility of conceptual knowledge is
to observe what information is activated when concepts combine. The conceptual
features that are activated or strengthened in complex concepts (e.g., “warm
ocean”, “summer ocean”) can tell us something about how conceptual
information is structured and also how it is flexibly used. For example, consider
the different effects of “salty” in “salty cookie” and “salty ocean”: salty oceans are
much saltier than salty cookies, but comprehension of “salty cookie” involves
activating rare and thus potentially more informative features of cookies. Here we
explore whether interactions between features and noun concepts can predict
how features are represented in combined concepts.
Conceptual combination involves the selection of appropriate conceptual features
and the integration of those features into the head concept. This is especially true
for noun-noun compounds (e.g., “needle grass”) and figurative phrases (e.g.,
“The grass feels like needles”). In both of these phrases, comprehension involves
selecting appropriate NEEDLE features that are most likely to convey the
speaker’s intended meaning (e.g., SHARP) while excluding others (e.g., METAL).
These relevant features must then be applied to the GRASS concept. A rigorous
scientific exploration of conceptual combination will separately characterize the
cognitive processes for selection and integration, especially if the goal is to
understand which brain regions contribute to elements of flexible language and
concept use. Our current goal is to explore how features are flexibly integrated in
combined concepts, and thus want to target the integration component of
conceptual combination specifically. To do this, we focus on adjective-noun
combinations (e.g., “sharp grass”), which minimizes selection demands and lets
us explore how conceptual feature information is flexibly modulated during
comprehension. We will review previous cognitive and computational models of
adjective-noun combinations before explaining our own approach in more detail.
To avoid repetitiveness, we will use “features” and “properties” interchangeably.

55

A prominent source of divergence between early cognitive theories of combined
concepts is whether or not the outputs of a combination can be explained as a
function of the individual constituents alone (i.e., in a “closed operation”) or
whether knowledge external to the constituents is required. Smith et al.’s (1988)
selective-modification theory provides a well-defined model of adjective-noun
modification in which the only inputs are the adjective and noun constituents
being combined. A concept (e.g., APPLE) is represented as a collection of slots
and fillers, which relate to feature dimensions (e.g., color, shape) and specific
features (e.g., RED, ROUND), respectively. Each feature has a salience value that
indicates its strength for that concept (e.g., RED has higher salience than BROWN
for APPLE). Comprehension of adjective-noun phrases involves increasing the
salience of a feature and the diagnosticity of the associated slot in an instance of
the noun concept. For example, in the phrase “brown apple”, the adjective
“brown” increases the salience of BROWN and the diagnosticity of color in the
created APPLE instance. The success of this model lies in its ability to make wellformalized predictions about how concepts will combine, as well as in its success
at capturing similarity and typicality judgments (Smith & Osherson, 1984; Smith
et al., 1988). The simplicity of this model is also appealing: combined concepts
are computed in a closed operation, without referring to knowledge external to
the concepts being combined.
The simplicity of this model also has its disadvantages. Proponents of the
concept specialization theory (Cohen & Murphy, 1984; Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski
& Gentner, 1991) argue that Smith et al.’s (1988) model cannot capture the
flexibility and context-dependence of adjective meaning. The meaning of an
adjective can vary when paired with different nouns in stark or subtle ways. For
example, consider the differences between “fresh vegetable”, “fresh shirt”, and
“fresh idea” (Murphy & Andrew, 1993), and between “red truck”, “red face”, and
“red fire” (Halff et al., 1976). Additionally, conceptual features seem to interact
with each other and this aspect of conceptual structure affects how people
interpret combined concepts. For example, people assume that “wooden spoons”
are large, whereas “metal spoons” are small (Medin & Shoben, 1988). Therefore,
critics of the selective modification model argue that its unstructured conceptual
representations cannot explain the feature interactions observed in conceptual
combination (Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991; Medin & Shoben, 1988), and that the
flexibility of adjective meaning cannot be explained in a closed operation but
requires the incorporation of additional knowledge (Cohen & Murphy, 1984;
Murphy, 1988). On the one hand, it is clear that exploring feature interactions and
correlations is critical to understanding conceptual combination and conceptual
processing more generally, and conceptual structure has been modeled in
various ways (e.g., McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Tyler & Moss, 2001; McRae et
al., 1997; 1999; Sloman et al., 1998; Solomon et al., 2019). However, it is unclear
how the construct of “world knowledge” increases our understanding of how
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concepts combine. The content of this external knowledge is poorly defined and
the way it influences the combinatorial process is unspecified. Our goal is to
understand and predict flexible adjective meaning within a well-defined
framework. More specifically, we want to represent concepts and their features in
a way that enables flexible meaning to emerge when concepts combine.
A relevant class of models can be found in distributional semantics, in which
word meanings are represented as vectors derived from word co-occurrence
statistics in language (e.g., Lund & Burgess, 1996; Landauer & Dumais, 1997;
Michell & Lapata, 2010; Baroni & Zamparelli, 2010). In these models, vector
representations of adjectives, nouns, and adjective-noun phrases can be
extracted from large text corpora. Researchers can compare the success of
different compositional models (e.g., additive, multiplicative) in predicting the
representations of combined phrases, using the adjective and noun vectors as
input. These computational models are well-defined: various functions can be
applied to constituent representations in a closed operation in order to make
precise, quantitative predictions about the representation of the combined
concept. Mitchell & Lapata (2010) contrast different combinatorial functions and
provide empirical support for a simple multiplicative model. Baroni & Zamparelli
(2010) also use a distributional semantics approach to define adjectives as
matrices which are applied to noun representations in order to generate
representations of combined phrases that can potentially reflect flexible adjective
meaning. Compositional models in distributional semantics thus have the
potential to make quantitative predictions of combined concepts; however,
representing word and phrasal meanings based on word co-occurrence statistics
makes it difficult if not impossible to know what featural information is actually
being modified in the combined concept. In other words, it is difficult to associate
the text-based representations of word meaning in distributional semantics with
the cognitive and neural representations people actually use to understand
concepts.
In cognitive neuroscience investigations of conceptual combination, researchers
have characterized the neural regions recruited in the combinatorial process. For
example, a substantial body of work on conceptual combination implicated the
anterior temporal lobe (ATL; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011; 2012; 2013; Westerlund
et al., 2015; Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011; Boylan et al., 2017)
and angular gyrus (AG; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012; Price et al., 2015, 2016;
Boylan et al., 2015, 2017; Graves et al., 2010). In most of these studies, neural
sensitivity to semantic composition is determined by contrasting different kinds of
compositional phrases (e.g., “red meat”, “eats meat”) with non-compositional
phrases (e.g., “### meat”). The motivation behind this approach is to
characterize the neural regions involved in different kinds of conceptual
combination.
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Another approach is to analyze the information contained in the neural responses
evoked by conceptual combination. Two related fMRI studies found evidence that
multivoxel patterns (MVPs) in left ATL represent combined concepts (Baron et
al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011). Specifically, Baron & Osherson (2011)
determined that MVPs in the left ATL during processing of a “combined” concept
(e.g., GIRL) could be predicted by an additive or multiplicative combination of the
multivoxel patterns elicited by the simple constituents (e.g., YOUNG + FEMALE). In
another multivariate fMRI approach, Chang et al. (2009) analyzed distributed
neural responses to combined concepts. A reduced set of voxels (n=120) were
selected based on a measure of voxel “stability”, in which the patterns elicited by
adjective-noun combinations (e.g., “soft bear”, “plastic bottle”) and their
constituent concepts were analyzed. The distributed patterns of activity in these
voxels were more successfully predicted using a multiplicative model of featurebased constituent representations (see Mitchell et al., 2008), rather than an
additive model. The relative success of the multiplicative model implies that these
voxels captured the modified noun meaning, rather than a superimposition of the
constituent adjective and noun concepts (Chang et al., 2009). Taken together,
these findings suggest that meaningful representations of adjective-noun phrases
can be captured in patterns of activity in fMRI data.
We are interested in how conceptual information is modulated in combined
concepts. The processes involved in conceptual combination, and the resulting
modulation of conceptual features, will be constrained by conceptual structure.
That is, the way in which information is structured within individual concepts will
influence the ways in which that information will combine. A broad, theoretical
goal is thus to propose a theory of conceptual structure that can explain
previously reported empirical phenomena relating to flexible concept use (e.g.,
Halff et al., 1976; Medin & Shoben, 1988; Springer & Murphy, 1992; Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016). Here we use ideas from information theory (Shannon,
1948) to propose elements of a feature-based conceptual structure that might
relate to flexible modulation of information. Specifically, we use the information
theoretic measures of surprisal and entropy (e.g., Hume & Mailhot, 2013) to
represent the surprisal and uncertainty, respectively, of features given a
particular concept (Fig. 12A-B). Surprisal is defined as the negative log
probability of a feature given a concept: a high surprisal feature-noun pair
indicates that the feature very rarely applies to the noun concept. For example,
the features METAL and ORANGE have high and low surprisal for PUMPKIN,
respectively (Fig. 12A).
Entropy has previously been adopted in the fields of behavior theory (Berlyne,
1957), psycholinguistics (Hale, 2006), phonology (Hume & Mailhot, 2013) and
natural language processing (Berger et al., 1996). Here, we use entropy as a
measure of feature uncertainty, such that the highest entropy values are
58

observed when a feature applies to a noun concept about half of the time. Such
features are highly uncertain for a given noun concept, because they could be
true or false of any given noun instance. For example, GREEN has high
uncertainty for PUMPKIN because pumpkins are green only some of the time (Fig.
12B). On the other hand, there is low uncertainty for ORANGE (because pumpkins
are very likely to be orange), and also low uncertainty for METAL (because
pumpkins are very unlikely to be metal). Importantly, this measure of uncertainty
diverges from our measure of surprisal, enabling us to determine which of these
is a better predictor of feature modulation in adjective-noun combinations.
Previous research suggests that word meaning is flexible (e.g., Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; McElree et al., 2001) and
this extends to the flexibility of adjective meaning in combined concepts (Halff et
al., 1976; Springer & Murphy, 1992; Baroni & Zamparelli, 2010). Representations
of adjective-noun phrases can be analyzed across distributed neural patterns
using fMRI (Chang et al., 2009; Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011),
and these patterns appear to reflect a modification of the noun concept (Chang et
al., 2009). Our current goal is to predict the fluctuations of conceptual feature
information during comprehension of adjective-noun phrases, as reflected in
distributed patterns of neural activity, using the measures of surprisal and
uncertainty described above.
We selected a set of eight noun concepts (KEY, TABLE, PUMPKIN, GRASS, COOKIE,
PICKLE, PILLOW, KNIFE) and eight adjective concepts (METAL, WOODEN, ORANGE,
GREEN, SWEET, SALTY, SOFT, SHARP), and fully crossed them to create 64
adjective-noun combinations (see Fig. 10). Analyzing all possible combinations
eliminates bias on the part of the experimenter (Murphy, 1988), and enables a
wide range of feature-noun interactions to emerge. We observed distributed
neural patterns evoked by the individual concepts (e.g., “cookie”) as well as the
combinations (e.g., “salty cookie”), and derived a quantitative measure reflecting
the extent to which the adjective increased the adjective-denoted feature
information in the combination. For example, we determined the degree to which
SALTY information increases in “salty cookie” relative to “cookie” alone. We then
explored whether feature surprisal or feature uncertainty could predict the
observed degree of feature modulation observed in neural activity. That is, we
set out to explore the feature-noun relationships that contribute to the neural
representations of combined concepts. Understanding how individual features
are modulated across contexts is one important step in understanding the suite
of processes involved in conceptual combination and flexible concept use.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
Eighteen right-handed participants (10 female) from the University of
Pennsylvania community completed the fMRI study and were compensated
$20/hour for their time. An additional 46 participants completed online surveys on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and were compensated according to standard
rates. Consent was obtained for all participants in accordance with the University
of Pennsylvania IRB.

3.2.2 Adjective and noun stimuli
We explored the pairwise relationships between eight adjective (property)
concepts (METAL, WOODEN, ORANGE, GREEN, SWEET, SALTY, SOFT, SHARP) and
eight noun concepts (KEY, TABLE, PUMPKIN, GRASS, COOKIE, PICKLE, PILLOW,
KNIFE). These adjective and noun concepts were fully crossed, resulting in 64
adjective-noun combinations. These particular stimuli were selected such that
each noun (e.g., “pumpkin”) was matched with at least one adjective (e.g.,
“orange”) whose corresponding property was highly associated with the noun
concept. We also selected adjectives whose corresponding properties spanned
four property dimensions (i.e., material, color, taste, texture), such that our
experiment would not be restricted to one type of information but would apply to
property integration in conceptual combination more generally.
Adjective concepts (e.g., “metal”), noun concepts (e.g., “knife”), and adjectivenoun combinations (e.g., “metal knife”) were displayed in verbal format. The
words or phrases were presented in black, capitalized, Arial font in the center of
the screen on a white background. In the fMRI study, participants viewed nounwords in Run1, adjective words in Run 4, and adjective-noun combinations in
Runs 5, 6, and 7. The order of presentation was pseudo-randomized; eight
participants were presented with stimuli in reverse order within each run to
minimize order effects.
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Figure 10: Adjective and noun stimuli. We collected multivoxel patterns evoked by the
verbal labels of eight noun and eight adjective concepts. We also collected multivoxel patterns
elicited by visual depictions of the adjective concepts. These patterns were used in our
calculation of neural property modulation.

Adjective concepts and noun concepts were also displayed in an image-based
format. The image stimuli comprised real-world photographs collected from
Google that represented the appropriate concept. For noun concepts, this
resulted in a collection of 20 images/noun that represented examples of each
object (e.g., a set of images depicting kinds of cookies); for adjective concepts,
this resulted in a collection of 30 images/adjective in which the corresponding
property was represented (e.g., a set of images depicting metal things). None of
the adjective concept images contained any of the eight object concepts of
interest. These images were presented in the center of the screen on a white
background. In the fMRI study, participants viewed noun-image stimuli in Run 2
(these data were not analyzed in the current study) and adjective-image stimuli in
Run 3. Images were presented in a blocked design by concept. The order of
blocks was pseudorandomized; eight participants were presented with blocks in
a reverse order within each run to minimize order effects. No image was
presented more than once.
3.2.3 Feature surprisal and feature uncertainty
We were interested in characterizing unique interactions between the targeted
adjectives and nouns. We specifically determined the extent to which each
adjective-denoted property is surprising or uncertain for each noun concept using
the information theory measures of surprisal and entropy (Shannon, 1948). Both
of these measures can be calculated based on a measure of probability. In our
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case, we needed to know each feature’s probability with respect to each noun
concept. We collected subjective ratings of probability in an online AMT survey
(N=46), in which participants were asked whether each noun concept has each
property (e.g., “Is a pumpkin orange?”) and responded on a sliding scale from 1100 ranging from “Definitely No” to “Definitely Yes”. These responses were
averaged across participants and scaled between 0 - 1.
Surprisal is calculated as negative log probability (Fig. 12A). If the probability (P)
of a feature given a noun concept is low, then feature surprisal will be high (and
vice versa). We calculated feature surprisal (S) using the equation:
S = - log2(P)
Entropy is a measure of uncertainty, and can similarly be calculated from
probability values (Fig. 12B). If the entropy (E) of a feature given a noun concept
is high, then feature uncertainty will be high. We calculated feature uncertainty
(E) using the equation:
E = [-P * log2(P)] + [-(1-P) * log2(1-P)]
These methods resulted in a feature surprisal and feature uncertainty value for
each of the 64 adjective-noun pairs. The relationships between probability and
each of these two measures is visualized in Fig. 12A-B, along with the specific
surprisal and uncertainty values for each of the 64 adjective-noun combinations.
3.2.4 Analyzing concept network core-periphery structure
We also characterized unique relationships between features and noun concepts
using the concept network models introduced and reported in Solomon et al.
(2019). In this approach, individual concepts are represented as networks, in
which nodes represent conceptual properties and edges capture within-concept
property associations. A range of global (concept-level) and local (property-level)
measures can be extracted from these networks, and in Solomon et al. (2019)
we observed that the global core-periphery network structure relates to the
semantic diversity of the concept label (Hoffman et al., 2013). Here, we
examined local core-periphery structure — whether individual properties are in
the “core” or “periphery” of a given concept network — and asked whether
adjective-noun combinations differentially modulate property activations when the
relevant property is in the concept’s core vs. periphery. Peripheral properties are
more loosely associated with other properties for a given concept; these
properties might therefore be more uncertain for the associated noun. Thus, our
prediction is that peripheral properties will exhibit increased property modulation
relative to core properties during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations.
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Networks for seven of our noun concepts (all except TABLE) were constructed on
the basis of the same set of property nodes, and therefore are comparable.
Within each of these seven concept networks, we determined which of our
current adjective-denoted properties (i.e., METAL, WOODEN, ORANGE, GREEN,
SWEET, SALTY, SOFT, SHARP) were represented as nodes. The networkconstruction methods in Solomon et al. (2019) resulted in some properties being
excluded from each of the final network models, so not all properties are
represented for all concepts. Out of the 64 total adjective-noun combinations
tested in the current study, there were 35 corresponding feature-noun
relationships that were captured in the network models. For each of these 35
feature-noun pairs, we determined whether the property was located in the
concept’s core or periphery (Rubinov et al., 2015). There was an approximately
even distribution of core (N=16) and periphery (N=19) feature-noun pairs.
3.2.5 Task order and design
Participants in the fMRI study completed seven scanning runs; these runs
contained different stimuli and tasks. Participants were exposed to noun-words
(Run 1), noun-images (Run 2), adjective-images (Run 3), adjective-words (Run
4), and adjective-noun combinations in verbal form (Runs 5, 6, 7). We did not use
the noun-image data in the analyses reported here, so will not discuss it further.
In the noun-word (Run 1), adjective-word (Run 4), and adjective-noun
combination (Runs 5-7) scans, participants performed a memory task. Lists of six
words (or eight adjective-noun phrases) were presented in an event-related
design. Each stimulus was presented in the center of the screen for 2 seconds
followed by a jittered fixation ISI (2-12 seconds). After eight stimuli were
presented, participants were prompted with a word (or phrase) and were asked
to respond whether the cued stimulus was on the previous list, by pressing a
button on a hand-held response box. Each run contained eight lists; each
individual word or phrase was seen by the participant three separate times. In the
adjective-noun combination runs, each combination occurred once per run. This
task design enabled us to collect verbally-evoked neural patterns of activity for
each noun, adjective, and adjective-noun combination.
In the adjective-image scan (Run 3), participants performed an attention task.
Stimuli were presented in a blocked design, with blocks corresponding to
adjective concepts. Each block began with a cue specifying the dimension to
which they should attend (e.g., “color”), displayed in the center of the screen.
After the cue, a series of images were presented (6-24 images/block) that
represented one of the eight target properties (e.g., GREEN). In half of the blocks
there was an additional image added at the end of the block that depicted a
property different than the target property (e.g., the last image in a GREEN block
would depict a blue object). After participants viewed the series of images in
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each block, they were asked whether the last image was different from the others
with respect to the cued property-dimension. Each property concept was seen in
two separate blocks. Three 12-second fixation blocks were distributed throughout
the run. This task design enabled us to collect visually-evoked neural patterns of
activity for each adjective concept.
3.2.6 Functional MRI acquisition and analysis
fMRI data were collected on a 3-T Siemens Trio System and 32-channel array
head coil. Structural data included axial T1-weighted localizer images with 160
slices and 1mm isotropic voxels (TR = 1620 ms, TE = 3.87 ms, TI = 950 ms, FOV
= 187 x 250 mm, Flip Angle = 15°). Functional data included seven acquisitions
of echo-planar FMRI using a multiband sequence performed in 42 axial slices
and 2 mm isotropic voxels (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 234 x 234 mm,
Flip Angle = 90°).
Data were pre-processed and analyzed using FSL. Pre-processing included
motion-correction using MCFLIRT, spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of
FWHM 5 mm, and high-pass temporal filtering. Motion outliers were modeled as
covariates of no interest. The runs with verbal stimuli, which were presented in
an event-based design, were analyzed with a GLM
including item-level regressors modeling the individual TRs for each concept or
combination contrasted against the fixation baseline; this resulted in whole-brain
beta maps for the 8 adjectives, 8 nouns, and 64 adjective-noun combinations for
each subject. Since the adjective-noun combinations were presented across
three different runs, beta values were averaged across runs to result in a single
beta map for each of the 64 combinations for each subject. The runs with image
stimuli, which were presented in a blocked design, were analyzed with a GLM
including item-level regressors modeling the two blocks for each concept (6-24
seconds/block) contrasted against the fixation blocks. Individual subjects’ data
were transformed to MNI standard space.
3.2.7 Searchlight voxel selection
Our goal was to observe the amount of property modulation evoked by each
adjective-noun pair. To do so, we needed to capture the multivoxel patterns
(MVPs) that corresponded to each of our target adjective concepts. Our
adjectives denoted properties in different dimensions (i.e., material, color, taste,
texture), and it is likely that these kinds of information are represented across
different populations of voxels. We therefore employed four different searchlight
analyses to find voxels that are sensitive to each of these four dimensions (Fig.
11A).
Our searchlight analyses are based on the theoretical assumption that both
words and images should evoke conceptually-relevant information. For example,
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there should be overlap in neural activity when people read the word “green” and
when they visually perceive green things: this overlap in neural representation is
amodal with respect to stimulus presentation and is conceptually meaningful
(Fairhall & Caramazza, 2013). We therefore sought out to find the voxels that
responded similarly to the word-evoked and image-evoked presentations of the
same adjective concept compared to presentations of two different adjective
concepts.
For each dimension, we created a representational similarity analysis model
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2006, 2008) that predicted high similarity for within-adjective
correlations (r=+1; e.g., GREEN-word, GREEN -image), high dissimilarity for
between-adjective correlations within the appropriate dimension (r=-1; e.g.,
GREEN-word, ORANGE-image), and baseline similarity for between-dimension
property correlations (r=0; e.g., GREEN-word, METAL-image). Within each 123voxel searchlight, we correlated the eight adjective-word patterns with the eight
adjective-image patterns (spearman’s correlation), resulting in an 8 x 8 MVP
similarity matrix. We correlated these 64 neural correlation values with the 64
model-predicted values to assess how well the neural patterns captured
stimulus-independent property information for each dimension. For each
dimension, the correlation between the MVP similarity matrix and the dimensionspecific model was assigned to the voxel at the center of the searchlight; the
searchlight was swept over all voxels in the brain and the analysis was repeated
in each one. This resulted in four whole-brain maps for each subject, indicating
which voxels best captured information within each of the four property
dimensions. These maps were averaged across subjects, resulting in four grouplevel dimension maps. We selected our four voxels of interest (VOIs) by
extracting the top 100 voxels within each dimension. Because this was a voxelselection technique and not a statistical test, we did not assess voxel-wise
significance. In the subsequent analyses, we computed property activation and
modulation within the appropriate VOI; for example, we calculated the activation
of GREEN during comprehension of “green pumpkin” within the color VOI,
whereas we calculated the activation of METAL during comprehension of “metal
pumpkin” within the material VOI.
3.2.8 Property modulation in adjective-noun combinations
We wanted to calculate the extent to which the activation of the adjectivedenoted property increased in an adjective-noun combination, relative to the
noun concept. For example, how much more GREEN is contained in the
representation of “green pumpkin” than in “pumpkin” alone? In order to calculate
this difference in property activation — which we refer to as “neural property
modulation” — we first needed to calculate the degree of property activation in
the noun and adjective-noun items. Our approach was based the assumption
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stated above — that correlations between word-evoked and image-evoked MVPs
can capture conceptual similarity.
Specifically, our measure of property activation in unmodified noun concepts is
calculated by correlating image-evoked adjective MVPs and word-evoked noun
MVPs (Fig. 11B). High correlation values indicate high similarity between neural
patterns; we interpret a high similarity between noun- and adjective- patterns to
reflect that the adjective-denoted property is represented in the noun-MVP. For
example, to calculate the degree of GREEN activation in “pumpkin”, we correlate
the GREEN-image MVP with the “pumpkin”-word MVP. This results in 64 propertyactivation values for each subject (i.e., the activation of each of the properties in
each of the noun concepts). These values are averaged across subjects to result
in group-level data reflecting the degree of property activation in each unmodified
noun concept. Note that these are correlations between word- and image-evoked
neural patterns; the similarity cannot be driven by confounding variables such as
orthographic similarity.
We use the same method to calculate the activation of properties in adjectivenoun combinations (e.g., correlate GREEN-image MVP with “green pumpkin”
MVP). These data are similarly averaged across subjects, resulting in group-level
data reflecting the degree of property activation in each adjective-noun
combination. We can then calculate, for each of the 64 combinations, the extent
to which the adjective-denoted property increased in the combination relative to
the noun; this is calculated by subtracting the property activation in the noun from
the property activation in the combination. This our measure of neural property
modulation. For example, to calculate the amount of green modulation during
comprehension of “green pumpkin”, we subtracted the level of GREEN activation
in “pumpkin” from the level of GREEN activation in “green pumpkin.” This reflects
the extent to which the property GREEN is modulated during comprehension of
“green pumpkin.” Each of these analyses are carried out in the appropriate VOI:
modulations of ORANGE and GREEN are assessed in the color VOI, modulations of
METAL and WOODEN are assessed in the material VOI, etc. We thus have a neural
measure of property modulation for each of the 64 adjective-noun combinations,
and aim to determine whether specific interactions between features and noun
concepts can predict this observed neural property modulation.
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Figure 11: Calculating neural property modulation. (A) We selected voxels using a
searchlight analysis for each of our property dimensions (e.g., color). In each searchlight sphere,
we calculated the neural pattern similarity between word- and image-evoked adjective
information in a spearman’s correlation. We then computed the spearman’s correlation between
these neural similarity matrices and the model similarity matrices that probed dimension-specific
information. The resulting correlation value was assigned to the central voxel in the searchlight,
and we performed this analysis across the whole brain. The 100 voxels with the highest
agreement between neural and model similarity were extracted to create our 4 VOIs. (B) Within
these VOIs, we calculated a measure of neural property modulation that reflects the extent to
which a feature was more activated in the combined concept than in the noun concept alone.
Feature activation in the noun pattern and combination pattern was determined by correlating
each of their corresponding multivoxel patterns with the multivoxel pattern evoked by visual
depictions of the adjective-denoted property. The difference between these two spearman
correlation values is our measure of property modulation observed for that adjective-noun
combination.

3.2.9 Validating VOIs and analysis methods
We defined our VOIs using the searchlight analysis described above, in which we
assessed the sensitivity of voxels to our property dimensions (i.e., material, color,
taste, texture). Our main goal was to observe the amount of property modulation
within the corresponding VOIs, and specifically to determine whether featurenoun relationships can predict the amount of property modulation during
adjective-noun comprehension. However, we first wanted to validate our voxelselection technique by establishing that the VOIs represent the kinds of
information we expect. We therefore used the property modulation analysis
described above to calculate the degree of property modulation for all 64
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combinations within each VOI. The expectation was that a given VOI (e.g., colorsensitive voxels) would reveal greater property modulation for properties within
the VOI’s dimension (i.e., ORANGE and GREEN) than for properties outside of that
dimension (e.g., METAL, SWEET, SHARP). Within each VOI we calculated the
average degree of property modulation during adjective-noun comprehension for
within-dimension and between-dimension properties. Our VOIs did exhibit
greater property modulation for within-dimension properties (t(3)=4.26, p=0.024).
This confirms that our VOIs are differentially sensitive to our property
dimensions, and validates our voxel-selection and analysis methods. In all other
analyses, we only calculated property modulation for within-dimension properties
(e.g., we only analyzed modulation of ORANGE and GREEN in the color-VOI,
SWEET and SALTY in the taste-VOI, etc.).

3.2 Results
3.3.1 Feature uncertainty predicts degree of property modulation
Our main question is whether either feature surprisal or feature uncertainty can
predict the amount of neural property modulation during comprehension of
adjective-noun phrases. We capture these feature characteristics in the
information theory measures of surprisal and entropy (Shannon, 1948) and
define these values for the feature-noun pairs corresponding to our 64 adjectivenoun combinations. For each combination, we used multivoxel pattern analysis of
fMRI data to calculate the degree of neural property modulation within
dimension-appropriate VOIs (see Methods). For example, we calculated the
extent to which the property SALTY is increased during comprehension of “salty
cookie” relative to “cookie.” We subsequently tested whether feature surprisal or
uncertainty predicted increased property modulation. We observed a positive
relationship between feature uncertainty and the degree to which property
activation increases during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations
(r=0.26, p=0.035; Fig. 12D). This result was observed in our original 100-voxel
VOIs but was robust between VOIs of 50-190 voxels. We did not observe a
positive relationship between feature surprisal and property modulation; if
anything, the relationship was negative (r=-0.22, p=0.08; Fig. 12C). This is in part
explained by the negative relationship between uncertainty and surprisal (r=0.78, p<0.001); we therefore wanted to additionally test whether the relationship
between uncertainty and property modulation was significantly stronger than the
relationship between surprisal and property modulation. We confirmed that the
correlation between uncertainty and property modulation was stronger than the
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Figure 12: Feature surprisal and feature uncertainty. (A) Feature surprisal is greatest
when the probability of a feature given a noun concept is low. (B) Feature uncertainty,
measured in entropy, is greatest when the feature is sometimes true of the noun concept.
(C) Feature surprisal did not predict neural property modulation. (D) Neural property
modulation was positively predicted by feature uncertainty.

correlation between surprisal and property modulation in a Steiger’s Z test of
dependent correlations (ZH=2.05, p=0.04). These results suggest that feature
uncertainty, and not feature surprisal, predicts neural property modulation during
comprehension of adjective-noun combinations.
We ran an additional analysis to confirm that feature uncertainty influences the
specific, targeted activation of the adjective-denoted property. An alternative
possibility is that feature uncertainty more generally influences the activation of
all conceptual features in a combined concept. In each of the 64 combinations,
we calculated the property modulation for all eight properties (e.g., calculated the
modulation of METAL, WOODEN, ORANGE, GREEN, SWEET, SALTY, SOFT, and SHARP
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Figure 13: Concept network analysis. We exploited the networks reported by
Solomon et al. (2019) to assess adjective-noun relationships in a network-based
framework. For 35 of our combinations, we could determine whether the adjective
denoted a property in the concept network’s core (n=16) or periphery (n=19). We
compared mean levels of neural property modulation between core- and peripheryproperties, and found a greater increase in adjective-denoted information for peripheryproperties vs. core-properties (t(33)=2.19, p=0.036).

for “salty cookie”). We averaged these eight values to calculate a general
modulation value for each combination. These general modulation values were
not predicted by either feature uncertainty (r=-0.13, p=0.29) or surprisal (r=0.20,
p=0.12), suggesting that our main observed relationship between feature
uncertainty and property modulation reflects a targeted modulation of the
adjective-denoted property, and not the modulation of the noun concept’s
information more broadly.
3.3.2 Concept network structure predicts degree of property modulation
For 35 of the adjective-noun combinations, we determined whether the adjectivedenoted property is in the noun concept’s “core” or “periphery”, using a networkbased approach (see Solomon et al., 2019). Properties in a concept’s periphery
can be interpreted as properties that are more uncertain, and therefore the
associated adjective may have a greater effect when combined with the
associated noun. We thus predicted that we would observe greater property
modulation in adjective-noun combinations when the targeted property is in the
concept’s periphery. Indeed, we found that property activation increased more for
periphery properties than for core properties during comprehension of adjectivenoun phrases (t(33)=2.19, p=0.036; Fig. 13). If peripheral properties can be
considered as more “uncertain”, then this result strengthens our main finding that
that increased feature uncertainty relates to increased property modulation
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during comprehension of adjective-noun combinations. More generally, it implies
that the structure of feature representations within noun concepts has
consequences for how that feature information will be flexibly activated in
different language contexts.

3.3.3 Neural representation of properties in unmodified noun concepts
While our main empirical question was addressed above, we ran additional
analyses to observe the degree of property activation in the unmodified noun
concepts. For example, we calculated how strongly we could detect the
activation of GREEN, SWEET, and SOFT during comprehension of the noun “pickle”
in isolation. First, we predicted that there would be more activation of core
properties than periphery properties, since core properties are more certain and
consistent for a given concept. Using the same MVP analysis described above,
we did observe that properties present in a concept’s network core are
spontaneously more active during comprehension of the unmodified noun, as
opposed to properties found in the concept network’s periphery (t(33)=2.31,
p=0.026).
We had no a priori predictions regarding relationships between our information
theory measures (i.e., surprisal, uncertainty) and property activation in
unmodified nouns. However, if they do exist, negative relationships would be
more interpretable than positive ones: we might expect decreased activation of
uncertain and/or surprising features when the noun concept is presented alone.
We did observe a strong negative relationship between feature uncertainty and
property activation in the noun concept (r=-0.43, p<0.001) and a significant
positive relationship between surprisal and property activation in the noun
concept (r=0.32, p=0.01). As above, we ran a Steiger’s Z test on the difference
between these dependent correlations: the relationship between uncertainty and
property activation in the noun concept was significantly stronger than the
relationship observed with feature surprisal (ZH=3.28, p=0.001). We thus interpret
the significant effect of feature surprisal to be explained by its negative
relationship with feature uncertainty. These results suggest that when a noun
concept is comprehended, features that are possible but uncertain for that noun
concept are suppressed. This would in turn enable activation of this feature to
substantially increase when the uncertainty of the feature is resolved, such as in
adjective-noun combinations when the feature is directly asserted. This is an
interesting line of inquiry to explore in future work.

3.2 Discussion
We tested whether feature surprisal or uncertainty predicted the degree of neural
property modulation elicited by comprehension of adjective-noun phrases. Both
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of these measures are derived from information theory (Shannon, 1948); in the
present study, both characterize relationships between features and noun
concepts. Surprisal indicates the extent to which an adjective-denoted property is
unexpected given a noun concept, whereas entropy indicates the extent to which
an adjective-denoted property is uncertain given a noun concept. We found that
uncertainty in the feature-noun relationship positively predicted the increased
neural activation of conceptual properties in the adjective-noun combination. The
unexpectedness of a feature-noun pair did not predict these neural effects.
These results suggest that, at least in the property-sensitive voxels we analyzed,
the uncertainty of the adjective-denoted property, rather than surprisal, is
informative for the combinatorial process. If there is uncertainty reflecting
whether a certain property (e.g., GREEN) applies to an instance of a noun (e.g.,
PUMPKIN), then asserting this property in an adjective-noun phrase (e.g., “green
pumpkin”) reduces this uncertainty and is therefore informative.
In this study, we compared our measures of surprisal and entropy with a neural
measure of property modulation. Our measure of property modulation reflected
the degree to which a property (e.g., SWEET) is more activated in a combination
(e.g., “sweet pickle”) than in the noun alone (e.g., “pickle”). We calculated
property activation in both the nouns and adjective-noun phrases by assessing
the similarity between each of their corresponding multivoxel patterns (MVPs)
with the MVPs representing the adjective-denoted properties (e.g., MVPs elicited
by images of sweet things). We then calculated the extent to which, relative to
the unmodified noun, property activation increased in the adjective-noun
combination.
If properties are increased in adjective-noun combinations in relation to their
unexpectedness or novelty, then our measure of surprisal would have positively
predict our measure of neural property modulation. For example, METAL would be
a very surprising property for the noun concept PUMPKIN, and so we might have
observed a substantial increase in METAL activation during processing of “metal
pumpkin.” In line with this hypothesis, we would expect less property modulation
in combinations asserting less-surprising properties (e.g., “green pumpkin”,
“orange pumpkin”). This might be the prediction stemming from early featurebased models of conceptual combination, in which the salience of the adjectivedenoted property was increased in the noun concept (Smith et al., 1988).
However, we did not observe a positive relationship between surprisal and
property modulation; if anything, the relationship between these two measures
was negative. Thus, in the property-sensitive voxels we analyzed, increased
property modulation was not explained by an increase in property-object
surprisal, or unexpectedness.
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We did find that feature uncertainty positively predicted neural property
modulation. Even though METAL is a surprising property for PUMPKIN, it has low
uncertainty because pumpkins are never metal (or if they are metal, then they
might not be considered to be pumpkins; c.f. Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991). The
property ORANGE is neither surprising nor uncertain for PUMPKIN, because
pumpkins are orange most of the time. On the other hand, GREEN has high
uncertainty because sometimes pumpkins are green, and sometimes they are
not. Our results suggest that the uncertainty present in a feature-noun pair is a
meaningful source of information in the combinatorial process and that it may
influence the extent to which activation of the adjective-denoted property is
increased during comprehension of an adjective-noun phrase.
The observed relationship between uncertainty and property modulation points to
a combinatorial mechanism in which properties are flexibly modulated depending
on the adjective and noun being combined. The specific relationship between the
adjective-denoted property and the noun concept will influence the ways in which
the resulting combination is represented. In other words, an adjective does not
have the same effect across all nouns, rather the meaning or effect of the
adjective will change across noun contexts. This flexibility or context-dependence
of adjective meaning relates to theories of conceptual flexibility (Yee &
Thompson-Schill, 2016; Casasanto & Lupyan, 2015; Solomon et al., 2019), as
well as related theories of type-shifting or coercion in the language domain (e.g.,
McElree et al., 2001; Pustejovsky, 1998; Traxler et al., 2005). Classic theories of
conceptual combination (e.g., Smith et al., 1988; Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991;
Murphy, 1998) reference this flexibility inherent in the combination process and
rely on notions of “world knowledge” in order to explain these effects. In a
theoretical approach similar to our own, Halff et al. (1976) reports varied effects
of “red” in the contexts of e.g. “fire”, “face”, and “sunset” and claims that features
are represented as ranges of numerical values, rather than point estimates. In
this view, concepts themselves can contain the structure necessary to explain
flexible activation of feature information. In the present study, we observed
flexible adjective meaning without relying on world knowledge: the relationship
between uncertainty and flexible property modulation could be explained within a
closed operation whose only inputs are the adjective and noun constituents and
their corresponding conceptual structures. That is, we can capture flexibility of
adjective meaning without referring to information external to the two concepts
being combined.
Though we did not observe a relationship between surprisal and property
modulation, this relationship could in theory also imply a flexible combinatorial
mechanism. However, a positive relationship between surprisal and property
modulation would permit an alternative, non-combinatorial interpretation. If the
voxels we analyzed represented only the adjective during comprehension of the
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adjective-noun phrase, then we would observe a positive relationship between
surprisal and property modulation but not due to a combinatorial process (but
because surprisal is an inverse of probability). For example, the property SWEET
might be equally represented across all combinations (e.g., “sweet key”, “sweet
pumpkin”, “sweet cookie”), but we could observe the greatest SWEET increase in
the high-surprisal combinations (e.g., “sweet key”) simply because SWEET was
not present at all in the unmodified noun (e.g., “key”). In other words, an increase
in SWEET activation might not be a result of the flexible modulation of SWEET in
KEY, but rather a result of how property modulation was calculated. The
possibility that a representation reflects an adjective concept alone, rather than
an integrated adjective-noun combination, is an important consideration in
studies of combined concepts. This idea has been dealt with in distributional
semantics, in which researchers attempt to predict the representation of a phrase
(i.e., combined concept) based on high-dimensional word representations
derived from text corpora (e.g., Mitchell & Lapata, 2008, 2010; Baroni &
Zamparelli, 2010). The methods used in these approaches can be applied to
cognitive neuroscience investigations of conceptual combination in order to
ensure that observed results reflect the compositional processes of interest.
Importantly, however, these concerns do not apply to our current observed
results: a positive relationship between entropy and property modulation cannot
result from an adjective-only representation, but implies a combinatorial process
influenced by the unique representations of the adjective and noun concepts.
If the uncertainty of a feature-noun pair influences the outputs of the adjectivenoun combinatorial process, it follows that this uncertainty is likely embedded in
the associated conceptual representation(s). Feature-based models of
conceptual structure have incorporated this uncertainty to various extents.
Shifting away from classical theories, early probabilistic views of category
structure claimed that concepts are not composed of necessary or defining
features, but by characteristic or typical features (Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch,
1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975): category boundaries are “fuzzy”, and category
membership can be uncertain. Rosch & Mervis (1975) found that the frequency
with which a feature applies to category members relates to exemplar typicality.
More recent feature-based accounts of conceptual knowledge represent
concepts as weighted sets of stable features (e.g., McRae et al., 1997; Tyler &
Moss, 2001; McClelland & Rogers, 2003); it is acknowledged that these
representations are flexible in theory (O’Connor et al., 2009; Rodd et al., 2004),
but flexibility is rarely implemented in these models. A recent neural network
model incorporates flexibility of word meaning (Hoffman et al., 2018), though the
fluctuations of individual feature representations across contexts has not yet
been formalized. An alternative approach that might be able to capture feature
uncertainty is to embed feature uncertainty in a probabilistic framework. For
example, one could construct probabilistic feature-based models, in which
74

concepts are characterized by probability distributions over features. This idea
might be analogous to the probabilistic topic models in distributional semantics
(e.g., Griffiths et al., 2007), in which words are represented as a probability
distribution over a set of topics. This approach also relates to probabilistic
inference models of language comprehension (Goodman & Frank, 2016; Lassiter
& Goodman, 2013). In this proposed probabilistic feature model, each feature
within a concept would be represented as a probability distribution which
captures the most likely feature value as well as the variance, or uncertainty,
around that value. Representing feature uncertainty in this way might enable
flexible feature modulations during conceptual combination to be directly
predicted and tested within a probabilistic framework.
Recently, we proposed a feature-based concept network model in which
individual concepts are represented as networks of features which can be
selectively activated across different contexts (Solomon et al, 2019). These
models reflect aspects of global structure of whole concepts, as well as the local
structure of individual conceptual features. Aspects of this network structure
might relate to feature uncertainty. In the present study, we used the concept
networks described in Solomon et al. (2019) to analyze neural responses to
adjective-noun combinations. We looked within comparable (noun) concept
networks to see which of the eight adjective-denoted features were represented
in those networks. Out of our total list of combinations, we were able to analyze
35 adjective-noun pairs in terms of their local network structure. Specifically, we
determined whether the adjective-denoted feature was located in the noun
concept’s network core or periphery (Rubinov et al., 2015). We observed
increased neural property modulation when adjectives denoted properties in a
concept’s periphery, rather than when those properties are found in the concept’s
network core. This result highlights another way in which conceptual structure
relates to the flexible adjustment of conceptual information in language contexts.
Here our goal was to determine whether the information-theoretic notions of
surprisal or entropy could predict the extent to which conceptual information is
adjusted in conceptual combination: we wanted to know whether either measure
is informative in the conceptual combination process. There are other measures
reported in previous work that capture similar relationships between objects and
features, though the goal has typically been to characterize the properties that
hold a privileged status in distinguishing between basic-level concepts, rather
than to predict how property activations will fluctuate within a concept across
language contexts. However, some of these related measures include cue
validity (Bourne & Restle, 1959), informativeness (Devlin et al., 1998),
distinguishingness (Cree & McRae, 2003), distinctiveness (Garrard et al., 2001,
Tyler & Moss, 2001), and diagnosticity (Sedivy, 2003). Neural network models of
concept representation and learning have highlighted the importance of
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distinctive properties in conceptual knowledge and processing (Randall et al.,
2004, Cree et al. 2006). In these approaches, distinctive properties are
informative because they can be used to discriminate between similar basic-level
concepts. In our case, we are interested in informativity as a predictor of flexible
concept activation across different contexts. Our measures of surprisal and
entropy are simpler than the measures mentioned above, because they reflect
feature representations within single concepts, rather than statistics extracted
over a large set of concepts. It is likely, however, that flexible concept activation
is influenced by conceptual structure at many levels — on the level of features
(e.g., sweet), concepts (e.g., cookie), and semantic domains (e.g., food) — and
the relationship between conceptual structure and flexible concept use should be
explored at all of these levels.
Though cognitive theories of conceptual combination focus on how features are
mapped, integrated, or created in combined concepts (Wisniewski & Gentner,
1991; Springer & Murphy, 1992; Wisniewski, 1997; Smith et al., 1988; Estes &
Glucksberg, 2000), there has not, to our knowledge, been previous attempts to
directly observe the degree to which the neural representation of conceptual
information is modulated during comprehension of complex phrases. Many
cognitive neuroscience investigations of conceptual combination have illuminated
distinct neural regions implicated in some aspect of the combinatorial process.
Two regions that appear particularly implicated in conceptual combination tasks
are the left anterior temporal lobe (ATL; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011; 2012; 2013;
Westerlund et al., 2015; Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011; Boylan et
al., 2017) and left angular gyrus (AG; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012; Price et al.,
2015, 2016; Boylan et al., 2015, 2017). In a MEG study, the left AG was sensitive
to semantic composition relative to non-compositional phrases (e.g., “red boat”
vs. “xqv boat”; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012). More specific characterizations of left
AG response to conceptual combination has been offered by fMRI studies
revealing that this region is sensitive to the plausibility of adjective-noun
combinations (e.g., “plaid jacket” vs. “fast blueberry; Price et al., 2015), and to
combinations containing events or relations (e.g., “eats meat” vs. “red meat”;
Boylan et al., 2015).
In the left ATL, MEG studies have revealed this region’s sensitivity to general
semantic composition (e.g., “red boat” vs. “xqv boat; Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2011;
2012; 2013; Westerlund et al., 2015), and that an increased response in left ATL
to adjective-noun combinations is observed when the adjective modifies a lowspecificity noun (e.g., “blue boat” vs. “blue canoe”) which thus results in
increased specificity of the object concept (Westerlund & Pylkkänen, 2014). This
suggests that left ATL may be involved in the combinatorial process of property
integration or modulation, at least when the relevant properties relate to visual
information. The left ATL also appears to contain representations reflecting the
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output of the combination process: in the left ATL, patterns of fMRI activity
evoked by combined concepts can be predicted by adding or multiplying the
patterns evoked by the constituent concepts (Baron et al., 2010; Baron &
Osherson, 2011). These fMRI and MEG results suggest that the left ATL could
be involved in the property integration and property modulation targeted in the
current paper. Though here we focused on distributed representations across the
brain, a direct analysis of the left ATL in future work could further reveal how
information is modulated in the representation of combed concepts.
Our decision to observe property modulation across distributed brain regions was
motivated by the assumption that conceptual information is distributed across the
brain and comprises many information types (e.g., visual, tactile) that are
processed in various neural locations (e.g., Binder et al., 2016; Fernandino et al.,
2015, Anderson et al., 2016). We did not aim to characterize the functions of
specific neural regions (e.g., ATL, AG) during conceptual combination tasks, but
to observe how conceptual information fluctuates in meaningful ways during this
process. We thus analyzed distributed patterns of neural activity in voxels that
were sensitive to our dimensions of interest (i.e., material, color, taste, texture).
Previous work has analyzed distributed neural responses to adjective-noun
combinations: Chang et al. (2009) use fMRI to analyze distributed patterns of
neural responses to combined concepts and report that these patterns reflect a
representation of the modified noun concept. Our current results confirm that
information evoked by combined concepts can be detected across distributed
sets of voxels, and further suggest that these patterns can be probed for
meaningful changes in property activation during comprehension of combined
concepts.
If feature uncertainty is relevant for feature modulation in adjective-noun phrases,
it is likely that these same principles extend to other kinds of conceptual
combination (e.g., noun-noun combinations, figurative language). In many
combinations whether simple or complex, features are added, mapped, or
integrated onto the head concept. For example, the interpretation of the nounnoun concept “zebra cake” is a striped cake (Wisniewski, 1997); in this case, the
STRIPED feature is selected from ZEBRA and applied to CAKE. Additionally, in the
figurative phrase “The train is a worm”, features are selected from WORM (e.g.,
ELONGATED, SLITHERS) and applied to TRAIN (Solomon & Thompson-Schill, 2017).
Though these more complex combinations require the additional step of selecting
the relevant feature(s), the feature(s) must then be integrated with the head
concept in an appropriate way and to an appropriate degree. We hypothesize
that the same feature integration process is present across combination types,
and thus predict that feature uncertainty will be broadly relevant in conceptual
combination.
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The meaning of a phrase emerges out of the interaction between its constituents.
Characterizing meaningful interactions between constituent concepts is an
important step in understanding how the brain flexibly modulates information in
different language contexts. Here we have shown that the uncertainty of a
feature with respect to a given noun concept is an important interaction between
constituents, and that it may influence the degree to which feature information is
adjusted during comprehension of combined concepts. Representing conceptual
features as probabilistic and uncertain may further our understanding of how
information is flexibly modulated in complex language, and in conceptual
processing more generally.
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4: PROBABLISTIC MODELS OF FEATURE UNCERTAINTY
PREDICT BEHAVIORAL AND NEURAL RESPONSES TO
COMBINED CONCEPTS
4.1 Introduction
Human language relies on a deep reservoir of conceptual knowledge. Words
(e.g., “diamond”) refer to concepts (e.g., DIAMOND) that contain information
relating to knowledge about things in the world (e.g., diamonds are bright,
sparkly, and expensive). It is rare for individual words to be used alone: most
utterances comprise many words strung together, and one must combine the
meanings of the underlying concepts in order to generate an appropriate
interpretation. This is a complicated task because the meaning of a word is often
influenced by the words surrounding it (Frege, 1884). That is, the information
activated to represent a concept (e.g., DIAMOND) will be flexibly adjusted when
the concept combines with other concepts in language (e.g., “dirty diamond”,
“baseball diamond”). Here we use conceptual combination to explore (1) aspects
of conceptual structure that enable flexible activation of conceptual features, with
a focus on feature uncertainty, and (2) the neural regions that are involved in
flexible feature modulation in complex language use.
One approach to testing theories of conceptual structure and combination is to
embed theoretical assumptions in different computational models and see how
well those models predict behavioral and neural responses to combined
concepts. These methods have been fully adopted in models of vector-based
distributional semantics in which the meaning of a word is represented in terms
of its co-occurrences with other words in large text corpora (e.g., Mitchell &
Lapata, 2008; 2010; Baroni & Zamparelli, 2010; Steyvers & Griffiths, 2007). For
example, Mitchell & Lapata (2010) compared various additive and multiplicative
models against non-combinatorial models and reported general success of a
multiplicative model — which, compared to additive models, reflects an
integration of constituent representations. A few fMRI studies have used a
related approach to analyze neural responses to combined concepts (Baron et
al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011; Chang et al., 2009). For example, Baron &
Osherson (2011) revealed that multivoxel patterns evoked by complex concepts
(e.g., GIRL) in the left anterior temporal lobe (LATL) can be predicted by adding or
multiplying the patterns evoked by the constituent concepts (e.g., YOUNG and
FEMALE). Focusing on adjective-noun combinations, Chang et al. (2009) found a
multiplicative model to be successful in predicting distributed neural responses to
combined concepts (e.g., “soft bear”, “small cup”). Here we draw from these
methods to directly explore how conceptual features are flexibly modulated in
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combined concepts in behavioral and fMRI data. Comparing different
combinatorial models will tell us something about how concepts are represented
and also the processes by which they are combined.
We specifically hypothesized that the uncertainty of a conceptual feature (e.g.,
BRIGHTNESS) within a concept (e.g., DIAMOND) can explain the flexible activation
of that feature in combined concepts (e.g., “dark diamond”). If a feature is present
or absent in a concept with high certainty (e.g., DARK for CHARCOAL), then
activation of that feature will be less flexible in different contexts (as in “light
charcoal”). On the other hand, uncertainty in a conceptual feature (e.g., DARK for
PAINT) allows this ambiguity to be resolved in conceptual combination and
therefore substantial feature fluctuations may occur (as in “dark paint”). One way
we examined the potential influence of feature uncertainty is using information
theory’s notion of “entropy”, a measure derived from probability values which
reflects uncertainty or the informativity of a signal (Shannon, 1948). We
previously used this approach to explore neural responses to combined concepts
(Chapter 3) and found a relationship between feature uncertainty and flexible,
distributed neural activation of conceptual features during comprehension of
combined concepts (e.g., “green pumpkin”, “sweet pickle”). We also embedded
feature uncertainty in a new Bayesian model of feature composition and
compared its predictions regarding degree of feature modulation to more
traditional models. Probabilistic models of language composition have been
explored in prior work (Goodman & Frank, 2016; Lassiter & Goodman, 2013);
here we extend these ideas to the analysis of feature-based semantic
composition.
We used adjective-noun combinations to modulate conceptual brightness in a
range of nouns (e.g., “dark diamond”, “light charcoal”). Our goal was to test how
well feature uncertainty (i.e., entropy) and a Bayesian model could predict (1) the
degree of feature modulation caused by combined concepts, and (2) neural
responses to combined concepts observed in fMRI data. We focused our fMRI
analysis on a priori regions of interest including the anterior temporal lobe
(LATL), left angular gyrus (LAG), left fusiform gyrus (LFUS), and left inferior
frontal gyrus (LIFG).

4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
In the behavioral part of the study, 357 participants completed online surveys on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) and were compensated according to standard
rates. Twenty-four additional participants from the University of Pennsylvania
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Figure 14: Explicit measures of conceptual brightness. (A) Participants used a visual scale
to indicate the brightness of nouns and adjective-noun combinations. (B) For each of the 45
concepts, we calculated the extent to which conceptual brightness was modulated by “dark” and
“light” adjectives. Distance from the central black line corresponds to increased modulation of
conceptual brightness for both “dark” and “light” adjectives relative to the noun alone. The
calculated adjective effect for each concept is the mean absolute distance between combination
brightness and noun brightness across the two adjectives.

community completed the fMRI study and were compensated $20/hour for their
time. All fMRI participants were right-handed, fluent speakers of English with no
self-reported neurological disorders or damage. Consent was obtained for all
participants in accordance with the University of Pennsylvania IRB.
4.2.2 Adjective and noun stimuli
We focused on the single dimension of conceptual brightness to enable a tightlycontrolled analysis of how brightness information is modulated across verbal
contexts. We thus used the adjectives “dark” and “light” to modulate the
conceptual brightness of 45 noun concepts. These 45 noun concepts covered
the full range of brightness values (e.g., “diamond”, “snow”, “paint”, “shadow”,
“charcoal”). A full list of noun stimuli is shown in the Appendix.
4.2.3 Behavioral measures of conceptual brightness
Information theory’s measure of entropy (Shannon, 1948) is a measure of
uncertainty that can be calculated from probability values. Here we use entropy
as a measure of feature “uncertainty” for a particular feature-noun pair. For
example, we want to know the uncertainty of BRIGHTNESS in the concepts
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and PAINT. We collected subjective ratings of brightness probability on
AMT in which participants (N=58) were asked “Is/are [noun] typically dark?” on a
5-point scale ranging from “This is always light” to “This is always dark.”
Participants made responses to the 45 noun concepts presented in a random
order. These ratings were averaged across participants and scaled between 0-1
to reflect brightness probability (p), in which values close to 0 indicate that a
concept is likely light in color and values close to 1 indicate that a concept is
likely dark. We then calculated brightness entropy (E) using the following
equation:
DIAMOND

E = -pDARK∙log2(pDARK) + -pLIGHT∙log2(pLIGHT)
This was our measure of brightness uncertainty. Entropy is symmetrical around
p=0.5, where p=0 and p=1 indicate maximum lightness and darkness
respectively; each concept was thus assigned a single entropy value that
captured the concept’s brightness uncertainty on the light-dark spectrum. We
predict that brightness uncertainty will positively relate to the degree to which
conceptual brightness can be modulated across the 45 noun concepts when
paired with “dark” and “light” adjectives.
A separate set of participants on AMT provided explicit brightness judgments for
the noun and adjective-noun items concepts. For each of the 45 noun concepts,
participants (N=100) were asked to rate the darkness of each concept by sliding
a bar corresponding to a visually-presented scale transitioning from white to
black (e.g., “Rate the darkness of: PAINT”, Fig. 14A). The values of the visual
scale ranged from 0 (white) to 50 (black) and were unseen to participants. A
different set of participants (N=199) saw each noun modified by either “dark” or
“light” and performed the same task (e.g., “Rate the darkness of: DARK PAINT”).
Items were presented in a randomized order. Responses were averaged across
participants, resulting in ground-truth brightness values for the 45 noun concepts
(e.g., “diamond”) and for the combined concepts containing each of these noun
concepts modified by “dark” and “light” adjectives (e.g., “dark diamond”, “light
diamond”).
We then calculated the “dark” and “light” effects for each noun by calculating the
difference in brightness between the unmodified and modified items (Fig. 14B).
For example, we took the absolute difference between the brightness values of
“diamond” and “dark diamond” to calculate the DIAMOND “dark”-effect, and the
absolute difference between the brightness values of “diamond” and “light
diamond” to calculate the DIAMOND “light”-effect. The “dark” and “light” effects for
each noun were averaged together to result in a single measure that reflects the
extent to which brightness information can be modulated within a concept across
language contexts. We refer to this as our measure of ground-truth adjective
effects.
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4.2.4 Predictive models of adjective-noun combination
In order to understand how conceptual features are modulated in combined
concepts, we created a set of predictive models that made different predictions
about how concepts combine. Each model generates predictions reflecting the
conceptual brightness of the adjective-noun combinations (BCOMBO) based on the
conceptual brightness of the adjective (BADJ) and noun (BNOUN), and thus also
generates a prediction of brightness change (BCHANGE), which corresponds to the
ground-truth adjective effects described above. We constructed and tested an
adjective model, a noun model, a weighted additive model, and a Bayesian
model.
The adjective- and noun-models are non-combinatorial and are useful because
their outputs can be considered baseline predictions that the combinatorial
models should outperform. A similar approach is found in distributional or vectorbased semantics (e.g., Mitchell & Lapata, 2008; 2010; Chang et al., 2009). In the
adjective model, the predicted brightness of the combined concept (e.g., “dark
diamond”) is identical to the brightness of the adjective (e.g., “dark”), which is
formalized as:
BCOMBO = BADJ
Where BADJ corresponds to the extreme values of the scale (dark=50; light=0).
Within a single adjective (e.g., “dark”), the adjective model does not predict
differences in BCOMBO across the 45 nouns but it does predict differences in
BCHANGE based on differences in BNOUN for “dark” and “light” separately. That is, it
does make predictions about how observed feature activation will be influenced
by each combination. However, when adjective effects are averaged across
adjectives — as we did to define our ground-truth behavioral adjective effects —
the adjective model does not predict differences in BCHANGE. This is an important
point: the non-combinatorial adjective model is not able to capture variability in
the extent to which brightness can be modulated across our noun concepts.
In the non-combinatorial noun model, the predicted brightness of the combined
concept is identical to the brightness of the unmodified noun:
BCOMBO = BNOUN
The noun model predicts differences in BCOMBO across items. It does not predict
any variance in BCHANGE in the “dark” and “light” combinations separately, nor
when averaged together. Thus, like the adjective model, the noun model is also
unable to capture variability in the extent to which brightness can be modulated
across the 45 noun concepts.
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We constructed a combinatorial additive model in which the predicted brightness
of the combined concept is a weighted sum of BADJ and BNOUN. This model has
been proposed as a candidate combinatorial mechanism in both cognitive (e.g.,
Smith et al., 1988) and computational models of distributional semantics (e.g.,
Mitchell & Lapata, 2010). The simple form is:
BCOMBO = W∙BADJ + BNOUN
In our case, BADJ represents the extreme brightness values (dark=50, light=0).
Our implementation of the additive model makes predictions for “dark” and “light”
combinations that can be represented as:
BCOMBO-DARK = W∙50 + BNOUN
BCOMBO-LIGHT = BNOUN - W∙50
We optimized W between 0 W 1 (intervals of 0.01), separately for “dark” and
“light” combinations. This resulted in a value of WDARK that minimized the mean
squared error (MSE) of BCOMBO-DARK predictions relative to the ground-truth darkcombo brightness values, and the value of WLIGHT that minimized the mean
squared error (MSE) of BCOMBO-LIGHT predictions (Fig. 15D).
We also constructed a combinatorial Bayesian model of adjective-noun
combinations (Fig. 15A-C). The motivation behind this approach is that feature
uncertainty may influence how concepts combine. In addition to using entropy as
a measure of feature uncertainty, feature uncertainty can be embedded in
probabilistic feature models, like the one described here. We represented
conceptual brightness for adjective and noun concepts as probability distributions
over possible brightness values. In a Bayesian model, the predicted brightness of
a combined concept is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the product
of the constituent concepts’ brightness distributions. If the brightness probability
distributions for adjectives (PADJ) and nouns (PNOUN) are each captured by a
gaussian defined by a mean (µ) and standard deviation (𝜎), then the Bayesian
predictions of the brightness of combined concepts is the maximum a posteriori
(MAP) estimate of the product of these distributions:
BCOMBO = arg max f {PADJ (µ,𝜎)∙PNOUN (µ,𝜎)}
We derived the 45 PNOUN distributions (e.g., for DIAMOND, PAINT, CHARCOAL) by
fitting gaussian distributions to histograms reflecting the frequency of responses
in the explicit brightness judgment task (Fig. 15A). We do not have data from
which the PADJ distributions can be calculated; for simplicity, we assumed that
PDARKµ=50 and PLIGHTµ=0. We optimized separately for PDARK𝜎 and PLIGHT𝜎 (0≤
𝜎 ≤50; intervals of 0.01); two example PDARK distributions with PDARK𝜎 =8 and
PDARK𝜎 =15 are shown in Fig.2B-C. This procedure resulted in values for PDARK𝜎
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Figure 15: Predictive combinatorial models. (A) In our Bayesian model, conceptual
brightness was represented as a probability distribution over brightness values for each noun
concept. Greater values on the scale indicate increased conceptual darkness. Each
distribution is defined by a mean and sigma, derived from our behavioral task (see Fig. 14).
We defined the means of the “dark” and “light” distributions as the extreme ends of the
brightness scale, and optimized for sigma. (B-C) Different “dark” 𝜎 values result in different
BCOMBO predictions for “dark diamond”, and our goal was to find the sigma that generated the
most accurate predictions of BCOMBO across the 45 noun concepts. (D) In the additive model,
we optimized the adjective-weight for “dark” (W=0.35) and “light” (W=0.33) separately. (E) In
the Bayesian model, we optimized the standard deviation of the “dark” (𝜎= 8.42) and “light” (𝜎
= 10.27) distributions separately. We averaged the “dark” and “light” parameters within each
model to analyze fMRI data.

and PLIGHT𝜎 that minimized the MSE of BCOMBO predictions relative to the groundtruth BCOMBO values (Fig. 15E).
The two combinatorial models (i.e., additive and Bayesian) each had one free
parameter. For each model we generated predictions by optimizing the
parameter (i.e., W or PADJ𝜎 ) across the 45 concepts and then used that
parameter value to make BCOMBO and BCHANGE predictions for each concept. We
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compared the accuracy of these models in their ability to predict the behavioral
data.
In our analysis of fMRI data, we simplified the combinatorial models by averaging
the “dark” and “light” parameter estimates within each model, resulting in a single
value for W and a single value for PADJ𝜎 . One of the goals of the fMRI analysis
was to determine which of any neural regions exhibit responses to combined
concepts that reflect a combinatorial feature-based mechanism. The additive
model and Bayesian model are both combinatorial, and success of either one in
predicting neural response would satisfy our goal. We thus created a “composite
combinatorial model” by averaging the BCHANGE predictions across the additive
and Bayesian models. This resulted in BCHANGE predictions for the 45 darkcombos and the 45 light-combos.
4.2.5 fMRI task and design
Participants in the fMRI study completed 6 scanning runs. Participants viewed
the 45 unmodified noun concepts in the first two scans, and the 90 adjectivenoun combinations in the final four scans. Participants completed two tasks
simultaneously: a conceptual color detection task (“color task”), and a fixation
size-change detection task (“fixation task”).
In the unmodified noun scans (1-2), items were presented in an event-related
design with 2s stimulus presentation and a fixation ISI of 2-8s. In the color task,
participants were asked to press a button on a hand-held response box when an
item referred to a cued color; the color cue (i.e., red or green) was presented
before each block of trials. We thus interspersed filler items throughout each
scan that were either typically red (e.g., “strawberry”, “ruby”), or typically green
(e.g., “lettuce”, “frog”). This task was chosen to encourage visual imagery of the
items without explicitly asking participants to think about conceptual brightness.
Each run comprised one block of red-cued trials and one block of green-cued
trials; the order of red/green blocks was pseudorandomized across runs. Each of
the 45 target noun concepts was presented once per scan in a
pseudorandomized order and was seen once in a red block and once in a green
block across the experiment. To increase engagement with the stimuli, we
included an additional fixation task in which participants were asked to press a
different button on the response box when the fixation cross presented between
stimulus items briefly changed in size, which happened at random intervals 8
times per scan (4 per block).
In the combined concept runs (3-6), participants completed the same color task
and fixation task described above. The color task here involved fillers that were
combined concepts for red (e.g., “dark blood”, “stop sign”) and green (e.g., “light
moss”, “football field”). We included fillers that did not include “dark” and “light”
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modifiers in order to encourage participants to process the full combined phrases
rather than focus on the final word alone. Each of the 45 noun concepts
appeared (modified by “dark” or “light”) once per scan, resulting in two
presentations of each specific combination across the experiment. Each
combination (e.g., “dark diamond”) was seen once in a red block and once in a
green block.
4.2.6 fMRI acquisition and analysis
fMRI data were collected on a 3-T Siemens Trio System equipped with a 64channel array head coil. Structural data included axial T1-weighted localizer
images with 160 slices and 1mm isotropic voxels (TR = 1850 ms, TE = 3.91 ms,
TI = 1100 ms, FOV = 240 mm, Flip Angle = 8°). Functional data included six
acquisitions of echo-planar FMRI using a multiband sequence performed in 78
axial slices and 2 mm isotropic voxels (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 192
mm, Flip Angle = 75°).
Data were pre-processed and analyzed using FSL. Pre-processing included
motion-correction using MCFLIRT, spatial smoothing with a Gaussian kernel of
FWHM 5 mm, and high-pass temporal filtering. Motion outliers were modeled as
covariates of no interest. All scans were analyzed with a GLM including itemlevel regressors modeling the individual TRs for each concept or combination
contrasted against the fixation baseline. We added regressors for TRs in which
filler items or instructions were presented, TRs in which the fixation cross
changed size, and TRs in which participants made a response on the button box.
These data were averaged across scans, resulting in whole-brain beta maps for
the 45 unmodified noun concepts, 45 dark-combos, and 45 light-combos for each
participant. We excluded time-points in which participants incorrectly responded
to an experimental item from all subsequent analyses. Individual subjects’ data
were transformed to and analyzed in MNI standard space.
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Figure 16: A priori neural regions of interest (ROIs). We analyzed responses in four
ROIs; each 123-voxel spherical ROI was drawn around the peak voxel reported in a prior
study. The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) ROI (blue) was centered at Talairach coordinates
x=-52, y=22, z=11 based on an analysis of metaphor processing (Cardillo et al., 2012). The
left anterior temporal lobe (LATL) ROI (green) was centered at x=-39, y=10, z=-25 based on
a multivoxel analysis of combined concepts (Baron & Osherson, 2011). The left angular
gyrus (LAG) ROI (orange) was centered at x=-51, y=-54, z=23 based on an analysis of
adjective-noun combinations (Price et al., 2015). The left fusiform gyrus (LFUS) ROI (yellow)
was centered at x=-36, y=-47, z=-7 based on an analysis of task-dependent color processing
(Hsu et al., 2012). (A) Left lateral view and (B) ventral view, projected onto a Talairach
surface.

4.2.7 Defining a priori ROIs
We analyzed neural responses to combined concepts within a priori regions of
interest (ROIs; Fig. 16). We defined four ROIs in the left fusiform gyrus (LFUS),
left angular gyrus (LAG), left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), and left inferior
frontal gyrus (LIFG). Each of these spherical ROIs were comprised of 123 voxels
and were centered on the peak voxel previously reported in a related study. The
LFUS ROI was drawn around the peak voxel in an analysis reported by Hsu et al.
(2011) in which increased activation in left fusiform was observed when the task
required more detailed or specific color knowledge. This context-dependent
activation of conceptual color information might relate to context-dependent
feature modulation during combined concepts. The LAG ROI was drawn around
the peak voxel in an analysis reported by Price et al. (2015) in which increased
activation in left angular gyrus was observed for more plausible adjective-noun
combinations (e.g., “plaid jacket” vs. “fast blueberry”). We created our LATL ROI
based on Baron & Osherson’s (2011) finding that multivoxel patterns in left
anterior temporal lobe could be predicted by multiplicative and additive
combinations of the constituent concepts. Finally, we created our LIFG ROI
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based on an analysis reported by Cardillo et al. (2012) in which activation of left
inferior frontal gyrus was tuned by metaphor familiarity.
4.2.8 Neural adjective effects
We calculated univariate neural adjective effects (from now on “univariate
effects”) that reflected the extent to which neural activity was modulated by “dark”
and “light” adjectives across the 45 noun concepts. This measure was calculated
similarly to the behavioral ground-truth adjective effects described above. The
neural response evoked by each of the 45 unmodified noun concepts was
averaged across scans and z-scored for each subject, such that the mean
univariate response across all items was set to 0 across subjects. Similarly, the
neural responses to the 90 combinations were averaged across scans and zscored for each subject. Standardized univariate responses to the nouns and
adjective-noun combinations were then averaged across subjects and analyzed
as follows. For each concept, the neural “dark” effect was the absolute value of
the difference between the dark-combination (e.g., “dark diamond”) and noun
(e.g., “diamond”); the neural “light” effect was the absolute value of the difference
between the light-combination (e.g., “light diamond”) and the noun (e.g.,
“diamond”). These values were averaged to result in the univariate effect for that
noun concept. This approach resulted in univariate effects for the 45 noun
concepts reflecting the extent to which levels of neural activity were influenced by
the adjective-noun combinations.
We also captured the extent to which multivoxel patterns (MVPs) were
modulated in adjective-noun combinations. We calculated the Spearman’s
distance between the noun (e.g., “diamond”) and dark-combination (e.g., “dark
diamond”), as well as the distance between the noun and the light-combination
(e.g., “light diamond”), for each noun concept and separately for each subject.
These distance values were averaged across subjects, resulting in mean pattern
dissimilarity values for each noun compared to its dark- and light-combinations.
The dark- and light- distances were summed for each noun concept, resulting in
an overall MVP adjective effect for each of our 45 noun concepts. This
“multivariate effect” measure captures the extent to which patterns of neural
activity are influenced in combined concepts in each of the ROIs.
4.2.9 Analyzing neural effects
We tested whether our behavioral measures and combinatorial models predicted
either the univariate or multivariate effects observed in our fMRI data. In addition
to running Spearman’s correlations between these measures, we implemented
additional bootstrap analyses. In each bootstrap analysis, we randomly sampled
45 concepts with replacement and calculated the spearman’s correlation
between two measures of interest (e.g., feature uncertainty and univariate effects
in LIFG). We repeated this analysis 10,000 times, resulting in a distribution of
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correlation values between the two measures. In all cases we had an a priori
prediction regarding the direction of the relationship: we were looking for positive
relationships between our behavioral and model predictions and the neural
adjective effects. We thus assessed significance in a one-tailed design (𝜎 =
0.05).
To determine whether our compositional model predictions (i.e., the average of
the additive and Bayesian predictions of BCHANGE) related to our univariate and
multivariate neural effects, we needed to ensure that the compositional
predictions outperformed the non-compositional predictions. Remember that the
adjective-model does not make mean BCHANGE predictions when adjectives are
combined but does make BCHANGE predictions for “dark” and “light” separately. We
thus concatenated across “dark”- and “light”-combinations to result in BCHANGE
predictions for all 90 combinations for both the adjective-model and our
compositional model; we the “dark” and “light” neural effects were similarly
concatenated. To test the success of our combinatorial model, a general linear
model was used to determine whether the combinatorial model BCHANGE
predictions explained any unique variance in the neural adjective effects above
and beyond that explained by the non-combinatorial adjective model. We used
this regression analysis in the same bootstrap procedure described above,
resulting in a distribution of 10,000 beta values indicating the extent to which the
combinatorial model could predict either univariate or multivariate neural effects.
As above, significance was assessed in a one-tailed design (𝜎 = 0.05).

4.3 Results
4.3.1 Feature uncertainty predicts ground-truth adjective effects
We used entropy to derive a measure of feature uncertainty, which specifically
captured the uncertainty of conceptual brightness within each of our 45 noun
concepts. We predicted that brightness uncertainty would positively predict the
extent to which a concept’s conceptual brightness could be modulated by related
adjectives (i.e., “dark” and “light”). We did observe a strong positive relationship
between brightness uncertainty and ground-truth adjective effects (r=0.66,
p<0.0001), a result which supports the hypothesis that feature uncertainty is an
aspect of conceptual structure that may influence processes of conceptual
combination (Fig. 17A).
One reason to combine across “dark” and “light” when calculating adjective
effects is to reduce the influence of edge effects. By collapsing across “dark” and
“light” modifiers to calculate adjective effects, each concept has the same
maximum potential movement within the brightness scale (i.e., 50 brightness
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Figure 17: Behavioral results. (A) Brightness uncertainty predicts ground-truth adjective
effects (r=0.66, p<0.001). Uncertainty was captured using entropy, a measure from
information theory. (B) We compared the combination-brightness predictions of two noncombinatorial models (i.e., adjective, noun) and two combinatorial models (i.e., additive,
Bayesian) against ground-truth data (see Fig. 1). The Bayesian model performed better than
the additive model (t(44)=2.93, p=0.005), providing further evidence that feature uncertainty
is relevant for conceptual combination. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean.

units). For each individual modifier (e.g., “dark”), some concepts are given more
of an opportunity to change than others due to the brightness of the unmodified
concepts: for example, when modified by “dark”, the darkness of CHARCOAL
(BNOUN=43) can only increase by 7 units, whereas the darkness of SNOW
(BNOUN=3) can increase by 47 units. Combining across “dark” and “light” thus
eliminates this particular concern. However, to further confirm that our result was
not driven by noun concepts on the extreme edges of the bounded brightness
scale, we removed the 15 darkest and 15 lightest noun concepts and ran the
same correlation with the remaining 15 concepts. We still observed a positive
relationship between brightness uncertainty and ground-truth adjective effects
(r=0.78, p=0.0006). In fact, the relationship between uncertainty and adjective
effects still held when only the 9 middle-brightness noun concepts (GREY, CAR,
ROCK, MARBLE, FUR, SLIPPERS, PAINT, SILVER, COCONUT) were analyzed (r=0.74,
p=0.03). These additional analyses support our claim that the relationship
between feature uncertainty and feature modulation is not merely due to edge
effects but does reflect something meaningful about how concepts are combined.
4.3.2 Bayesian model best predicts ground-truth adjective effects
We tested the success of each of our models (i.e., adjective, noun, additive,
Bayesian) at predicting the brightness values of combined concepts. For each
model, we calculated the mean squared error (MSE) of dark- and light91

combination predictions for each item, averaged these MSE values across
modifiers, and then across items to calculate the overall error of each model (Fig.
17B). As expected, the adjective-model (MSE=258.6) and noun-model
(MSE=207.3) performed poorly relative to the combinatorial models. Comparing
the two combinatorial models, the Bayesian model (MSE=16.8) outperformed the
additive model (MSE=29.6), such that the Bayesian model generated predictions
that were closer to the actual brightness ratings of the combined concepts
(t(44)=2.93, p=0.005). These results further suggest that feature uncertainty
contributes to feature modulation in conceptual combination.
When the parameters were averaged across modifiers within each model, the
Bayesian model still outperformed the additive model (t(44)=2.29, p=0.027). We
averaged the BCHANGE predictions of these simplified models — separately for
“dark” and “light” combinations — in our subsequent analyses of fMRI data in
order to test whether activity in the ROIs reflected a combinatorial process.
4.3.3 Neural responses to combined concepts
We measured univariate and multivariate neural responses to combined
concepts in LFUS, LAG, LATL, and LIFG, and explored whether the neural
responses in these regions related to ground-truth adjective effects, feature
uncertainty, or our predictive combinatorial models.
4.3.3.1 Combinatorial effects in LIFG
The difference between mean LIFG response to a combined concept (e.g., “dark
shadow”, “light shadow”) relative to the noun alone (e.g., “shadow”) was
predicted by the explicit change in conceptual brightness caused by “dark” and
“light” modifiers (Fig. 18A). That is, we observed a positive relationship between
ground-truth adjective effects and univariate effects in LIFG (r=0.33, p=0.03). The
robustness of this finding was confirmed in our bootstrap analysis, which similarly
revealed a significant positive relationship between ground-truth effects and
univariate LIFG effects (p=0.006).
Additionally, feature uncertainty positively predicted univariate LIFG effects
(r=0.38, p=0.01), suggesting that a concept’s brightness uncertainty influences
activity in LIFG when the brightness of that concept is directly modified (Fig.
18B). A bootstrap analysis confirmed this positive relationship (p=0.001).
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Figure 18: fMRI results. Sensitivity to our combinatorial measures of interest were found in
LIFG and LATL. (A) Ground-truth adjective effects predicted univariate responses to
combined concepts in LIFG. (B) Feature uncertainty, defined using entropy, predicted
univariate responses to combined concepts in LIFG. (C) Ground-truth adjective effects
predicted multivariate responses to combined concepts in LATL; the greater difference in
conceptual brightness when modified by “dark” and “light”, the greater the difference in
multivoxel patterns in LATL between noun and adjective-noun patterns. (D) The Bayesian
model explained unique variance in univariate LATL response when controlling for the noncombinatorial adjective model. This result also held for the initial analysis using a composite
combinatorial model (averaged across additive and Bayesian models).

Univariate effects in LIFG were not predicted by the combinatorial model in the
main regression analysis (p=0.20) nor in the bootstrap analysis (p=.09).
Multivariate LIFG effects did not relate to ground-truth effects (p’s>0.2), feature
uncertainty (p’s>0.3), or the combinatorial model (p’s>0.15).
We thus observed that univariate responses in LIFG during comprehension of
combined concepts are predicted both by ground-truth effects and by feature
uncertainty. These results suggest that recruitment of LIFG during conceptual
combination in part relates to the flexible modulation of conceptual features.
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4.3.3.2 Combinatorial effects in LATL
Univariate effects in LATL were precited by our predictive combinatorial model
when controlling for a non-combinatorial baseline. We ran a general linear model
to test whether BCHANGE predictions of the combinatorial model explained unique
variance above and beyond that explained by the BCHANGE predictions of the noncombinatorial adjective model. The result of this initial analysis did not reach
statistical significance (p=0.06), however our bootstrap analysis revealed that the
combinatorial model did explain unique variance over 10,000 iterations (p=0.04).
These results suggest that univariate responses to combined concepts in LATL
may reflect a combinatorial process in which features are flexible modulated. In a
post-hoc analysis we tested whether the predictions of the additive model or
Bayesian model could individually explain unique variance above and beyond the
non-combinatorial baseline. The additive model did not explain a significant
amount of unique variance in either the main regression analysis (p=0.40) nor in
the bootstrap analysis (p=0.17). On the other hand, the predictions of the
Bayesian model explained unique variance in both the main regression analysis
(p=0.044) and the bootstrap analysis (p=0.032; Fig. 18D). We did not observe
positive relationships between univariate LATL effects and either ground-truth
adjective effects (p’s>0.2) or brightness uncertainty (p’s>0.5).
We calculated the extent to which multivoxel patterns of neural activity differed
between processing the noun concepts (e.g., “marble”) and the corresponding
combined concepts (e.g., “light marble”, “dark marble”). We found that groundtruth adjective effects positively predicted the extent to which multivoxel patterns
were changed in LATL during comprehension of the combined concepts (r=0.37,
p=0.012; Fig. 18C). This positive relationship was confirmed in the corresponding
bootstrap analysis (p=0.007). These multivariate effects in LATL suggest that this
region represents the output of a conceptual combination process. We did not
observe a positive relationship between multivariate LATL effects and brightness
uncertainty (p’s>0.5), and multivariate effects were not predicted by the
combinatorial model (p’s>0.2).
4.3.3.3 Sensitivity to conceptual brightness in LFUS Neither LFUS or LAG
exhibited responses that related to our combinatorial measures (i.e., ground-truth
effects, feature uncertainty, combinatorial model). However, we did find that
univariate response to unmodified noun concepts (e.g., “charcoal”, “snow”) in
LFUS positively correlated with explicit ratings of conceptual brightness (r=0.31,
p=0.036). This finding is consistent with previous work implicating LFUS in the
representation of visual features (e.g., Hsu et al., 2011). Univariate LFUS
response to combined concepts did not relate to explicit brightness ratings of the
90 combinations (p>0.2). These results suggest that the flexible modulation of
conceptual features in combined concepts might not necessarily rely on the
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same neural mechanisms involved in representing the features of individual
concepts in isolation.

4.4 Discussion
Here we explored how conceptual information is flexibly activated during
comprehension of combined concepts. We simplified this challenge by focusing
on the feature dimension of conceptual brightness, and we modulated conceptual
brightness using adjective modifiers (i.e., “dark” and “light”). We collected explicit
ratings of conceptual brightness for both unmodified nouns (e.g., “diamond”,
“shadow”) and their combinations (e.g., “dark diamond”, “light diamond”), and
used these data to characterize the extent to which conceptual brightness could
be flexibly modulated in different noun concepts. We then set out to determine
whether brightness uncertainty related to these ground-truth effects, and to
determine which brain regions exhibit sensitivity to this feature-based
combinatorial process.
We captured feature uncertainty using entropy, a measure from information
theory (Shannon, 1948) that reflects the uncertainty of an outcome or the
potential informativity of a signal. If P is the probability of an outcome, then
entropy is highest when P=0.5. For example, consider flipping fair vs. biased
coins. A flip of a fair coin has PHEADS=0.5 and PTAILS=0.5; the result of the coin flip
is maximally uncertain. On the other hand, if a biased coin has PHEADS=0.8 and
PTAILS=0.2 then the result of the flip will be less uncertain, as it is likely to result in
heads. We translated these ideas to the realm of conceptual knowledge to
explore the flexible activation of features in conceptual combination. If a noun
concept is characterized by complementary values of PDARK and PLIGHT, then
conceptual brightness will be most uncertain when both PDARK and PLIGHT =0.5.
Consider the concepts DIAMOND and PAINT, which were characterized by PDARK ~
0.2 and PDARK ~ 0.5, respectively. These values reflect the fact that diamonds are
unlikely to be dark, whereas paint is equally likely to be dark or light in color.
Because PLIGHT = 1- PDARK, and because entropy is symmetrical around 0.5, each
concept can be assigned a single brightness uncertainty value: DIAMOND has a
lower brightness uncertainty (0.73) than PAINT, which has very high brightness
uncertainty (0.99).
We predicted that brightness uncertainty would positively relate to the extent to
which conceptual brightness would be modulated in combined concepts. For
example, we predicted greater change in conceptual brightness for PAINT when
modified by brightness adjectives (i.e., “dark paint”, “light paint”) than for DIAMOND
when paired with the same adjectives. These predictions were supported by our
data: we observed a strong positive relationship between brightness uncertainty
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and ground-truth adjective effects across the 45 noun concepts. We also
embedded feature uncertainty within a predictive Bayesian combinatorial model,
in which a concept’s conceptual brightness is represented as a probability
distribution defined by a mean and standard deviation (see Fig. 15A-C). We
compared the success of this Bayesian model with a more traditional additive
model (Smith et al., 1988; Mitchell & Lapata, 2008; 2010) in its ability to predict
brightness modulations evoked by our combinations. The Bayesian model
outperformed the additive model, highlighting the relevance of feature uncertainty
in the conceptual combination process. Our behavioral and model results
suggest that conceptual feature uncertainty influences how features are flexibly
modulated in complex phrases.
The left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) was sensitive to our measures of flexible
feature modulation in combined concepts. Univariate effects in LIFG were
correlated with ground-truth adjective effects as well as brightness uncertainty.
LIFG is not typically associated with conceptual combination, but it is known to
play a role in metaphor processing (Solomon & Thompson-Schill. 2017; Cardillo
et al, 2012; Bambini et al., 2011; Eviatar & Just, 2006; Lee & Dapretto, 2006;
Rapp et al., 2004, 2007; Stringaris et al., 2007). Figurative language and
conceptual combination rely on similar conceptual devices (Wisniewski, 1997;
Estes & Glucksberg, 2000), in that they both involve the selection and integration
of conceptual features. The metaphor “His teeth are pearls” and the noun-noun
combination “pearl teeth” both involve selecting the relevant conceptual features
from the PEARL concept (e.g., WHITE, SHINY) and mapping or integrating these
features into the TEETH concept. The feature is often pre-selected in adjectivenoun combinations (e.g., “white teeth”) but integration of feature information is
still required. Our current results suggest that LIFG is involved in the feature
integration process during complex language comprehension, and we argue that
this process is relevant for combined concepts, figurative language, and natural
language use in general.
The other neural region sensitive to our measures of flexible feature modulation
was the left anterior temporal lobe (LATL). Univariate effects in LATL were
predicted by a combinatorial model of conceptual combination, suggesting that
activity in LATL reflects a feature-based combinatorial process. There is a
substantial body of evidence implicating LATL in conceptual combination (Bemis
& Pylkkänen, 2011; 2012; 2013; Westerlund & Pylkkänen, 2014; Boylan et al.,
2015; 2017), and MEG evidence suggests that this region is involved in feature
integration and the specification of object concepts (Westerlund & Pylkkänen,
2014). We applied predictions of a well-defined combinatorial model to LATL
responses and confirmed this region’s sensitivity to a feature modulation and/or
integration process during conceptual combination.
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Multivariate effects in LATL were predicted by ground-truth adjective effects. That
is, increased modulation of conceptual brightness across concepts relates to
increased distance between multivoxel patterns evoked by the noun and
combined concepts. For example, the brightness of PAINT was substantially
modified in combinations (i.e., “dark paint”), and the neural patterns evoked by
these combinations were substantially different from those evoked by the noun
alone (e.g., “paint”). This finding strengthens the theoretical claim that LATL’s
role in conceptual combination relates to the flexible modulation or integration of
features. Multivariate responses in LATL were previously explored in two related
fMRI studies in which it was found that processing complex concepts evoked
multivoxel patterns in LATL that could be predicted by combining the patterns
elicited by the constituent concepts (Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson,
2011). These studies revealed the contribution of ATL to conceptual combination
but could not provide conclusive evidence of conceptual integration, per se. Here
we explored fine-grained effects of combined concepts on multivoxel patterns in
LATL and observed sensitivity of this region to the amount of conceptual change
evoked by the combinations. These results converge on the hypothesis that
LATL is involved in integrating feature representations of constituent concepts
during conceptual combination.
The left angular gyrus (LAG) has emerged in multiple neuroimaging studies of
conceptual combination (Bemis & Pylkkänen, 2012; Price et al., 2015; 2016;
Boylan et al., 2015; 2017, Graves et al., 2010). In particular, it has been argued
that LAG is sensitive to the plausibility of adjective-noun combinations (Price et
al., 2015), and to “relational” combinations which imply an event or relation
between two concepts, rather than feature attribution (Boylan et al., 2015; 2017).
Here we specifically targeted the process of feature modulation in adjective-noun
combinations and did not observe any LAG involvement. Though we hesitate to
strongly interpret these null results, the apparent lack of LAG response to
feature-based combination is consistent with the theory that LAG is recruited for
“relational” rather than “attributive” conceptual combinations (Boylan et al., 2015;
2017).
We analyzed neural responses in LFUS based on prior work establishing
sensitivity in this region to conceptual color (Martin et al., 1995; Simmons et al.,
2007; Hsu et al., 2011; 2012). We did not observe sensitivity in this region to any
of our feature-based combinatorial measures, though we did find a relationship
between conceptual brightness and univariate LFUS response to unmodified
nouns (e.g., “charcoal”, “snow”). Our results thus support a role of LFUS in
representing visual conceptual features, but do not support a role of LFUS in
combining conceptual features.
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Previous studies comparing color representations evoked by perception or
conception have revealed distinct yet overlapping representations in these tasks
(Martin et al., 1994; Simmons et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2012). It is possible that
combined visual features are represented in distinct regions of LFUS that we did
not test in the current study (see Supplemental Materials). However, our positive
results in LATL and the lack of combinatorial results in LFUS suggests that
combined conceptual features may be represented in regions that do not
represent those features in the constituent concepts alone. It has been argued
that the ATL is a semantic “hub” that integrates sensorimotor (e.g., visual)
information represented elsewhere in the cortex, and that the representations in
ATL reflect a conceptual similarity space transformed away from sensorimotor
features (Patterson et al., 2007; Ralph et al., 2010, 2017). Related work has
shown that ATL represents the conjunction of visual features (i.e., color and
shape), but not the visual features themselves (Coutanche & Thompson-Schill,
2014). Our current results suggest that visual features modified by conceptual
combination are similarly represented in ATL, distinct from the representations of
features evoked by individual concepts. Additional work is needed to clarify how
and where features are represented in combined concepts.
Here we have characterized the computational and neural mechanisms
underlying the flexible modulation of conceptual information during language
comprehension. Using methods inspired from information theory and Bayesian
modeling, we provided evidence that feature uncertainty plays a role in
conceptual combination. Further, our analyses exposed the LIFG and LATL as
regions involved in this feature-based combinatorial process. These findings are
likely to extend more generally to complex language processing and flexible
concept use.
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4.5 Appendix

Table A1: Noun concepts. The 45 noun concepts used in the current
study are displayed in order of conceptual brightness (light to dark).
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4.6 Supplemental Materials
Whole-brain Searchlight Analysis
In addition to analyzing the a priori regions of interest, we ran an exploratory
whole-brain searchlight analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) to observe what other
regions of the brain respond to flexible feature modulation in combined concepts.
We used the Princeton MVPA toolbox to define 123-voxel searchlights across the
whole brain; within each searchlight we calculated group-level univariate neural
effects as reported in the main manuscript. We correlated the univariate effects
with our measure of (1) ground-truth adjective effects, (2) feature uncertainty,
and (3) the predictive Bayesian model (controlling for a non-combinatorial
baseline).
We applied a voxel-wise threshold of 𝜎 =0.001 to each of the resulting wholebrain searchlight maps, and clustered these thresholded maps using a minimum
cluster size of 10 voxels (faces or edges touching). These maps were then
overlaid to determine whether there was any overlap between the three
measures of interest.
Using this conservative thresholding technique, we observed one region in which
univariate responses to combined concepts was significantly correlated with both
ground-truth adjective effects and feature uncertainty; this cluster had a peak
voxel in the right lingual gyrus (Fig. S5). We did not observe any other significant
overlap between the measures. However, we did observe one significant cluster
emerging from the Bayesian model analysis and several significant clusters
reflecting sensitivity to feature uncertainty (Table S2).
These exploratory results reveal that several brain regions exhibit responses to
combined concepts correlated with feature uncertainty. These results also
highlight the fact that many areas of the brain — besides the a priori ROIs we
analyzed in the main study — are likely implicated in the flexible modulation of
features during comprehension of complex language.
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Fig S5: Overlap between ground-truth effects and feature uncertainty. In a searchlight
analysis we found voxels distributed across the brain which exhibited a univariate response
(see main Methods) that related to our measures of interest. Whole-brain maps were
thresholded at 0.001 and then clusterized with a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels.
Significant overlap in sensitivity to ground-truth effects and feature uncertainty was found
in right lingual gyrus (peak MNI coordinates: x=20, y=-50, z=2).

Table S2: Significant clusters in whole-brain searchlight analysis. Whole-brain searchlight
maps were thresholded at 𝜎 ≤ 0.001 and clusterized with a minimum cluster size of 10 voxels.
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5: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this thesis was to explore the relationship between conceptual
structure and flexible concept use. These two questions — how conceptual
information is represented, and how concepts are flexibly used in language and
thought — are inextricably linked (Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991). Early debates in
cognitive science carved out possible solutions in this theoretical space, focusing
on the topic of conceptual combination (Smith et al., 1984; 1988; Hampton, 1988;
Murphy, 1988). However, this challenge has not been revisited after subsequent
decades of research in the cognitive neuroscience of conceptual knowledge and
the accumulation of evidence relating to flexible concept use. Here I attempted to
merge cognitive theories of conceptual knowledge with more recent methods in
cognitive neuroscience, network science, and computational modeling. The
fusion of these disciplines might help us understand how conceptual knowledge
is represented and used.
One claim presented in early cognitive theories of conceptual knowledge was
that conceptual representations are structured — that is, the features comprising
conceptual knowledge are interdependent or associated with one other (Medin &
Shoben, 1988; Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991; Sloman et al., 1998). However, no
well-defined models of conceptual combination were proposed that included
structured feature-based conceptual representations (c.f. Sloman et al., 1998).
The aim of Chapter 2 was to capture a feature-based, structured conceptual
representation using a network science model, and to test whether these network
models could capture empirical measures of conceptual flexibility. Individual
concepts (e.g., banana, bottle) were modeled as graph-theoretical networks, in
which network nodes represented conceptual properties (e.g., yellow, sweet) and
network edges captured their associations. These networks captured the withinconcept feature associations that reflect how properties relate to one another
across instances of a concept. Formal measures that relate to different aspects
of network structure were extracted in order to determine whether a concept’s
network structure relates to how that concept is flexibly used.
Network measures were compared with a text-based measure of semantic
diversity and also to empirical data from a figurative language task and an
alternative uses task. The semantic diversity (SemD) measure was derived within
the framework of distributional semantics described above (e.g., section 1.4)
which assumes that “you shall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth,
1957) — that is, by observing the other words with which it co-occurs. The SemD
measure was constructed in Hoffman et al. (2013) by quantifying the diversity of
a word’s co-occurring neighbors; this was interpreted to reflect meaningful
variability in a word’s semantic content. One of the goals of Chapter 2 was to see
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if aspects of concept network structure related to the SemD measure of flexibility
derived within distributional semantics. Two aspects of network structure (i.e.,
core-periphery structure and network clustering) were correlated with SemD
across the analyzed concepts. These results reveal that conceptual flexibility —
previously only captured in methods of distributional semantics — can also be
captured using the compositional, feature-based representations frequently
adopted in cognitive theories of conceptual knowledge.
The relationship between concept network structure and flexible concept use was
further explored using two additional empirical measures. First, a measure of
“simile goodness” was derived for each concept, based on ratings of simile
meaningfulness and familiarity. Second, a measure of creativity was derived for
each concept based on an alternative uses task. Results revealed possible
relationships between aspects of network structure and both of these empirical
measures. These results are offered as a proof-of-concept that feature-based
network representations of concepts can relate to how those concepts are
flexibly used in language and thought.
The methods proposed in Chapter 2 are broad in scope and there are many
iterations of this model that have not yet been explored. In particular, the concept
network models capture feature relationships, but the kind of relationship can be
modified based on methodological or theoretical preferences. For example,
Sloman et al. (1999) describe asymmetrical dependences between features that
could be captured in directed concept networks, instead of the undirected
networks described here. Methodological variations of network construction could
reveal further insights into the representation and use of conceptual knowledge.
However, using a particular set of methodological decisions, I revealed that
variations in concept representation and use can be formally understood in terms
of the informational content and topology of concept networks. This approach
also suggests a possible way to represent feature interdependencies and
associations without appealing to “world knowledge” external to conceptual
representations themselves (Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991).
Conceptual structure can be analyzed on global and local scales. In Chapter 2, I
analyzed the global structure of each concept by exploring the structural
characteristics of a concept as a whole. In Chapters 3 and 4, I zoomed in to
examine conceptual structure on a local scale — that is, I explored how the
representation of individual features may relate to flexible concept use. These
experiments specifically explored whether probabilistic measures of feature
representation relate to flexible modulation of features in conceptual combination.
Examining the principles by which individual concepts combine into more
complex phrases can illuminate not only how the brain combines concepts but
also can reveal the key ingredients of conceptual structure. Concepts interact
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with each other in language in interesting ways: the conceptual information
activated to represent a noun concept (e.g., pumpkin) can be flexibly modulated
depending on the verbal context. One way to approach this challenge is to
observe patterns of feature activation when concepts combine (e.g., sweet
pumpkin). In Chapter 3, I explored the feature-noun relationships that influence
feature activations in combined concepts, and focused on feature surprisal and
feature uncertainty, measures developed in information theory. In an fMRI study,
eight adjective concepts (e.g., orange, sweet), eight noun concepts (e.g.,
pumpkin, cookie) and the resulting 64 adjective-noun combinations were
analyzed. A searchlight analysis was used to select voxels distributed across the
brain that were sensitive to the kinds of information targeted by the adjectives. In
these voxels, a correlational multivoxel pattern analysis was used to calculate
property activation (e.g., sweet) in nouns (e.g., pumpkin) and combinations (e.g.,
sweet pumpkin). These methods provided a way to characterize the degree to
which conceptual property information was influenced by the adjectives.
A measure of neural property modulation reflected the degree to which adjectivenoun combinations increased the activation of the adjective-denoted property.
Feature uncertainty, not feature surprisal, positively predicted the neural
modulation of conceptual features during comprehension of adjective-noun
combinations. These results suggest a more nuanced view of feature adjustment
than those provided in previous theories of combination, in which the uncertainty
of a feature is important — not (only) its strength or salience (e.g., Smith et al.,
1988). Using the network structures described in Chapter 2, it was possible to
examine local aspects of network structure — that is, how the adjective-denoted
feature nodes related to the noun concept network as a whole. The specific
comparison was between combinations in which the adjectives denoted features
in the network “core” versus “periphery”; this analysis revealed increased neural
property modulation for “periphery” properties. Taken together, these results
reveal how local feature representations influence the neural representation of
combined concepts.
The neural representations analyzed in Chapter 3 were distributed feature
representations across a range of property dimensions (i.e., material, color, taste,
texture). This view of conceptual representation is consistent with and adds to
prior work in cognitive neuroscience (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962; Haynes & Rees,
2005; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Martin et al., 1995;
Beauchamp et al., 1999; Konkle & Oliva, 2012; Lederman et al., 2001; CavinaPratesi et al., 2010; Boronat et al., 2005; Buxbaum et al., 2006). This approach
made it possible to observe how neural representations of conceptual features
are influenced in conceptual combination, but this study was not designed to
reveal the specific brain regions that might be involved.
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The goal of Chapter 4 was to further explore how the cognitive and neural
structure of conceptual knowledge affects how concepts combine in language
and thought. Following up on the findings from Chapter 3, the behavioral and
fMRI experiments in Chapter 4 tested the role of feature uncertainty in the
modulation of conceptual brightness evoked by adjective-noun combinations
(e.g., dark diamond). Explicit ratings of conceptual brightness were collected for
45 noun concepts (e.g., diamond, fur, paint, charcoal) and their “dark-” and “light” combinations, resulting in an explicit measure of conceptual brightness
modulation for each noun concept. Feature uncertainty was captured in an
entropy measure, as well as in a predictive Bayesian model of feature
modulation.
In the behavioral data, feature uncertainty (i.e., entropy) was a strong predictor of
the explicit measure of conceptual brightness change evoked by adjective-noun
combinations. This was a clear behavioral replication of the fMRI results reported
in Chapter 3: feature uncertainty relates to how conceptual information is
modulated in combined concepts. To further analyze the behavioral data, I
created a set of predictive models and compared their ability to predict behavioral
responses to combined concepts. Following approaches in distributional
semantics (e.g., Mitchell & Lapata, 2010), non-combinatorial adjective- and nounmodels were compared to two combinatorial models that made different
assumptions about how concepts combine. The first combinatorial model was a
traditional weighted-additive model, in which the predicted brightness of
combined concepts (e.g., dark diamond) was a combination of the brightness of
the noun (e.g., diamond) and adjective brightness (i.e., dark and light), the latter
weighted by a value determined through parameter optimization. The second
combinatorial model was a novel Bayesian model of conceptual combination in
which the brightness of each adjective and each noun was represented as a
probability distribution over brightness values. These distributions captured the
uncertainty of conceptual brightness in the variance of these distributions. The
predicted brightness of each combination in the Bayesian model was the
maximum a posteriori estimate of the product of the adjective and noun
distributions. Unsurprisingly, both the weighted-additive and Bayesian model
outperformed the non-combinatorial models. More importantly, the Bayesian
model outperformed the weighted-additive model in its ability to predict explicit
behavioral ratings of conceptual brightness for adjective-noun combinations. The
success of the Bayesian model further reveals the role of feature uncertainty in
the process of conceptual combination.
The fMRI study in Chapter 4 revealed the neural regions affected by feature
uncertainty in the comprehension of adjective-noun combinations. The neural
responses evoked by the concepts and combinations were observed in a priori
regions of interest based on previous work related to conceptual combination.
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Specifically, neural regions in left anterior temporal lobe (LATL), left angular
gyrus (LAG), left fusiform gyrus (LFUS), and left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) were
analyzed. Participants were exposed to the same nouns and adjective-noun
combinations while fMRI data were collected, and the univariate and multivariate
neural effects were calculated. Univariate neural effects were calculated
analogously to the explicit behavioral effects, such that a large univariate effect
indicated that mean activity in a neural region was substantially influenced by the
adjective-noun combinations, relative to the noun alone. Multivariate neural
effects were calculated by analyzing the dissimilarity of multivoxel patterns
between the combinations and the noun alone.
Univariate effects in LIFG were predicted by both feature uncertainty and the
explicit behavioral measure of brightness change. LIFG is not currently
considered an important region for conceptual combination but is known to play
an important role in figurative language comprehension (Solomon & ThompsonSchill. 2017; Cardillo et al, 2012; Bambini et al., 2011; Eviatar & Just, 2006; Lee
& Dapretto, 2006; Rapp et al., 2004, 2007; Stringaris et al., 2007). The current
results reveal this region’s sensitivity to feature uncertainty, and more generally
support the role of LIFG in flexible concept use.
Univariate effects in LATL were predicted by a combinatorial model of feature
integration (i.e., combined predictions of the additive and Bayesian models). A
post hoc analysis revealed that LATL responses were specifically predicted by
the Bayesian model. Additionally, multivariate effects in LATL correlated with the
explicit behavioral measure of conceptual brightness change. Previous work has
revealed the sensitivity of LATL to conceptual combination in general (Bemis &
Pylkkänen, 2011; 2012; 2013; Westerlund & Pylkkänen, 2014; Boylan et al.,
2015; 2017) and specifically suggests that LATL can capture representations of
combined concepts (Baron et al., 2010; Baron & Osherson, 2011). The univariate
and multivariate effects observed in LATL in the current study further support the
hypothesis that this region represents combined concepts, and additionally
suggest it is involved in the flexible modulation of conceptual features. These
fMRI findings inform cognitive neuroscience theories of conceptual combination
by highlighting the role of LIFG and LATL in the process of flexible feature
modulation during comprehension of complex language. In sum, Chapter 4
provides a set of behavioral and neuroimaging results suggesting that feature
uncertainty is a key ingredient of conceptual structure.
Questions remain about how conceptual features are represented in combined
concepts. The experiment in Chapter 3 suggests that the comprehension of
adjective-noun phrases results in modulation of conceptual features in distributed
neural regions that represent those features in isolation. However, analysis of
fMRI data in Chapter 4 revealed that a region that represented conceptual
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brightness in unmodified nouns (i.e., LFUS) did not represent the conceptual
brightness of the combinations. Further exploratory analyses suggest that other
regions of ventral visual cortex might be involved in combining visual features in
combinations (see section 4.6), but additional work exploring how features are
represented in combined concepts is needed. One possibility is that combined
concepts are represented in the same regions that represent the features in
individual concepts; another possibility is that conceptual features are
transformed in combinations and are represented in distinct neural regions (e.g.,
LATL). These questions reflect some of the core questions in the cognitive
neuroscience of conceptual knowledge (e.g., Patterson et al., 2007; Martin, 2007;
Ralph et al., 2010; Binder & Desai, 2011), further revealing the utility of
conceptual combination in the study of conceptual knowledge more broadly.
We can further ask whether the kinds of structured feature-based representations
captured in the concept networks in Chapter 2 can be observed in neural data.
Chapters 3 and 4 analyzed the modulations of individual features in adjectivenoun combinations, though it is likely that a whole suite of features were affected
in these combinations. For example, the difference between pumpkin and green
pumpkin is more than a change in color: the age or size of the pumpkin is also
likely to be modified. Methodological and theoretical developments are needed
such that we can understand how structured conceptual representations are
represented and modified in the brain.
Another open question is whether feature uncertainty (which appears to be an
important aspect of local structure) can be directly captured in feature-based
concept networks. A certain degree of correspondence was suggested in
Chapter 3, in which both feature uncertainty and core-periphery structure
predicted neural responses to combined concepts. However, there is no clear
one-to-one correspondence between feature uncertainty and any individual
aspect of network structure. Though the integration of feature uncertainty and
network models may not be necessary, linking these local and global theories of
conceptual structure would provide a more cohesive view of the relationship
between conceptual structure and flexible concept use.
An intriguing line of inquiry regards the extent to which concept network models
can predict interpretations of combined concepts. As mentioned in Chapter 2,
concept networks could be used to predict the features activated in combined
concepts using spreading activation models, or similar methods (e.g., Abbott et
al., 2015; De Deyne et al., 2016). For example, imagine a noun-noun
combination with concept A in the modifier position and concept B in the head
noun position. To generate feature predictions of combination AB, concept B
would be represented as a full feature-based network, and concept A would be
represented as a compressed vector of feature activations. This A feature-vector
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would be used as input in a spreading activation model when applied to the B
concept network. The conceptual information contained in A would spread
through the B concept network in a pattern determined by the structured feature
associations embedded in the B network. This method would likely result in
asymmetrical interpretations of combined concepts (i.e., AB would be interpreted
differently than BA), consistent with prior work (Hampton, 1988; Ortony et al.,
1985). One implication of this model is that all of the features activated by
combination AB will be present in the representation of concept B — that is, there
are no features unique to A and no “emergent” features in the combination
(Wisniewski & Gentner, 1991; Hampton, 1997). However, an important
difference between concept network models and previous feature-based
representations is the complexity of information they can contain. A networkbased representation might obviate the need to explain emergent features.
For example, Springer & Murphy (1992) compared the extent to which the
combination hard cake activated the properties inflexible, sweet, and stale.
Whereas inflexible and sweet were considered properties contained in the
adjective and noun concepts respectively, stale was considered to be an
emerging property of the combination and not contained in either of the
constituent concepts. The authors reported that combination properties (e.g.,
stale) were accessed more quickly than noun properties (e.g., sweet), and argue
that a spreading activation model cannot explain these findings. Concept network
models include strong and weak features for a concept and their associations
across multiple sub-concepts: it is thus possible that a cake concept network
would include stale as a feature, and that this feature would be activated by the
hard cake combination, even if it is not typically true of cakes. In this case, an
explanation of emergent features would not be necessary, and a spreading
activation model might suffice.
In sum, the work contained in this thesis explored the global and local aspects of
conceptual structure that relate to how concepts are flexibly used in language
and thought. The global structure of feature-based concept network models
relates to text-based and empirical measures of conceptual flexibility, and a local
measure of feature uncertainty relates to how conceptual information is flexibly
modulated in combined concepts in both behavioral and neural data. Integrating
classical theories of conceptual knowledge with more recent computational
approaches can help illuminate the relationships between conceptual structure
and flexible concept use.
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